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PREFACE

In July 1994 a conference on the subject of Orality and Literacy in Ancient Greece was held at the University of Tasmania in Australia. The conference, which was devised and organised by Ian Worthington, was a response to a burgeoning interest in the subject of how oral or how literate Greek culture was. The interdisciplinary nature of the conference (and in some cases its cross-cultural aspect too) was so well received that further conferences followed on a biennial basis: University of Natal, South Africa (1996), Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand (1998), University of Missouri-Columbia, USA (2000) and the University of Melbourne, Australia (2002). The sixth in the series will be held at the University of Winnipeg in Canada in July 2004 on the theme of the Politics of Orality. Whilst all of these conferences differed in size and character, the common themes and interests have been sustained and enhanced. It is fair to say therefore that the conference series is now a well established international forum for scholars with an interest in orality and literacy. And all this has come about, appropriately, through word of mouth (with some help from modern technology).

This volume is made up of papers presented at the University of Melbourne conference in July 2002. In the early stages of organising the conference I had anticipated, and to some extent feared, being swamped with offers of papers from one or two specific areas of the study of Greek antiquity, to the exclusion of many other important areas. In fact the eventual conference programme, and I think this volume resulting from it, show that a diversity of interests and approaches still characterises the Orality conference. The conference papers were given by scholars working in Britain, the USA, Israel, Canada, South Africa, New Zealand, and Australia. They covered areas as diverse as papyri, Homer and the epic cycle, epigraphy, oratory, ancient lives, lyric, the novel, Greek and Roman drama, vase painting, philosophy, Modern Greek studies, and others. One aspect of this inter-disciplinary combination was that specialists in one area often provided particularly useful responses to those in other research areas. I think it is fair to say that participants went away well pleased, not just with the papers themselves, but with the atmosphere of friendliness and collegiality that has always characterised these conferences.

I would like to acknowledge gratefully the support of the University of Melbourne (Faculty of Arts and School of Fine Arts, Classics and Archaeology) which contributed both moral and financial support. I am also very grateful to Deborah Thomas, Professor Ian Worthington, Dr Elizabeth Minchin, Ms. Annabel Orchard, Dr Chris Gribbin, Mr James Stratford. In addition, I would like to thank the contributors for their patience, and also Michiel Klein Swormink at Brill for all his assistance.

As far as style and formatting are concerned I have followed the *exempla* of the previous volumes. All dates in the book are BC unless otherwise indicated. There is a variability in the use of English and American spellings. And authors have the indulgence of spelling ancient Greek names as they prefer.

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THE MODESTY OF HOMER

Ruth Scodel

This paper will argue that Homeric epic generally treats other epic traditions respectfully rather than competitively. This should not be surprising, but recent scholarship has strongly emphasized the agonistic aspects of archaic Greek poetry. Homerists trained in oral theory have, of course, paid rich attention to the ways that meaning in epic depends on the contexts made available to poet and audience by all the performances that have gone before.[1] Scholars' awareness of the traditionality of meaning has led them to argue that Homeric poetry does not simply make meaning by its relationship to tradition. It is self-conscious in its relationship to its own sources and its own place within the tradition. Its versions are not just one of many possible versions. Homeric epic deliberately varies and adapts, so that it is meta-epic, an implicit commentary on its sources.[2] This argument is plausible, but since Greek culture was in general profoundly competitive, interpreters tend to assume that this self-conscious relationship with the tradition must be agonistic. Yet the rhetoric of the epics not only avoids overt competition with earlier poetry, but suggests that Homer, like his heroes, identifies himself as seeking a place in a canon. In many passages, the poet almost announces the inferiority of his own subjects relative to others by having his characters admit their inferiority relative to earlier heroes, even though they also see themselves as worthy of epic memory.

[1] The inherited context of epic is especially the emphasis of J.M. Foley, *Homer's Traditional Art* (University Park, 1999) ('traditional referentiality'), and G. Nagy, *The Best of the Achaeans* (Baltimore, 1979). I have argued elsewhere that the Homeric poems do not require extensive knowledge of earlier songs of their audiences: 'Pseudo-Intimacy and the Prior Knowledge of the Homeric Audience', *Arethusa* 30 (1997), 201–19; *Listening to Homer* (Ann Arbor 2002), 90–123. However, I did not mean to suggest that the *ideal* audience does not have rich experience.

[2] See M. Finkelberg, 'The Sources of *Iliad* 7', *Colby Quarterly* 37 (2002), 159–61; cf. K. Dowden, 'Homer's sense of text', *JHS* 116 (1996), 47–61. For the *Odyssey*, see R. Martin, 'Telemachus and the Last Hero Song', *Colby Quarterly* 29 (1993), 222–40. I. Malkin, *The Returns of Odysseus. Colonization and Ethnicity* (Berkeley, 1998), shows the importance of alternative *Odysseys* for establishing both Greek and non-Greek identities in the Early Iron Age.

R. Martin argues that the poet, like his characters, competes by telling 'in more detail, about more topics.' Indeed, he seeks to 'obliterate' other performances.[3] Others see competing claims to truth in early epic, and their interpretations emphasize passages of overt polemic. So, for example, many see the 'lies like truth' of the Muses in the proem of Hesiod's *Theogony* as marking Hesiod's assertion of the superiority of his own kind of poetry over heroic epic.[4] Polemic evidently existed. The opening of the Homeric *Hymn to Dionysus*, for example, where the poet dismisses the claims of various locations to be the god's birthplace, has a strong agonistic element. Since rivalry with other poets must have been a basic condition of poetic production—as Hesiod's proverb, 'beggar begrudges beggar, and bard, bard' (*WD* 26) implies— it seems only appropriate to look for more subtle polemic where competitiveness is less overt.[5] The Homeric poems, in such a view, implicitly claim superiority both to other traditions, while the *Odyssey*, or its tradition, is in contention with the *Iliad*ic tradition or the *Iliad* itself.[6] While Andrew Ford has pointed out that the poems themselves almost entirely suppress the reality of poetic competition or even interaction, for him this is a denial of lateness and thus a competitive gesture.[7]

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[3] R. Martin, *The Language of Heroes* (Ithaca, 1989), 238–39. The index of G. Danek, *Epos und Zitat. Studien zur den Quellen der Odyssee. Wiener Studien*, Beiheft 22 (1998), has eighteen entries for 'Konkurrenz, poetische' (525).

[4] Homeric poetry as the 'lies like truth': A. Kambylis, *Die Dichterwiehe und ihre Symbolik* (Heidelberg 1965), 63; H. Maehler, *Die Auffassung des Dichterberufs im frühen Griechentum bis zur Zeit Pindars* (Göttingen, 1965), 40–42; W. Verdenius, 'Notes on the Proem of Hesiod's Theogony', *Mnemosyne* 25 (1972), 225–60, especially 234; P. Murray, 'Poetic Inspiration in early Greece', *JHS* 101 (1981), 87–100, 91; E. Bowie, 'Lies, Fiction, and Slander in Early Greek Poetry', in *Lies and Fiction in the Ancient World*, ed. C. Gill and T.P. Wiseman (Austin, 1993), 21–22; earlier bibliography in G. Lanata, *Poetica pre-platonica* (Florence, 1963), 24–25.

[5] On poetic competitiveness in general, see M. Griffith, 'Contest and Contradiction in Early Greek Poetry', in *The Cabinet of the Muses*, ed. M. Griffith and D. Mastronarde (Atlanta, 1990), 185–205.

[6] F. Jacoby, 'Die geistige Physiognomie der Odyssee', *Die Antike* 9 (1933), 159–94, especially 161 (a 'conscious rivalry' with the *Iliad*); W.G. Thalmann, *Conventions of Form and thought in Early Greek Epic Poetry* (Baltimore, 1984), 157–84 (arguing that the *Odyssey* defines itself and its hero by competition with the *Iliad*, but does not necessarily ask that its claim of superiority be taken seriously); Nagy, *Best of the Achaeans*, 35–41; A. Edwards, *Achilles in the* Odyssey, Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie 171 (Königstein, 1985); K. Usener, *Beobachtungen zum Verhalten der Odyssee zur Ilias*, Scripta Oralia 21 (Tübingen, 1990), 205–7.

[7] A. Ford, *Homer: the Poetry of the Past.* (Ithaca 1992), 94–117. Ford is strongly influenced by Harold Bloom's *The Anxiety of Influence*, and sees Homer as the 'strong poet' who seeks to overcome his predecessors by presenting his poem as early rather than late.

There is no question that an agonistic attitude is important in archaic poetry, and the Homeric poems are surely the product of a desire to outperform others. Still, claims that other versions are false are not actually as common in archaic poetry as the ubiquity of rival versions might lead us to expect. They appear when the difference among versions has moral or political weight.[8] Nowhere does a poet claim that a traditional story about one hero is better than an unrelated story about another, only that one is more appropriate to a particular occasion. The common *aporia*-motif implies that there are many attractive possibilities, and that the poet regrets that he must choose. One is most appropriate now, but all are worthwhile. In the epic, where the genre does not permit overt polemic, and so traces of competition must be subtle, an emphasis on such traces disguises how often the epics make overt gestures of deference towards other traditions.

Archaic and classical Greek works frequently stress the magnitude of their themes, because theme and expression are assumed to match each other, so that if the poet is competent enough, the greater hero will always have the best song. Claims about the importance of the subject are also claims about the work. The two mirror each other. Yet Homeric epic, although it certainly has totalizing, hegemonic qualities, also, even as it appropriates other traditions, acknowledges their excellence and even superiority. The epics do not usually criticize other heroes and traditions. Instead, assuming that heroic glory is not a zero-sum contest, they place their own heroes within a traditional canon that has room for them all.[9] Although they insist that their heroes and stories deserve attention, they do not claim that other songs are unworthy.

The *Odyssey* does not even imply, less alone declare, that its hero is the best hero in any absolute sense. Instead, it claims—even this tentatively—that he is the most fortunate, the most deserving of *makarismos* (and fittingly celebrated also for his cunning). The *Odyssey* does not thereby claim to be the best poem, since there is no traditional association between the excellence of a song and whether its hero is happy, or most deserving of emulation. In fact, since struggle and suffering are the usual themes of song, this claim is potentially paradoxical. If

[8] See L. Pratt, *Lying and Poetry from Homer to Pindar* (Ann Arbor, 1993), esp. 115–16, 131–56.

[9] Even the competition of heroes with their contemporaries is not zero-sum, as D. Cairns has pointed out (*Aidos* [Oxford, 1993] 56 n. 42 94 n. 141).

Odysseus were too fortunate, he would not be worth singing about. Insofar as Odysseus is fortunate because of his *arete* and because Athena loves him, his story has a powerful claim to corresponding excellence; but this claim does not take a form that would detract from the claims of other heroes and their stories. Instead, the poem stakes out its own territory—effectively implying that its genre is not the same as the *Iliad*'s—without criticizing other songs.

For Homer's rivalry with other traditions, a comparison among Homer, Herodotus, and Thucydides is instructive. The proems of both *Iliad* and *Odyssey* stress the magnitude of the subject at hand: Achilles' wrath brought *innumerable* sufferings, and sent to Hades *many* mighty souls, ἣ *μυρί'* Ἀχαιοῖς ἄλγε' ἔθηκε· *πολλὰς* ἰφθίμους ψυχὰς ... (*Iliad* 1.2–3). The *Odyssey* is even more insistent:

> ...*πολλὰ* / πλάγχθη, ἐπεὶ Τροίης ἱερὸν πτολίεθρον ἔπερσε· / *πολλῶν* δ' ἀνθρώπων ἴδεν ἄστεα καὶ νόον ἔγνω, / *πολλὰ* δ' ὅ γ' ἐν πόντῳ πάθεν ἄλγεα ὃν κατὰ θυμόν (1.1–5)
>
> ... [who] wandered *much*, after he sacked the holy citadel of Troy. He saw the cities of *many* men and learned their minds, on the sea he suffered *many* griefs in his heart

While these proems thereby point not only to the length of the poem to come (since no brief performance could accommodate this mass of material), but also its importance, they are remarkable for the absence of hyperbole. The poet in no way suggests that no other hero ever had an anger so devastating, or that no one wandered and suffered as much as Odysseus.

Homer is hyperbolic about the magnitude of his subject only in the *recusatio* of the proem of the Catalogue of Ships (2.484–93); the number of Achaeans is beyond speech, and the poet will therefore not attempt it.[10] Many times Homeric characters say that particular events, deeds, or heroes will win *kleos* or deserve to be remembered. Such events are essential to the overall outcomes of the plot and to the stories to which the plots belong.[11] They are not, however, greater than all other

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[10] Martin, *Language of Heroes*, 223–25, argues that Achilles is Homer-like at *Iliad* 9.379, when he says he could not be persuaded if Agamemnon gave him ten or twenty times as many gifts. Homer's hyperbole, however, accepts human limits; Achilles uses a similar trope to deny limits.

[11] M. Finkelberg, *The Birth of Literary Fiction in Ancient Greece* (Oxford, 1998), 73–85, discusses all the examples and shows that 'historical' importance is their common feature.

deeds or events, because there is no attempt to create a hierarchy of stories. When Agamemnon offers his daughter in marriage to Achilles, he promises more gifts than anyone has ever given with his daughter (9.147–48)—but he will, of course, never actually give these marriage-gifts.

Herodotus' rhetoric is not unlike Homer's. At the beginning, he defines his topic as great and wonderful accomplishments, ἔργα μεγάλά τε καὶ θωμαστά, and so accepts the association of an important *logos* with important subjects. Later, indeed, he says that he will examine small cities as well as great ones, because greatness is subject to vicissitude:

> ... going equally through small and great cites of human beings. For most of those that were great long ago have become small. Those that were great in my time, formerly were small. Therefore, recognizing that human prosperity never stays in the same place, I shall mention both alike. (1.5.3–4)

He feels the need, apparently, to apologize for sometimes treating what might appear to be small places. At the same time, he does not seem to feel any need to argue that other, earlier topics were any less great or wonderful. He is not overtly competitive.

Thucydides, by contrast, devotes considerable space and energy to demonstrating not just that the Peloponnesian War was important and worthy of study, but that it was the biggest war ever, more significant than the Persian War or the Trojan War. He began to write, he says

> Expecting that it would be *great* and most worthy of being narrated of those that had occurred up to this time, basing this conclusion on the fact that both sides were at the highest level in every kind of preparation, and seeing the rest of the Greek world attaching itself to one side or another, some doing so immediately, others considering it. For this was the *greatest* disturbance among the Greeks and a significant number of non-Greeks—practically among the *most numerous* part of humanity. (1.1–1.2)

Earlier cities and their deeds, he extensively argues, were on a lesser scale: 'Those that took place before them and those from remote times ... I do not believe were great' (1.3; cf.1.21.2).[12] Thucydides is the author of a single book on a single subject, and he confronts an incipient

[12] Scholars have discussed Thucydides' polemic here, but they have given relatively little attention to why he conducts it about the *scale* of events. C. Macleod, *Collected*

canon (Herodotus, Hellenicus) within which he fights for his position. Therefore, even though he argues that the stability of human nature guarantees the value of his work (1.22.4), which would surely imply that even small matters could be worthy of attention for their exemplary value, he does not rely on this paradigmatic value for his assertion that his book is important. Instead, accepting the conventional association between the importance of the subject and the importance of the corresponding account, he insists that his subject is, indeed, greater than all others.

Homer is not Thucydidean. The *Iliad* proem insists only that the wrath of Achilles caused an immense number of griefs, μυρί' ... ἄλγε' (1.2). The *Odyssey* is even more restrained, stating only that the hero's wanderings were 'many' (πολλά, 1.2). There are no claims, explicit or implicit, that these griefs or wanderings were more than any others, ever. In fact, his heroes acknowledge the greatness of their predecessors. The Homeric narrator, to be sure, does not compare his heroes to their own predecessors in his own voice, whether positively or negatively, though he does repeatedly stress that they were stronger than his own contemporaries. Heroes in the *Iliad*, however, do not claim to be the best within the tradition. Of course, they compete vehemently with each other. It is not only Achilles and Agamemnon who quarrel; Idomeneus and his own *therapon* Meriones are evidently in competition with each other, for example (13.246–94). Within the *Iliad*, Homer offers a ranking in his own voice, straightforwardly stating that Achilles was best, Ajax second (2.768–69).

However, nothing in the poem suggests that its overall topic is better than others. The only allusion to poetic competition is the *Iliad* implies that bards need to show some restraint in their competitiveness. The short narrative about how Thamyris said that he could defeat even the Muses in song (2.594–600), who lamed him and deprived him of song, shows the dangers that bards, like others, can extend their urge to primacy too far. Too be sure, this passage has been read as evidence for Homer's competitiveness with other traditions. Thamyris met the Muses as he came from Eurytus' city, Oechalia, and R. Martin has suggested that this detail implies that the poetic tradition of the Sack of Oechalia is impaired by Thamyris' loss of song, so that the

Essays. (Oxford, 1983), 153, points out how in the Funeral Oration (2.64.3), Thucydides' Pericles repeats the word μεγίστη, 'greatest.'

poet here points to the superiority of his own tradition.[13] The Homeric poet, however, never acknowledges that he depends on tradition for his material. The Muses provide it directly.[14] Thamyris' failure thus says nothing about the story of Oechalia. Instead, perhaps, the mention of Oechalia associates the god-challenging singer with god-challenging heroes, for both Eurytus and Heracles, the sacker of Oechalia, challenged Apollo in archery (*Odyssey* 8.224–25). The poet may thus have in mind a Thamyris who resembles Ovid's Arachne in not just challenging gods, but in simultaneously using narrative material that they resent (*Met.* 6.103–28). If there is an implicit criticism of the Sack of Oechalia as a subject of song, therefore, it is not directed at the accuracy of the tradition, but at telling the story in a way that is offensive to the gods.

More fundamentally, the anecdote points to a basic limit in the poet's possibilities of polemic against other poetic subjects. As the proem to the Catalogue of Ships stresses (*Iliad* 2. 484–86), the Muses possess all possible knowledge, as no mortal can do. The poet must be somewhat humbled even in respect to his competition with other mortals by his recognition that he cannot master the entire possible repertory, while the Muses guard it all. Too much praise of his own subject would risk offending them.

Many familiar passages show how Homeric heroes accept the excellence of the protagonists of other songs. Athena/Mentes urges Telemachus to emulate Orestes, who has achieved fame among all humanity (*Odyssey* 1.298–300). When the character praises Orestes, the narrator reminds his audience of the continuing glory of this hero, whom he has already mentioned at 1.30.[15] While Telemachus certainly achieves heroic standing in the poem, it is not entirely clear that he reaches the level of an Orestes—that an independent *Telemachy* could ever have had the popularity of an *Oresteia*. Athena's praise is thus potentially praise of a song different from this one.

Paradigmatic tales often imply an *a fortiori* argument. The heroes of former times were greater than those 'now', and they are therefore to be imitated. Nestor explicitly says that he is the survivor of an era of greater heroes than his contemporaries, and that their opponents, the Centaurs, were mightier than his contemporaries' opponents. Overtly,

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13 Martin, *Language of Heroes*, 228–30.

14 R. Scodel, 'Bardic Performance and Oral Tradition in Homer', *AJP* 119 (1998), 171–94.

15 See Danek, *Epos und Zitat*, 40–41.

he is explaining why Agamemnon and Achilles should listen to him, since mightier heroes than they did so:

> Those were the mightiest of heroes who have been nurtured on the earth. They were mightiest and they fought with the mightiest, the mountain-dwelling beats, and destroyed them violently. And I mingled with them, having come from Pylos, from a far-off, distant place. For they themselves summoned me. And I fought along with them on my own. With those men nobody could fight among men who are now alive on the earth. (*Iliad* 1.266–72)

Implicitly, he may be trivializing Achilles' and Agamemnon's dispute about who is superior in the here-and-now by reminding them that neither can be as great as these heroes of the past. Even though Agamemnon and Achilles are the best of the Greeks at counsel and fighting (258—an obvious piece of flattery, since in counsel Nestor far surpasses them both), Nestor says that he has never seen such heroes as these and never will (262). When he says that no present mortals are their equals, he echoes the language the narrator uses to contrast his own contemporaries with the heroes of the *Iliad* (5.304, 12.449, 20.287).[16]

When the heroes are initially hesitant to accept Hector's challenge to single combat, Nestor evokes Peleus, who was impressed when he heard their genealogies but would be so deeply disappointed by their present timidity that he would pray for death: the heroes are failing to live up to the excellence of their ancestors (7.124–31). Although seven men then answer the challenge, their response cannot entirely cancel the effect of this speech. To be sure, Nestor surely chooses Peleus to represent the older generation in order to imply that Achilles would not hesitate to fight Hector, so that there may be a single exception to the present generation's inferiority. Nonetheless, the overall impression is one of decline.

Achilles seems to accept that Heracles was a greater hero than himself, for he was dearest to Zeus:

> Not even the mighty Heracles escaped the death-demon, the one who was dearest to the lord Zeus; but fate overcame him, and the harsh anger of Hera. (18.117–19)

The emphatic οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδέ, 'not even', marks the implicit *a fortiori* of the motif of consolation, explicit when Achilles tells Lycaon that he

[16] Nestor's authority is beyond question; see M. Alden, *Homer beside Himself: Para-Narratives in the Iliad* (Oxford, 2000), 74–111, and N. Austin, 'The Function of Digressions in the *Iliad*', *GRBS* 7 (1966), 295–312.

should not lament his imminent death (21.106–13): after all, Patroclus has died, who was better than Lycaon, and Achilles himself will die, too. If Heracles was not at least the equal of Achilles, Heracles' death is no reason for Achilles to accept his own mortality.

There is, of course, a rule-testing exception to the pattern of heroes' acceptance that earlier heroic generations were greater than themselves. Sthenelus replies passionately to Agamemnon's rebuke of Diomedes, which compares Diomedes unfavorably with his father Tydeus: 'It was not dear to Tydeus to cower like this, but rather to fight with his enemies far out in front of his dear companions.' Sthenelus insists that the Epigoni are greater than their fathers were, since they took Thebes, while their fathers failed:

> Son of Atreus, do not tell falsehoods when you know how to speak the truth. We claim to be much better than our fathers. We actually took the citadel of seven-gated Troy leading a smaller army beneath a more powerful wall, obeying the portents of the gods and the help of Zeus: But they perished by their own recklessness (4.404–10)

Strikingly, however, he does not say that he and his comrades succeeded because they were better in battle, but because they obeyed the portents of the gods, while their fathers had attacked although the gods did not support them. In saying this success makes them 'better', Sthenelus is using a 'persuasive definition.'

Sthenelus is himself a relatively minor hero, while his father Capaneus—the most impious of the Seven throughout the tradition—is a far more significant figure. Capaneus is a frequent topic precisely because of his awesome defiance of the gods and consequent dramatic death by the thunderbolt. The heroes who are the greatest topics of song are usually those who are closest to the gods, whether in enmity or love. In describing the success of the Epigoni as the result of their confidence in divine favor, though, Sthenelus does not imply that the Epigoni were extraordinary recipients of divine favor, who would thus be unequivocally better than their fathers. He avoids grandiose claims. Furthermore, Diomedes rebukes his companion on the grounds that Agamemnon is right to rouse his troops, though when Agamemnon himself shows cowardice, Diomedes shows that he too resents Agamemnon's insult (9.34–36). Diomedes himself uses his father's greatness as a source of his own authority (14.110–32).

Athena also rebukes Diomedes as inferior to his father:

> Truly, Tydeus begot a son little like himself. Tydeus was small in build, but a warrior. And once I forbade him to make war, and to throw himself

> into battle, when he came, without the Achaeans, as a messenger to Thebes, so that he was among many Cadmeians. They urged him to dine at peace in their halls. But he, having that mighty spirit he had had previously, challenged the young men of the Cadmeians, and defeated everyone easily. Such a helper I was to him. But you—I stand by you and protect you, and I bid you eagerly fight the Trojans. But you—either rushing exhaustion has entered your limbs, or maybe spiritless fear holds you. So then, you are not the son of Tydeus, the fierce-minded son of Oeneus. (5.800–13)

Here, as often, exceptional divine favor is linked with exceptional heroism; Diomedes, however, lacks either strength or courage to use the divine help offered. The goddess' reproach is unfair, as Diomedes' reply shows, for he has held back only because she herself told him to fight with no gods other than Aphrodite. Diomedes is in the midst of a spectacular *aristeia*. Still, the poet consistently evokes an earlier generation of heroes who were less cautious than those he himself sings. Dione consoles Aphrodite with a catalogue of gods who suffered at the hands of mortals, and a warning that Diomedes may suffer a similar fate (5.381–415). Diomedes himself, though only a direct warning from Apollo makes him end his attack on the divinely-protected Aeneas (5.433), soon reverts to the more careful style of a Homeric hero and tells the story of Lycurgus. Patroclus similarly refuses to fight Apollo (16.710–11), while Achilles expresses his resentment that he cannot take vengeance on the god (22.20). Homer's heroes reach the limits of human daring, but do not quite cross them.

Strikingly, the *Odyssey* once does proclaim its subject superior to all others, but this claim is made not for the hero, but for Penelope. Antinous complains of her in the assembly:

> And cunning tricks, such as do not hear that any woman ever performed, even those of old, those who were beautiful-haired Achaean women in the past—Tyro, Alcmene, Mycene of the lovely crown. None of these knew ideas like Penelope's ... (2.118–22)

Although Odysseus refers to his own fame for cunning (*Odyssey* 9.19–20), probably with the implication that he is the most cunning man alive, he does not compare himself to earlier cunning heroes. The narrator implies that Odysseus' skills are inherited from his grandfather Autolycus, who surpassed all human beings in theft and oath-taking through the beneficence of Hermes (19.398–95). In this case, Odysseus' skills seem to be wider and more impressive than his grandfather's, just as the divinity who helps him, Athena, is more powerful than

Hermes. She says at 13.299 that she is famous among all the gods for intelligence and schemes; this is surely an implicit claim to superiority. She adds that Odysseus surpasses all mortals in planning and speaking (13.297–98). That Odysseus is best in this respect of all his contemporaries seems plain enough, and no hero of the past is ever cited who could equal him. Yet while Penelope is overtly called the most cunning heroine known from tradition, Odysseus does not receive such an explicit evaluation. To be sure, Athena says that another man would have rushed home to see his wife and children (13.333–34), and Odysseus complains that another woman would not hold away from her husband when he returned in the twentieth year (23.168–70). It is easy for the hearer to apply these generalizations, not only to the speakers' contemporaries, but to all humanity. Odysseus and Penelope probably excel all other mortals, past and present, in controlling their impulses in order to act with cunning. The poet, though, does not quite say so.

Of bowmanship, Odysseus says straightforwardly that, while he was inferior to his own contemporary Philoctetes, he would not even compete with the great archers of the past, Heracles or Eurytus:

> Only Philoctetes was superior to me with the bow, in the country of the Trojans, when we Achaeans shot with the bow. I declare that I am much better than all other grain-eating mortals who are now alive. I have no desire to compete against former heroes, not with Heracles nor Eurytus of Oechalia, who used to compete even against immortals in archery. Therefore great Eurytus died quickly, and he did not reach old age in his halls. For Apollo in anger killed him, because he challenged him to a shooting contest. (8.219–25)

Since Odysseus' skill with the bow is so crucial to the plot, this is not a trivial concession. His bow was a guest-gift from Eurytus' son Iphitus, killed by Heracles soon after (21.13–38), so that he is closely linked with these heroes even as he accepts their superiority. These heroes' closeness to the gods is hostile rather than friendly; in Odysseus' version, Apollo killed Eurytus (226–28). Like Sthenelus, Odysseus rejects the earlier heroes' willingness to fight against gods. The poet also implies that Odysseus, unlike Heracles, respected the sacred ties of guest-friendship.[17] Unlike Sthenelus, however, Odysseus does not say

[17] See I. F. de Jong, *A Narratological Commentary on the Odyssey* (Cambridge, 2001), 506–8.

that his greater respect for the gods makes him 'better' than they; on the contrary, he implies that their impiety was the natural corollary of their excellence.[18]

Circe in effect says that Jason was a greater hero than Odysseus.

> The only sea-crossing ship to pass through there was the Argo, known to everyone, sailing from Aietes. And in fact the sea would quickly have thrown that ship against the great cliffs; but Hera conveyed it past, since Jason was dear to her [ἐπεὶ φίλος ἦεν Ἰήσων] (12.69–72)

Odysseus will not be able to sail through the Planctae, and must choose another route. The Argonaut's feat is inimitable. Here again, the unsurpassable heroic action is based on exceptional love from a god.

Odysseus himself, of course, has extraordinary divine support, but it is lacking during the Adventures. Since having good relations with the gods is typically a point on which Odysseus and the *Iliad*-heroes are greater than their predecessors, his inability to match Jason because he lacks divine help is striking. Odysseus, of course, angers Poseidon, and his men bring the wrath of Helius on themselves. The poet seem to be aiming at a careful balance that will sufficiently motivate Poseidon's anger, and Zeus' acquiescence in it, without making the hero an antagonist of the gods like Locrian Ajax.[19] Instead, he stresses Athena's help where he can. Nestor compares Athena's help for Odysseus only to other instances he knows from personal experience:

> For I never saw the gods showing their affection so openly, as Pallas Athena openly stood beside that man. (3.221–23)

Since Nestor is so old, this remark extends Odysseus' closeness to the goddess beyond his own contemporaries, but it is still only the closest another man has seen. There is no claim that Athena loved him more than a god has ever loved anyone, or more than this goddess has loved anyone.

Heroes acknowledge inferiority in specific areas even relative to their peers, as Achilles admits at *Iliad* 18.105–6 that while he is best at fighting, others are superior in council. Odysseus makes this very point back to him:

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[18] Ford, *Poetry of the Past*, 98–99 discusses this analogy, but thinks that the *Iliad*-poet, because he ignores his predecessors, is hybristic.

[19] I think that R. Friedrich, 'The Hybris of Odysseus' *JHS* 111 (1991), 16–28, is basically right that 9.525 is the moment Odysseus goes too far, but overstates Odysseus' offense.

> Achilles, son of Peleus, by far mightiest of Achaeans, you are more powerful and mightier than I am by no small amount with the spear. But I would exceed you in thought by a great deal, since I am older and I know more. Therefore, let your heart put up with my advice.
>
> (*Iliad* 19.216–2●)

Such arguments and admissions do not lower the hero's overall claims to heroic standing. When a hero boasts that he is best in one field, he still allows others also their own justified claims in others.[20] This qualification of the boast makes it more plausible and acceptable. This generosity towards contemporaries thus emphasizes the heroes' underlying competitiveness. Even from the poet's point of view, as characters in the same songs they would directly compete for his attention and praise. Heroes of different generations, however, do not need to compete so directly, because the tradition has room for them all, and the heroes of earlier stories provide exempla by which to measure and understand the heroes of the tale at hand. Achilles and Odysseus do not need to displace Jason and Heracles. Odysseus does not need to displace Achilles, either. For the *Odyssey*, Achilles is already canonical.[21]

Ajax is the rule-testing exception. Ajax in the Underworld is still angry over the arms of Achilles. The Contest of the Arms was not a contest in one heroic quality or another, but in general superiority, between contemporaries. Ajax' anger at losing is not surprising for a living hero fighting for his *timê*; what makes his anger remarkable is that it survives his death. Odysseus-as-narrator acknowledges that Ajax was best after Achilles in both looks and deeds, *erga*, (11.550–51), and wishes that he himself had not won such a victory. His wish, however, could as easily imply that no such contest had ever taken place as that he would prefer that Ajax have won it. He does not quite acknowledge that Ajax was more deserving of the arms, since he implicitly continues to claim superiority in counsel. Instead he presents the contest from

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[20] Nagy, *Best of the Achaeans*, 45: 'these words are used of or by a hero to express his superiority in a given area of heroic endeavor'; cf. L. Muellner, *The Meaning of Homeric εὔχομαι through its Formulas* (Innsbruck, 1976), 79–83.

[21] I do not agree with Nagy, *Best of the Achaeans* 42–58, that *Odyssey* 8.72–82 reflect an epic tradition of enmity between Achilles and Odysseus, and so an old tradition of competition between their traditions. The quarrel is meaningful precisely because Achilles and Odysseus are traditionally friends. On this passage, see W. Marg, 'Das erste Lied von Demodocus', in *Navicula Chilionensis. Festschrift Felix Jacoby* (Leiden 1956), 16–29; J.S. Clay, *Wrath of Athena* (Princeton, 1983), 96–103; O. Taplin, 'The Earliest Quotation of the *Iliad*?' in *Owls to Athens: Essays on Classical Stubjects Presented to Sir Kenneth Dover*, ed. E.M. Craik (Oxford 1990), 109–12.

an epic, retrospective viewpoint from which the participants need no longer compete, since both are securely within the story. His address to Ajax concedes nothing about the merits:

> Such a tower of defence for them, you perished. And we Achaeans grieved without stopping for your death as much as we did for the life of Achilles, son of Peleus. And no one else was responsible, but Zeus extraordinarily hated the army of Danaan spear-fighters, and he laid fate upon you. (11.556–60)

By referring to the will of Zeus, praising Ajax formally, and reminding Ajax of the grief of the Achaeans (equal to that for Achilles!), Odysseus tries to persuade Ajax to see the Judgment of the Arms as he himself does, as a tragic story whose placement in the epic canon will give both heroes their due. Even dead, Ajax does not see himself as a figure of epic whose place in song is secure, but as someone who must still contend for his position.

The *Iliad* does set its hero in direct contrast with the *Iliad*'s when it comes to blessedness, however.[22] Odysseus in the Underworld declares Achilles most blessed of all men:

> Achilles, no man in the past was more blessed then you, nor will any be in the future. For before, when you were alive, we honored you equally with the gods, and now that you are here, you are a great ruler among the dead. So do not be upset that you are dead, Achilles. (11. 482–86)

Odysseus does not confine himself here to his own experience, but claims that Achilles is the most fortunate, even among those not yet born. Achilles, of course, rejects the blessing, insisting that he would rather be alive as the hired hand of a poor man than rule the dead (487–91). Implicitly, he thus prefers Odysseus' fate to his own—although Odysseus, too, is mortal, so that this preference may not be permanent: once Odysseus dies, he may lose his superiority to Achilles. While the *Iliad* (or Odysseus) thus makes it possible for Odysseus to 'win' against Achilles by placing him within a competition for 'most blessed', the grounds on which Odysseus blesses Achilles still mark his heroic superiority. Achilles was deservedly most honored in life and death.

In the second Nekyuia, Achilles and Agamemnon compare their fates. Achilles contrasts Zeus' apparent affection for Agamemnon with Agamemnon's wretched death (24.24–34). Agamemnon answers: ὄλβιε Πηλέος υἱέ, θεοῖς ἐπιείκελ', Ἀχιλλεῦ, / ὃς ἔθανες ἐν Τροίῃ ἑκὰς Ἄργε-

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[22] See S. Dova, 'Who is μακάρτατος in the *Odyssey*?' *HSCP* 100 (2000), 53–65.

ος (24.36). This death far from home, which ought to be a source of sadness, is in fact the basis of Agamemnon's *makarismos* of Achilles in contrast to himself (since he died at home, but miserably). Agamemnon details the extraordinary honor Achilles received in death, and comments on his everlasting fame. 'For you were very dear to the gods', he says (24.92). After Agamemnon hears Amphimedon's account of the slaughter of the suitors, however, he delivers a parallel *makarismos* for Odysseus, beginning ὄλβιε Λαέρταο πάϊ, πολυμήχαν' Ὀδυσσεῦ, / ἦ ἄρα σὺν μεγάλῃ ἀρετῇ ἐκτήσω ἄκοιτιν, 'Blessed son of Laertes, much-contriving Odysseus, truly it was with great excellence that you obtained a wife' (24.192–93)...

> How noble was the mind in blameless Penelope, daughter of Icarius. How well she remembered Odysseus, her wedded husband. Therefore fame of her excellence will never perish for her, but the immortals will make a delightful song for those on the earth for the benefit of sensible Penelope, not as the daughter of Tyndareus ... (*Odyssey* 24.194–99)

The promise of fame seems to be for Penelope rather than Odysseus, though the pronouns are ambiguous.[23] Within the context of such a *makarismos*, however, there is no rivalry for fame between husband and wife; the wife is famous precisely for 'remembering' her husband—her glory is defined by her preservation of his.

Agamemnon blesses both Achilles and Odysseus. Insofar as the blessings are neatly parallel, the two heroes are equal. Achilles' rejection of Odysseus' own hyperbolic *makarismos*, however, surely tips the balance. Both Achilles, whose death was supremely glorious, and Odysseus, who has achieved both heroic glory and a successful return, are blessed compared to Agamemnon; but in the terms of this poem, Odysseus is more fortunate.

Even this good fortune, though, is not expressed hyperbolically, and it has distinct limits. At the opening of 24, Odysseus is implicitly a victorious athlete and a bridegroom, both appropriately objects of *makarismos*.[24] Yet when he goes to bed with Penelope, they talk about the wanderings he is yet to undertake, and Penelope comments cautiously that if the gods indeed provide them with a better old age, they have hope

[23] M.A. Katz, *Penelope's Renown.* (Princeton, 1991), 20–21, summarizes differing views. While I take σὺν μεγάλῃ ἀρετῇ | in 193 adverbially (assuming that the poet has in mind a story of how Odysseus won Penelope), I do not see that this interpretation would change the 'natural' understanding of 196–99, which would refer the pronouns to her.

[24] On the recognition as a marriage, see U. Hölscher, *Die Odyssee: Epos zwischen Märchen und Roman.* 3rd ed. (Munich 1990), 292–93.

that they will escape troubles (23.286–87). Odysseus does not appear to be quite as fortunate from his own perspective and that of Penelope as he does from that of Agamemnon or Achilles. The *Odyssey* is thus a poem about a fortunate hero, but his good fortune is oddly celebrated in a poem that so extensively details his sufferings. The blessings of the hero are a claim to be a particular kind of poem, but do not imply that it is better than poems about less lucky heroes.

The encounter with Heracles in the Underworld adds a further complication. Heracles commiserates with Odysseus in a way that perhaps invites the hearer to see Odysseus as Heracles' equal (11.617–25). If the *catabasis* was the most difficult labor of Heracles, and Odysseus also successfully complctes a *catabasis*, Odysseus must be equally great. Indeed, he may be by some standards more admirable.[25] Heracles, however, is actually on Olympus, according to the received text (11.602–04): he is more fortunate than Odysseus will ever be.[26] What they share is marked by Heracles' expression of pathos, ἆ δείλ', 'unfortunate man' (11.618)—and pathetic events, as we shall see, are the subject basis of poetry. (Similarly, Menelaus, whose adventures are almost a weak parody of Odysseus', will receive immortality; Menelaus is too fortunate to be a first-rank hero). Furthermore, immediately after seeing Heracles, Odysseus abandons his project of seeing more of the heroes of earlier times, because the arrival of a vast swarm of ghosts terrifies him into flight (11.633–35). The narrator reminds the hearer that Odysseus has not penetrated all the way into Hades, and that he is not fearless. Odysseus may at times emulate the greatest of heroes, but he is not the greatest.

In any case, being blessed does not make a hero the best subject of song. The assumption within the epics that human suffering is a primary subject of song is so blatant and familiar as to demand little discussion.[27] Most explicitly, Helen at *Iliad* 6. 357–58 assumes that Zeus has laid an evil fate upon Alexander and herself in order that they become a subject of song in the future. Typically, Odysseus' last

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[25] Danek *Epos und Zitat*, 247–49, follows Clay, *The Wrath of Athena*, 90–96, in arguing that the text shows the violent, impious Heracles, with whom Odysseus is positively contrasted; he then sees competition between the *Odyssey*-poet and singers of rival (Heracles)-epic.

[26] On 602–4, sec A. Heubeck *A Commentary on Homer's Odyssey*. vol. II. Books IX–XVI (Oxford, c. 1990), 114 (on 11.601–27).

[27] H. Fränkel, *Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy*, trans. M. Hadas and J. Willis (Oxford, 1975), 14.

heroic activity, as the *Iliad* presents it, will serve to reconcile him with Poseidon, and conclude with a hecatomb (11.121–37). Once the hero has made peace with all the gods, nothing remains but a peaceful old age and death—nothing to sing about. Homeric poetics simply do not make the hero's ultimate success or happiness central values in the excellence of songs. While achieving *timê* and *kleos* are essential to being fortunate, the reverse is not true. Paradoxically, the song that celebrates Odysseus' good fortune must concentrate on his sufferings. It can use the difference between Odysseus' successful return and Achilles' heroic death to define the ethical difference between the two traditions, and it certainly implies that it would be more desirable to be Odysseus than Achilles. It thereby implies that it would be a mistake only to listen to songs about Achilles, and not to those about Odysseus.[28] It does not, however, imply that songs about Odysseus are better than songs about Achilles; indeed, Odysseus and Achilles seem to need each other—and they both need the heroes who came before them. If the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* each hopes that its audience will accept it as the greatest of all songs, each bases this hope not on a traditional criterion that its hero is better than all others, but on its own qualities as song.

This modesty is surprising only if we assume that epic performers rigorously specialized in particular areas of the possible repertory—that a Troy-singer never sang about Heracles, for example, at least never to the same audiences. This is quite implausible. Just as Homeric heroes compete fully only with their contemporaries, the singer fully competed only with those songs with which he was immediately engaged: his present rivals. Implicitly, he had to compete with alternate versions of his own subject-matter that he expected his audiences to know. Beyond that, he did not need to define his heroes as better than others. *Iliad* and *Odyssey* make special efforts to give their own heroes features that distinguish them from all others, and make them obviously worthy of the audience's interest. The *Odyssey* creates a unique heroic niche for Odysseus, as the hero who wins both glory and a return. For Odysseus to be the most fortunate of heroes requires that he have a foil who is as great, if not greater, but less fortunate. Epic poems are thus at the same time competitive and symbiotic. Each song needs to assert its right to a place in memory, but if a song annihilates its rivals, it no longer has meaning. This is especially true of poems that stand in a self-conscious

[28] P. Pucci, *Odysseus Polytropos: Intertextual Readings in the Odyssey and the Iliad* (Ithaca, 1987), especially 214–21.

relationship to their own tradition. Indeed, the heroes' modesty relative to their predecessors is a factor in the poet's definition of what makes them worth hearing about.

The *Iliad* presents Achilles' tension with Apollo, but carefully avoids letting him actually fight the hostile god. Ultimately, all the heroes of the *Iliad* recognize mortal limits. The Ransom of Hector shows Achilles' ability to feel sympathy with his enemy, and even to console him, as closely linked with his understanding of human weakness before the gods. He tells Priam both the allegory of the jars (24.525–51), with its explicit comparison between Priam and his own father Peleus, and the paradigm of Niobe, whose sufferings were the punishment for her boasting of superiority to Leto (24.602–17). Yet the comparative piety of Achilles is only significant if the hearers recall the earlier, god-challenging heroes and Achilles' affinities to them. The *Odyssey* is more obviously a warning against ignoring divine power. The poem extensively thematizes divine vengeance from its opening. Here, too, the hero displays excess in his disastrous boast over Polyphemus, (9.502–36)—it is especially notable that he asserts that not even Poseidon will heal Polyphemus (thereby denying the god's power). Elsewhere, he stands in contrast to Heracles and Eurytus, the god-challengers. Indeed, Telemachus is astonished at his implicit boast when Odysseus suggests that Odysseus and Telemachus might fight the suitors alone (λίην μέγα εἶπες, 16.243). Yet this excessive heroic self-assertion turns out to be based on his confidence that Athena and Zeus will assist him (16.266–69). This confidence turns out to be justified. In this particular context, the old problem of the *Odyssey*'s combination of gods who enforce justice and gods who are concerned with their own prerogatives is irrelevant. From the point of view of a listener evaluating himself in comparison with the epic character, the issue lies in an awareness of divine power.[29]

This argument, if accepted, points to the two ways the poem seeks to direct their receptions. First, by representing heroes who do not ordinarily compete with their own predecessors and indeed recognize their greater strength, yet evidently are superior to them in respect for the

[29] For Unitarian approaches to the *Odyssey*'s theology, see R. Friedrich, 'Thrinakia and Zeus' Ways to Men in the *Odyssey*', *GRBS* 28 (1987), 373–400; C. Segal, *Singers, Heroes, and Gods in the Odyssey* (Ithaca, 1994), 195–227; S.D. Olson, *Blood and Iron: Stories and Storytelling in Homer's Odyssey*. Mnemosyne Suppl. 148 (Leiden, 1995), 205–27. W. Kullmann, 'Gods and men in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*', *HSCP* 89 (1985): 1–23, sees the entire poem as motivated by issues of justice, in sharp contrast to the *Iliad*.

gods, the epics also offer a model for their own reception. Even the most powerful men of the poet's own day are repeatedly reminded that they are inferior to the heroes. Yet these heroes themselves were inferior in might to those who came before them. They were also comparatively more mindful of the gods, presumably because their lesser might made it slightly more difficult for them to forget their mortal limits. Nonetheless, some of them still came dangerously close to outright theomachy. The contemporary hearer has no hope of being as powerful as Achilles, and gods do not appear as openly in his world as they do in song. The heroes of the epic treat their predecessors as models to be emulated for their courage and power, but also as warnings of various kinds of excess, so the poet hints that his audience should hold a complex attitude to its own characters. Implicitly, the poems urge their hearers to accept their own inferiority without allowing this humility to reduce their own efforts and expectations that their own deeds may be memorable.

Characters, I have suggested above, stand for the poem itself: their greatness is its greatness. Metapoetically, then, the poet's depiction of heroes earlier than his own as more powerful, but less aware of human limits, also describes his own poetic and narrative style compared to the Epic Cycle. The Cycle appears to have been more archaic in both content and tone than Homer, even if the actual epics forming it were later compositions.[30] Other epic poetry was probably more than like the Cycle than like Homer. Non-Homeric epic was also different in ethos from the Homeric poems. Other epics were freer in immortalizing heroes, and they were richer in supernatural content. Both these features have the same tendency: Homer places his characters in a world more like his own than other poets did.[31] In his heroes' attitudes to earlier heroes, we can see the poet as commenting on his own difference: as his characters stand in awe of the mighty men of the past, without wishing to emulate their most audacious actions, so the poet views other styles of epic with respect, but humanizes his own.

[30] See most recently J. Burgess, *The Tradition of the Trojan War in Homer & the Epic Cycle* (Baltimore, 2001).

[31] J. Griffin, 'The Epic Cycle and the Uniqueness of Homer', *JHS* 97 (1977), 39–53; Burgess, *Tradition of the Trojan War*, 157–71.

RHYTHM AND REGULARITY IN HOMERIC COMPOSITION: QUESTIONS IN THE *ODYSSEY*

Elizabeth Minchin

The most significant event in Homer studies in the twentieth century was the publication, through the 1920s and 1930s, of a series of studies by Milman Parry.[1] In these papers Parry discussed formulaic language and metre, Homeric language as a language of oral poetry, and, for comparative purposes, traditional oral song in the Balkans. Of great significance also was the appearance, some years later, of Albert Lord's *The Singer of Tales*.[2] In this volume Lord, who had been Parry's assistant, attempted to set out, in the light of his own and Parry's field studies, the processes of oral traditional composition. These two scholars, in opening our eyes to traditional storytelling in pre-literate or largely pre-literate cultures, raised new questions about traditional epic song and its production. One of these has been, in essence, 'How could a poet within an oral culture have *generated* works of such a kind and on such a scale?' Or, as Lord phrased it, '… how does the oral poet meet the … requirements of rapid composition without the aid of writing and without memorizing a fixed form?'[3]

Lord himself offered some answers to this question. In *The Singer of Tales*, following Parry, he established the critical importance of formulaic language as an enabling factor in oral composition.[4] And he identified and attached great significance to a narrative unit larger than the formulaic phrase, which he called a theme. A memory for the themes of epic, he proposed, was essential to the composition of the narrative stretches of oral song.[5] Although Lord's claims for themes marked an important early step in our understanding of the processes of oral composition, we now understand that themes, or typical scenes, as others

[1] These essays are to be found in *The Making of Homeric Verse: The Collected Papers of Milman Parry*, ed. A. Parry (Oxford, 1971).

[2] A.B. Lord, *The Singer of Tales* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960).

[3] Lord, *Singer of Tales*, at 22.

[4] Lord, *Singer of Tales*, at 30–67.

[5] Lord, *Singer of Tales*, at 68–98. Parry himself had been aware of this larger unit: see 'On Typical Scenes in Homer', in *The Making of Homeric Verse*, 404–7 (a review of Walter Arend, *Die Typischen Scenen bei Homer* [Berlin 1933]).

have termed them, are not unique to the epic tradition. Rather, these narrative segments may be traced to what cognitive psychology calls scripts, a term which describes the chunks of information about everyday events which we acquire in the course of life and store in memory in sequential form, as small episodes.[6]

We are in a better position now to understand how a poet like Homer, drawing on the resources of memory, may have generated the *narrative* stretches of his song. But, as any member of the audience might observe, only half (approximately) of each poem is presented as narrative.[7] The remaining half is rendered in units of speech composed by the poet for his actors. Lord himself had little to say about direct speech in the epics; and his reluctance to consider the composition of the 'spoken' discourse in the poems has been continued, with only a few exceptions, until recent times. I attribute this reluctance in part to a greater variation in the spoken elements of oral song compared with the more easily recognizable and more predictable patterns of its narrative segments;[8] and in part to our lack of comparative material. It is impossible for us to make a direct comparison of the speech forms used by Homer with the everyday talk of the time. It is important, however, that this topic be explored, even as we recognize the difficulties in doing so. We should therefore seek evidence in the poems that might tell us how Homer generated the speech which he attributes to his actors.

One work on Homeric speech which has been influential in recent years is Richard Martin's study of heroic discourse.[9] It is in response to, and in support of, his claim that there was a parallel between the discourse of Homer's heroes and the talk which Homer heard around him

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[6] See, from the point of view of cognitive psychology, D. Rubin, *Memory in Oral Traditions: The Cognitive Psychology of Epics, Ballads, and Counting-out Rhymes* (New York and Oxford, 1995); and, from the Homeric perspective, E. Minchin, *Homer and the Resources of Memory: Some Applications of Cognitive Theory to the* Iliad *and the* Odyssey (Oxford, 2001), chap. 1.

[7] See J. Griffin, 'Homeric Words and Speakers', *JHS* 106 (1986), 36–57, at 37, who reminds us of the proportions of direct speech and indirect speech in the epics. Of the *Iliad* 45% is rendered as direct speech; of the *Odyssey* 67%. Speeches in the two poems taken together amount to nearly 55% of the total.

[8] Confused by superficial variations in expression, we fail to notice underlying similarities in the form of speech acts which serve similar purposes. For further comment see E. Minchin, 'Speech Acts in the Everyday World and in Homer: The Rebuke as a Case Study', in *Epea and Grammata: Oral and Written Communication in Ancient Greece*, ed. I Worthington (Leiden, 2002), 71–97.

[9] R. Martin, *The Language of Heroes: Speech and Performance in the* Iliad (Ithaca and London, 1989).

every day that I examined the format which underlies the production of a rebuke in Homer.[10] The concept of the format, however, is relevant only to speech acts of a programmatic kind, which are rendered by a linked series of verbal tasks, or moves: rebukes, apologies, and refusals of invitations all fall into this category.[11] It is not relevant to those elements of discourse which are not in themselves speech acts, in Austin's sense of the word: questions, for example, which appear so frequently in exchanges of talk in our own world and in the world which Homer creates.[12] It is this category to which I now turn. In the conversations represented in the *Odyssey* I have identified 176 questions (counting strings of questions as one unit), along with their answers, for an exploratory study.[13] Although these sequences lack the regularities which we see in Homer's narrative segments or even in his speech acts, I propose to examine them to determine whether they manifest regularities of some other kind or kinds which facilitate oral composition in performance. I shall consider the exchange structure of question and answer; the inclusion of explanatory material; repetitive rhythms in double and alternate (either/or) questions and in question-strings; and the generation of answers. In surveying Homer's discourse habits in relation to questions (and answers) I shall include some commentary, where I think it appropriate, on comparable habits in the conversational discourse of English-speakers in the twenty-first century. (I am here assuming that it is fruitful to compare Homer's mimesis of speech with the speech we ourselves use in everyday discourse.[14]) And for a comparison closer in time to Homer's world, I shall look also at Plato's 'Socratic' and middle dialogues, each of which is introduced by a prolonged exchange which

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[10] Minchin, 'Speech Acts in the Everyday World and in Homer'.

[11] Cf. Martin's view of speech acts as stylized versions of everyday talk (Martin, *Language of Heroes*, 44–47, at 45. On speech acts as performatives, see J. L. Austin, *How to Do Things with Words* (Oxford, 1962).

[12] See Austin, *How to Do Things with Words*. Some questions are indeed speech acts. But questions as a class do not fall into any one category of speech act.

[13] These questions comprise both direct and indirect forms (but only where the indirect form is included within direct speech and is preceded by a second person imperative: e.g., μοι εἰπέ ... Tell me ..., 4.379); single questions; and double questions and strings of questions (each cluster of which I have counted as one unit in reaching my tally of 176). I here restrict my enquiry to the *Odyssey*, in order to give some coherence to my account of questions and answers. All references in the text are to the *Odyssey*.

[14] I make comparisons of this kind in order to note similarities to and differences from Western discourse practices amongst middle-class adults. I am not aiming to trace diachronic links.

mimics casual conversation. These dialogues, although composed in writing perhaps three centuries after Homer himself performed, give us a lively impression of patterns of everyday talk in the Greek world of their time.

1. *The Exchange Structure of Question and Answer*

Emanuel Schegloff and Harvey Sacks propose that the basic sequence in conversation is a two-unit sequence, or 'adjacency pair'.[15] They state that an adjacency pair comprises two speaking turns, that of the initial speaker (the first pair part) and that of the respondent (the second pair part). In most conversational contexts the first turn–a question or an invitation, for example–is designed in such a way that it invites a prompt response from the addressee–in the form of an answer or a reply. This, indeed, is the theory. If it were always the case in practice, our conversations would proceed in highly predictable patterns of alternation. But, as Malcolm Coulthard and David Brazil point out, it is not at all difficult to discover instances in which a question is not followed by an answer. They argue that the kind of analysis proposed by Schegloff and Sacks, which stresses the inevitably sequential nature of the exchange structure, is 'deceptively attractive'.[16] Their observations indicate that a response to a question may equally be another question, an elliptical response (strictly speaking, a response to another, suppressed, question), or a response which is irrelevant or in some other way unhelpful or inappropriate. As Coulthard and Brazil describe it, real conversation is rather untidy. Only in the 'artful dialogue' of novels and theatre do we find responses that are consistently well-phrased replies.[17] Nevertheless, despite our apparent disregard in conversation for the structure of the adjacency pair, it is not entirely without force as an organizing principle in conversation. If we have asked a question, we generally expect a reply or an acknowledgment of some kind. And our addressee is himself or herself aware of that expectation, even if he or she decides not to meet it immediately. This awareness of conversa-

[15] See E. Schegloff and H. Sacks, 'Opening up Closings', *Semiotica* 8 (1973), 289–327.

[16] M. Coulthard and D. Brazil, 'Exchange Structure', in *Advances in Spoken Discourse Analysis* (London, 1992), 50–78, at 52.

[17] See E. Goffman, 'Replies and Responses', *Language in Society* 5 (1976), 257–313, at 280.

tional protocols is part of our cultural knowledge.[18] The sequence of the adjacency pair, therefore, represents an understanding between speaker and listener about the way in which a conversational exchange should progress–in an ideal world, at least. It is, as Coulthard and Brazil conclude (despite their reservations), an overall descriptive framework which accounts for what generally occurs.

How, we might ask, does Homer stand with regard to questions and answers? Does the structure of his sequences indicate the stylized neatness which Goffman suggests we might find in 'literary' discourse in the Western tradition? Or do we find that Homer realizes the sequence in the same loose way that we do in conversation? (The 'we' and 'us' I refer to here are speakers in today's Western cultures.) We certainly find in Homer a number of conversational exchanges in which the structure of the adjacency pair is exemplary. Consider the following passages:

> Ἑρμεία, Διὸς υἱέ, διάκτορε, δῶτορ ἑάων,
> ἦ ῥά κεν ἐν δεσμοῖς ἐθέλοις κρατεροῖσι πιεσθεὶς
> εὕδειν ἐν λέκτροισι παρὰ χρυσέῃ Ἀφροδίτῃ;
> Τὸν δ' ἠμείβετ' ἔπειτα διάκτορος ἀργειφόντης·
> αἲ γὰρ τοῦτο γένοιτο, ἄναξ ἑκατηβόλ' Ἄπολλον. (8.335–39)
>
> 'Hermes, son of Zeus, guide and giver of good things, tell me,
> would you, caught in these strong fastenings, be willing
> to sleep in bed by the side of Aphrodite the golden?'
> Then in turn the courier Argeïphontes answered:
> 'Lord who strike from afar, Apollo, I wish it could only
> be ....'[19]
>
> Τὸν δ' αὖτε προσέειπε φίλη τροφὸς Εὐρύκλεια·
> αἲ γὰρ δή ποτε, τέκνον, ἐπιφροσύνας ἀνέλοιο
> οἴκου κήδεσθαι καὶ κτήματα πάντα φυλάσσειν.
> ἀλλ' ἄγε, τίς τοι ἔπειτα μετοιχομένη φάος οἴσει;
> δμῳὰς δ' οὐκ εἴας προβλωσκέμεν, αἵ κεν ἔφαινον.
> Τὴν δ' αὖ Τηλέμαχος πεπνυμένος ἀντίον ηὔδα·
> ξεῖνος ὅδ'· οὐ γὰρ ἀεργὸν ἀνέξομαι ὅς κεν ἐμῆς γε
> χοίνικος ἅπτηται, καὶ τηλόθεν εἰληλουθώς. (19.21–28)

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[18] Thus we occasionally hear remarks in mid-conversation such as: 'But you haven't answered my question.' Or: 'So, to answer your question.' Such remarks acknowledge both the need for a response and the expectation of adjacency (in that the question has been revived in order to link it with its response).

[19] Translations are from R. Lattimore, *The* Odyssey *of Homer* (New York, 1965).

Then in turn Eurykleia his dear nurse said to him:
'I only hope, my child, that you will assume such foresight
in taking care of the house and protecting all our possessions.
But tell me, who is it who will go with you and hold the light for you?
The maids would have given you light, but you would not let them
come out.'
Then thoughtful Telemachos said to her in answer:
'This stranger will. I will not suffer a man who feeds from
our stores, and does not work, even though he comes from far off.'

In the above cases, when a speaker has asked a question, his or her question is addressed immediately.[20] This, in fact, is the most common practice in Homer. In other cases, however, a response is delayed. For example, when Menelaos is asked by Telemachos to tell him what he knows about Odysseus (4.316–31), he begins his response with a long reflection on the wrongs of the suitors and the retribution which awaits them at Odysseus' hands (333–46) before he turns to the question (specifically recalling it at 347 after his digression) and introduces his detailed response. The expectations associated with the adjacency pair are fulfilled–but at the second speaker's leisure. A third category of questions includes all those which are not taken up at all by the addressee. Of my pool of 176 questions from the *Odyssey* approximately 30 % receive no response, by which I mean that they do not receive an informative answer. Of these many are rhetorical questions–for example, the question of Telemachos to Antinoos at 1.391:

ἦ φῂς τοῦτο κάκιστον ἐν ἀνθρώποισι τετύχθαι;

Do you think that is the worst thing that could happen to anyone?[21]

The rhetorical question is heard frequently in conversation today.[22] The listener is barely aware that a question has been put; and certainly does not feel that there is any need to reply. A second sub-category of questions comprises those intended to silence the addressee. Consider, for example, the question which introduces Telemachos' reproof to his mother at 1.346–47:

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20 For other examples amongst many: when Odysseus asks Elpenor how he has come to be amongst the shades of the dead (11.57), Elpenor replies promptly with his tale (11.60–65); when Odysseus at 15.347–50 asks Eumaios whether his mother or his father are still alive, the swineherd replies at once (352–60).

21 See also 2.312–13 (Telemachos to Antinoos); 9.351–52 (Odysseus to the Kyklops); 11.336–37 (Arete to the Phaiakians); 16.421–23 (Penelope to Antinoos).

22 For example, questions such as 'What could I do?' 'Who would have expected it? 'Did you ever see such a storm?''

> μῆτερ ἐμή, τί τ' ἄρα φθονέεις ἐρίηρον ἀοιδὸν
> τέρπειν ὅππῃ οἱ νόος ὄρνυται;
>
> Why, my mother, do you begrudge this excellent singer
> His pleasing himself as the thought drives him?[23]

Finally, there are also questions which, for one reason or another, the listener chooses to ignore. In Homer we can find only a small number of questions which are disregarded by the addressee (e.g., 20.178–82 [Melanthios to Odysseus]).

If we look now to questions which occur in the second pair part rather than the first, we find questions which are framed as a protest of some kind or as counter-questions.[24] They too are asked without expectation of a reply. I identify 20 protest-questions in the *Odyssey.* For examples of such questions, see 19.482 (Odysseus to Eurykleia); 23.70–72 (Eurykleia to Penelope); 23.264–65 (Odysseus to Penelope).[25] This figure is relatively high; it suggests an environment in which there is considerable tension. For counter-questions, which reflect this same tension but are used more rarely, see, for example, 19.71–73, Odysseus' brusque counter-questions to Melantho's question, at 66–67, when she had asked the hero, rather sharply, whether he would be hanging around the house all night.

As I have noted, the majority of questions posed in the *Odyssey* elicit a response which is prompt and informative. Is this proportion comparable with everyday talk in Western cultures? This is difficult to document; and we can rely only on impressions we gather from the conversations we hear about us, which on some occasions, with particular speakers, are quite orderly, but on other occasions are quite untidy. When we turn to Homer we must make allowance for the special circumstances of the storyworld. In the *Odyssey* Homer has created a world in which competitiveness, physical disguise, mind-games, fear, and hardship all play a part. In such circumstances suspicion, defensiveness, and anxiety will inevitably affect the way in which speakers

[23] For further discussion of this particular interaction, see below.

[24] A counter-question, a question asked in response to a question, falls into a different category. Whether intended defensively or aggressively, it enables the speaker of the second pair part to sidestep or defer his or her obligation to give an answer to the original question.

[25] Protest-questions are frequently marked by the standard phrase ποῖόν σε ἔπος φύγεν ἕρκος ὀδόντων; (What sort of word escaped your teeth's barrier?) See 1.64, 5.22, 19.492.

respond to each other. So it is not surprising that we do not always find the 'artful dialogue' of literature, with well-phrased and informative replies generated by each speaker. We find represented instead a variety of 'responses', each one appropriate to the present moment in the tale. Many (particularly protest-questions) are of a standardized nature. All of them are echoed in responses in comparable circumstances in our own world. I propose, therefore, that in Homer the structure of that unit of talk which we call the adjacency pair is, as Goffman would predict, rather more formalized than it is in everyday speech. It is to some extent a stylization of everyday talk.[26]

Before we proceed to our next topic, I make two points in connection with Homeric questions and answers. First, the form in which questions and answers are presented in Homer is as unlike real conversation as is, for a different reason, the stichomythia of tragedy. As we quickly discover when we read the epics, individual speeches are relatively long. Homer's actors prefer to ask questions in clusters rather than separately.[27] And, second, there is a question-type familiar to English-speakers today which I do not see represented in the Homeric epic in the same proportion as I observe in our own everyday talk. I refer to tag-questions, used in English (and other European languages) to check that one's addressee can confirm a positive or negative statement. So we may say: 'You like her a lot, don't you?' Or: 'He doesn't like you, does he?' These kinds of question are common in everyday English. And they always invite some minimal confirmation. In Homer's *Odyssey*, on the other hand, they are rare. I identify fewer than ten.[28]

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[26] My assessment is based on the exemplary nature of the bulk of replies and the observable formalization of even non-responses such as the protest-question or counter-question. We observe a similar phenomenon in Plato's dialogues: the series of exemplary adjacency pairs in the *Prt.* 309a1–310a5 is more like dialogue in literature (in this respect) than the exchanges of everyday talk.

[27] For discussion, see below.

[28] See, for example, 1.298–300; 6.57–59; 16.424–25. We find these forms more commonly in the small exchanges of Plato: for example, *Smp.* 172a5; *Prt.* 309a6–7. It may be, indeed, that the two points which I have raised are related. Tag-questions are a mark of conversation that is tennis-like in the frequency of its exchanges. Their absence from Homer may be a consequence of his preference for longer speech units and for questions presented in clusters.

2. *The Inclusion of Explanatory Material*

When Athene in the guise of Mentor meets Telemachos, she asks him whether he is the son of Odysseus (1.207). She then explains (208–11) why she asks such a question:

αἰνῶς μὲν κεφαλήν τε καὶ ὄμματα καλὰ ἔοικας.
κείνῳ, ἐπεὶ θαμὰ τοῖον ἐμισγόμεθ' ἀλλήλοισι,
πρίν γε τὸν ἐς Τροίην ἀναβήμεναι, ἔνθα περ ἄλλοι
Ἀργείων οἱ ἄριστοι ἔβαν κοίλῃς ἐπὶ νηυσίν·

Indeed, you are strangely like about the head, the fine eyes,
as I remember; we used to meet so often together
before he went away to Troy, where others beside him
and the greatest of the Argives went in their hollow vessels.

Likewise, when Odysseus resists Kirke's attempt to drug him and threatens her with drawn sword (10.321–22), she asks him for his personal details: she asks him who he is, where he comes from, where his city is, and where his parents are (325). Then she explains why she has put the question (326–29):

θαῦμά μ' ἔχει ὡς οὔ τι πιὼν τάδε φάρμακ' ἐθέλχθης.
οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδέ τις ἄλλος ἀνὴρ τάδε φάρμακ' ἀνέτλη,
ὅς κε πίῃ καὶ πρῶτον ἀμείψεται ἕρκος ὀδόντων.
σοὶ δέ τις ἐν στήθεσσιν ἀκήλητος νόος ἐστίν.

The wonder is on me that you drank my drugs and have not been
enchanted, for no other man beside could have stood up
under my drugs, once he drank and they passed the barrier
of his teeth. There is a mind in you no magic will work on.

When Odysseus encounters the soul of Elpenor in the Underworld, he asks how he came there (11.57); then he explains why he asked the question (58):

ἔφθης πεζὸς ἰὼν ἢ ἐγὼ σὺν νηῒ μελαίνῃ.

You have come faster than I could in my black ship.

The composition of a Homeric question, as we observe, in many cases includes one or two clauses–or several sentences–which justify the asking. We ourselves, in formulating questions, often include explanatory material of this same kind:

> 'Do you want to come and have a coffee? I want to ask your advice.'
>
> 'Where did you put yesterday's newspaper? There was an article there that I wanted to save.'[29]

It would be difficult to measure the frequency with which we include such information in our everyday questions. In the case of the epics, however, we can. Homer appears to have used this kind of material, whereby the speaker explains the narrative circumstances which have given rise to his or her question, in approximately two-thirds of questions, whether these questions are expressed directly or indirectly.[30] This, I suggest (despite the difficulties in assessing the frequency of explanatory segments in our own discourse), is at a higher rate than the proportions we observe in everyday conversational forms today.[31] And it certainly occurs more frequently in Homer than in Plato's earlier dialogues.[32] I identify this desire of actors within the tale to explain their verbal behaviour as one of the regularities associated with oral epic technique. The explanatory mode contributes to the predictable structure of question-asking in the oral epic tradition which we associate with Homer, where the apparent urgency of the question is counterbalanced by the discursive nature of its justification.[33]

Why does the poet entrust this explanatory material to the actor, when he could have included it in his preface to the speech? By organizing the presentation of his story in this way, the poet appears to remain aloof from events in the storyworld. He allows the tale to carry itself, without his distracting intervention. As we know from Aristotle (*Poetics* 1460a) and from discussions in our own world, this technique

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[29] The inclusion of material of this kind is similar to what Paul Drew calls 'reporting', an element of speech we regularly use when we refuse an invitation: see P. Drew, 'Speakers' Reportings in Invitation Sequences', in J. Atkinson and J. Heritage, *Structures of Social Action: Studies in Conversational Analysis* (Cambridge, 1984), 129–51, esp. at 146.

[30] Of the 176 questions or question strings in the *Odyssey*, 124 are accompanied by explanatory material of some kind presented within the speech segment.

[31] For comparison's sake, I examined passages of talk recorded in D. Tannen, *Conversational Style: Analyzing Talk amongst Friends* (Norwood, NJ, 1984). In the many chunks of talk recorded in this volume from two hours 40 minutes of conversation at a Thanksgiving Dinner, I noted only two questions which included explanatory material.

[32] See, for example, *Grg.* 447a1–449c3. Here, amid a number of adjacency pairs, we find only one question which incorporates explanatory material: at 447b9-c4.

[33] It may well contribute to the rhythm of speech in our own world. To my knowledge there is no study of this kind on English speech rhythms.

makes for a more successful story, since the audience becomes directly involved with the characters and engaged by the action.[34] And the introduction of explanatory material allows the audience to focus for just a few moments longer on the question which is hanging in the air. Thus it assumes a greater significance against its narrative background.

There is a remarkable exception to this rule. When Arete asks Odysseus his name and the story of how he acquired the clothes he was wearing, it is the poet as narrator who explains to his audience why she has posed the question (7.233–35):

τοῖσιν δ' Ἀρήτη λευκώλενος ἄρχετο μύθων·
ἔγνω γὰρ φᾶρός τε χιτῶνά τε εἵματ' ἰδοῦσα
καλά, τά ῥ' αὐτὴ τεῦξε σὺν ἀμφιπόλοισι γυναιξί·

Now it was white-armed Arete who began their discourse,
for she recognized the mantle and the tunic when she saw them, splendid
clothes which she herself had made, with her serving women.

In this particular case Homer has departed from his usual pattern of assigning explanatory talk to the actor. He himself, in the narrator's voice, explains to us, out of the hearing of Odysseus, that Arete has recognized the garments he wears. It is important on this occasion that it *not* be Arete who justifies her question: if she had explained to Odysseus why she asked about the clothing, she would have lost her strategic advantage in her quest to discover the truth of the matter. The fact that Odysseus does not know what Arete knows is the source of her power over him at this moment.[35]

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[34] See D. Tannen, 'The Oral-Literate Continuum in Discourse', in *Spoken and Written Language: Exploring Orality and Literacy*, Advances in Discourse Processes 9, ed. D. Tannen (Norwood, NJ, 1982), 1–16, at 8–9. For discussion in the Homeric context, see Minchin, *Homer and the Resources of Memory*, 123–28.

[35] For another example of this practice uncommon in Homer, whereby the poet expresses the explanatory material which underpins a question in the narrator's voice, see Athene/Mentor's question to Odysseus at *Od.*22.231–32 and its explanatory material at 237–40.

3. *Repetitive Rhythms in Double and Alternate Questions and Question-Strings*

Amongst the 176 questions and question-strings which I have identified in the *Odyssey* I find 74 instances of a single question, such as the question put by Odysseus to Eumaios at 14.115–16:[36]

ὦ φίλε, τίς γάρ σε πρίατο κτεάτεσσιν ἑοῖσιν,
ὧδε μάλ' ἀφνειὸς καὶ καρτερὸς ὡς ἀγορεύεις;

Dear friend, who is the man who bought you with his possessions
And is so rich and powerful as you tell me?

The remainder–102 in total–are clusters of questions posed in pairs, as alternates, or in strings. Homer has a clear preference for questions in clusters. Let us examine each category of multiple question more closely before drawing any conclusions.

(a) *Double Questions*

When Athene/Mentor has urged Telemachos to go up to Nestor to ask about his father, Telemachos demurs with anxious questions (3.22):

Μέντορ, πῶς τ' ἄρ' ἴω, πῶς τ' ἄρ προσπτύξομαι αὐτόν;

Mentor, how shall I go up to him, how close with him?

When the Old Man of the Sea has succumbed at last to Menelaos and his men, he asks the questions which indicate that he has conceded defeat (4.462–63):

τίς νύ τοι, 'Ατρέος υἱέ, θεῶν συμφράσσατο βουλάς,
ὄφρα μ' ἕλοις ἀέκοντα λοχησάμενος; τέο σε χρή;

Which of the gods now, son of Atreus, has been advising you
to capture me from ambush against my will. What do you want?

When Melantho has rebuked Odysseus for lingering in the palace, when as a beggar he should have been outdoors, he replies (19.71–73):

δαιμονίη, τί μοι ὧδ' ἐπέχεις κεκοτηότι θυμῷ;
ἦ ὅτι δὴ ῥυπόω, κακὰ δὲ χροῒ εἵματα εἷμαι,
πτωχεύω δ' ἀνὰ δῆμον;

[36] For further single questions, see, for example, 8.352–53; 10.501; 11.57; 13.168–69; 15.431–33.

I wonder, why do you hold such an angry grudge against me?
Is it because I am dirty, and wear foul clothing upon me,
and go about as a public beggar?

We see verbal repetition in the first two examples, as in the πῶς ... πῶς of 3.22 (and cf. 5.465: τί πάθω; τί νύ μοι μήκιστα γένηται; what will happen now, and what in the long outcome will befall me?) and, in 4.462–63, syntactic repetition (cf. also 6.276–77). In each case a pair of wh- words structure the question. The third example quoted above offers a structural pattern, which reveals pragmatic intent of another kind. The first question (19.71) is used to open up a general topic; the second (19.72–73) focusses on precise issues within that topic. Although this last example reveals no internal repetition, it conforms to a pattern of topic and expansion which we discern also in our own everyday talk.[37]

(b) *Alternate Questions*

Alternate questions reveal a tighter pattern of structural repetition, since the second (and, possibly, a third) arm of this kind of question parallels the first in, usually, some syntactic element. I have noted 31 instances of this form (from all instances of multiple questions) This is illustrated most concisely in Helen's question to Menelaos at 4.140:

ψεύσομαι, ἦ ἔτυμον ἐρέω;

Shall I be wrong, or am I speaking the truth?[38]

We see also alternate questions in indirect form (15.167–68):

φράζεο δή, Μενέλαε διοτρεφές, ὄρχαμε λαῶν,
ἢ νῶϊν τόδ' ἔφηνε θεὸς τέρας ἦε σοι αὐτῷ.

Menelaos, illustrious, leader of the people, tell us
whether the god showed this sign for you, or was it for us two?[39]

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[37] Cf. 'Well that's good uh how is yer arthritis? Yuh still taking shots?': cited in H. Sacks, 'On the Preferences for Agreement and Contiguity in Conversation', in *Talk and Social Organization*, ed. G. Butt and J. R. E. Lee (Clevedon, Philadelphia, 1987), 54–69, at 60. For further examples in Homer's *Odyssey*, see 10.64; 11.210–14, 473–76. And for comparable examples in Plato, see, e.g., *Prt.* 309b3–4; 309c1–3.

[38] This question is, in fact, part of a longer string: see my discussion of string-questions, below. For a similarly neat pair of alternatives, see 20.166–67.

[39] For the pattern of (indirect) alternate questions in which two *actions* are considered, see 19.525–31.

(c) *Question-Strings*

Strings of questions expand the patterns of repetition which I have noted above. All but one of Telemachos' questions at 1.170–77 is the kind of question which we describe in English as a wh-, or information, question:[40]

> τίς πόθεν εἶς ἀνδρῶν; πόθι τοι πόλις ἠδὲ τοκῆες;
> ὁπποίης τ' ἐπὶ νηὸς ἀφίκεο· πῶς δέ σε ναῦται
> ἤγαγον εἰς Ἰθάκην; τίνες ἔμμεναι εὐχετόωντο;
> οὐ μὲν γάρ τί σε πεζὸν ὀΐομαι ἐνθάδ' ἱκέσθαι.
> καί μοι τοῦτ' ἀγόρευσον ἐτήτυμον, ὄφρ' ἐῢ εἰδῶ
> ἠὲ νέον μεθέπεις, ἦ καὶ πατρώϊός ἐσσι
> ξεῖνος, ἐπεὶ πολλοὶ ἴσαν ἀνέρες ἡμέτερον δῶ
> ἄλλοι, ἐπεὶ καὶ κεῖνος ἐπίστροφος ἦν ἀνθρώπων.

> What man are you, and whence? Where is your city? Your parents?
> What kind of ship did you come here on? And how did the sailors
> Bring you to Ithaka? What men do they claim they are?
> For I do not think that you could have have traveled on foot to this country.
> And tell me this too, tell me truly, so that I may know it.
> Are you here for the first time, or are you a friend of my father's
> from abroad? Since many other men too used to come and visit
> our house, in the days when he used to go about among people.

These questions, or questions very similar in form and intent, will become familiar to the audience as the narrative proceeds. Each repetition of the cluster marks a new stage in either Telemachos' or Odysseus' journey towards his goal.[41] Note a similar pattern of interrogative repetition (based on τίς) in Athene/Mentes' questions to Telemachos about the 'festivities' in the palace on Ithaka, at 1.225–26:[42]

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[40] On the categorization of questions in general, see R. Quirk, S. Greenbaum, G. Leech, J. Svartnik, *A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language* (London and New York, 1985), at 806–26; on wh- questions and information questions, see 817.

[41] For other such sets, see 1.405–7; 3.71–74; 7.238–39; 8.550–56 (here indirect and much expanded); 10.325; 15.264; 16.57–59; 19.105. Although the most common question-string in Homer comprises three questions, it is occasionally the case (e.g., at 1.170–72, 405–9; 4.642–47) that more than three are asked. On the ascending order of these particular questions, see I. de Jong, *A Narratological Commentary on the* Odyssey (Cambridge, 2001), 26. De Jong refers to the questions at 1.170 as the 'international standard question', those at 171–73 as the 'local, i.e. Ithacan, standard question' and the question at 174–76 as the 'unique, personal question'.

[42] A.M. Devine and L.D. Stephens, *The Prosody of Greek Speech* (New York and Oxford, 1994), at 454–55, draw our attention to the fact that the acute accent on the interrogative τίς always remains unchanged, rather than becoming a grave within a

τίς δαίς, τίς δαὶ ὅμιλος ὅδ' ἔπλετο; τίπτε δέ σε χρεώ;
εἰλαπίνη ἠὲ γάμος; ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔρανος τάδε γ' ἐστίν.

What feast is this, what gathering? How does it concern you?
A festival, or a wedding? Surely, no communal dinner.

I suggest, however, that long strings of questions (three or more) may not be typical of everyday talk, whether in the world in which Homer lived or our own. None of us, in a Western culture today, would impose so heavily on the short-term memory of our listeners; nor would we insist on holding the floor for so long, unless we intended our questions as a form of aggression (or as a mark of enthusiasm).[43] Our preference would be to ask questions in smaller clusters and to await a response before proceeding. By contrast, the occasional long strings of questions (and their answers) that we observe in Homer's epics indicate that the singer is adjusting conversational practice in epic to the different circumstances of epic performance. To avoid frequent changes of speaker and the need to announce each transition, the traditional singer prefers to present questions in a cluster. How might he generate such a series of questions? I suggest that he relied not only on structural and verbal patterning, such as I have identified above, but also on the acoustic aids on which we also draw on those occasions when we present a series of questions. The poet would establish with his first question a particular pattern of intonation; he would then use this, in combination with structural and verbal cues, to draw from memory subsequent questions in the series.[44]

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phrase. This indicates, they propose, that the question word in Greek is raised in tone (and this is naturally the case with πόθεν, πόθι, ὁπποίης, and πῶς, the other question words, apart from τίς and τίνες, used at 1.170–72).

[43] On the limits of short-term memory (for 7–9 pieces of information), see G. Miller, 'The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for Processing Information', *Psychological Review* 63 (1956) 81–97; on issues in connection with 'holding the floor', see H. Sacks, E. Schegloff, G. Jefferson, 'A Simplest Systematics for the Organization of Turn-Taking in Conversation', *Language* 50 (1974), 696–735. For an example in a Western culture of single questions being used (in circumstances where Homer would bring the questions together into a single speaking turn), see Tannen, *Conversational Style*, 54–55. I thank Susan Ford for her observation that a barrage of questions may be used as an aggressive tactic.

[44] I am not suggesting that there is a single pattern of question-intonation in Greek, even in question-word questions. There is not: see A. Cruttenden, *Intonation* 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1997), 51 ('[T]here is no such thing as "question intonation", although some tones may be more common on questions than others.'); and see also Devine and Stephens, *Prosody of Greek Speech*, at 453. What I am suggesting is that the poet adhered to

By contrast, a strategy which we have observed in several strings (for example, at 1.225–26, above) and which is familiar to us from our own experience of everyday talk is that, first, a wh- interrogative may open up a topic and, second, alternative questions will focus on the real issue in the speaker's mind. I have noted a similar strategy in Homer above ('Double Questions'). We ourselves use this pattern frequently:

> How will you get here? Will you walk or come by bike?

I suggest that we use alternate questions in certain contexts to indicate either our intelligent engagement with the circumstances (we demonstrate that we are considering the possibilities) and/or a desire to prompt a response.[45] Thus, when old Aigyptios asks why an assembly has been summoned on Ithaka after so long, he poses two wh- questions, at 2.28–29:

> νῦν δὲ τίς ὧδ' ἤγειρε; τίνα χρειὼ τόσον ἵκει
> ἠὲ νέων ἀνδρῶν, ἢ οἳ προγενέστεροί εἰσιν;

> Now who has gathered us, in this way? What need has befallen
> which of the younger men, or one of us who are older?

He then expands on his second question to pose, at 30–32, alternative explanations:

> ἠέ τιν' ἀγγελίην στρατοῦ ἔκλυεν ἐρχομένοιο,
> ἥν χ' ἡμῖν σάφα εἴποι, ὅτε πρότερός γε πύθοιτο;
> ἦέ τι δήμιον ἄλλο πιφαύσκεται ἠδ' ἀγορεύει;

> Has he been hearing some message about the return of the army
> which, having heard it first, he could now explain to us?
> Or has he some other public matter to set forth and argue?

Odysseus structures his questions in a similar fashion when he speaks with his mother Antikleia in the Underworld. He asks her how she died (11.171). Then, sympathetically, he refers to the possibilities: was it a long illness or a quick and painless death (172–73)? He mentions next

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the intonation pattern he had adopted for his first question in generating the questions that followed. The resulting intonation pattern, across the series of questions, may have been similar to list-intonation. I am grateful to Belinda Collins for discussion and advice on this topic. For discussion of the 'phonological loop', which has the capacity to store acoustic and speech-based information (such as intonation) for up to two seconds, see A. Baddeley, *Human Memory: Theory and Practice* (Hove and London, 1990), 71–72.

[45] For a comparable–but relatively rare–example from Plato, see *Euthph.* 3e7–8: Ἔστιν δὲ δὴ σοί, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, τίς ἡ δίκη; φεύγεις αὐτὴν ἢ διώκεις; (What is your case, Euthyphro? Are you defending or prosecuting?)

his father and son (174), and in alternative questions asks whether his inheritance is safe or in the hands of another man (175–76). He then mentions his wife (177) and, again, offers alternative outcomes: is she still watching over Telemachos or has she married again (178–79)?[46]

I note 18 instances of this pattern of wh- question and alternative expansion. I propose that we find in Homer a stylization of what we might assume to be the everyday talk of his own world. Within these 18 we might isolate a sub-group of questions, which Kakridis calls 'mistaken questions'.[47] Aigyptios' questions at 2.28–32 and Odysseus' questions at 11.171–73 are identified as being of this kind.[48] Kakridis regards such questions as a poetic motif: their only purpose is to 'form a negative background from which the positive assertion will emerge'.[49] He argues that such a motif derives from popular poetry of the poet's own period; and that it was kept alive in popular oral tradition until our own time. I argue that this question-pattern (general question followed by alternative questions) derives directly from everyday talk. Kakridis' so-called 'mistaken questions' are a stylization of everyday talk, which serve as he proposed: to highlight the correct answer as we hear it.

Discussion

We have observed certain patterns in these three modes of presentation. These are of two kinds. The first is a pragmatic pattern of a structural kind which is echoed in our own talk: a question is asked which establishes a topic and it is followed by further questions which are more specific in their focus or by alternative resolutions posed also in interrogative form. As I have discussed above, the frequency of this pattern (particularly the poet's preference for alternatives) suggests that we may be dealing with a stylization of real-world conversational patterns. The second is a range of internal patterns of repetition, whether verbal (in

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[46] For other examples of this pattern of interrogative followed by alternative resolutions posed as questions, see 1.405–7 (interrogatives) and 408–9 (alternative); 3.71 (interrogatives) and 72–74 (alternative); 9.252 (interrogatives) and 253–55 (alternative); 9.403–4 (interrogative) and 405–6 (alternative). The measured–even leisurely–progress of question-talk in the epic world belies any claim of urgency on the part of the speaker.

[47] See J. Kakridis, *Homeric Researches* reprint edn. (New York and London, 1987), 106–20. I thank Ruth Scodel for drawing Kakridis' comments to my attention.

[48] See also 2.28–34, 11.398–403, 16.95–98, 24.106–13.

[49] Kakridis, *Homeric Researches*, 111.

the repetition of words or other material), syntactic (in the repetition of interrogative patterns), or intonational (in the repetition of tone across a series of questions). These small-scale patterns are not without purpose. Repetition is a highly efficient *modus operandi* for the production of discourse, whether we are engaged in the casual conversation of every day or the special speech of oral epic.[50] As we draw on short-term memory and make further use of the patterns which we have established, we are reducing the mental effort required for the generation of speech. As Tannen argues, our speech may have the appearance of spontaneity; but in reality much of it is prepatterned or formulaic.

4. *The Generation of Answers: Rhythm, Repetition, and Memory*

If we consider the adjacency pair in terms of the mental effort which is invested in production, we notice that certain economies operate. I shall discuss the economy of repetition, whereby the speaker takes the words and phrases of the question and re-uses them in his or her answer; and I shall consider also the economy of structure, with reference to the nature of the adjacency pair and our preference for contiguity.

When a so-called wh- question, or information question, is asked, the respondent repeats as much of the question as is relevant; or substitutes a new piece of information for the question-word. For example:

Q. How is your father? A. He is well.

We observe the same phenomenon in Homer. At 8.335–37, in the course of the story of Ares and Aphrodite, Apollo asks Hermes whether he would wish to be in Ares' position:

Ἑρμεία, Διὸς υἱέ, διάκτορε, δῶτορ ἑάων,
ἦ ῥά κεν ἐν δεσμοῖς ἐθέλοις κρατεροῖσι πιεσθεὶς
εὕδειν ἐν λέκτροισι παρὰ χρυσέῃ Ἀφροδίτῃ;

Hermes, son of Zeus, guide and giver of good things, tell me,
would you, caught in these strong fastenings, be willing
to sleep in bed by the side of Aphrodite the golden?

And Hermes replies, at 339–42, with expansion for comic effect:

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[50] See D. Tannen, 'Repetition in Conversation as Spontaneous Formulaicity', *Text* 7 (1987), 215–43, at 223. For discussion of repetition in the composition of answers, see below.

αἲ γὰρ τοῦτο γένοιτο, ἄναξ ἑκατηβόλ' Ἄπολλον.
δεσμοὶ μὲν τρὶς τόσσοι ἀπείρονες ἀμφὶς ἔχοιεν,
ὑμεῖς δ' εἰσορόῳτε θεοὶ πᾶσαί τε θέαιναι,
αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν εὕδοιμι παρὰ χρυσέῃ Ἀφροδίτῃ.

Lord who strikes from afar, Apollo, I wish it could only
be, and there could be thrice this number of endless fastenings,
and all you gods could be looking on and all the goddesses,
and still I would sleep by the side of Aphrodite the golden.

Even the responses to a string of questions, such as the series which Telemachos puts to Athene/Mentor at 1.170–77, may be relatively easily achieved (with prior rehearsal), since each of the answers (179–99) refers back to and to some extent repeats the content of the question. So, in response to τίς πόθεν εἶς ἀνδρῶν; πόθι τοι πόλις ἠδὲ τοκῆες; (What man are you, and whence? Where is your city? Your parents? 170), Athene/Mentes replies Μέντης Ἀγχιάλοιο δαΐφρονος εὔχομαι εἶναι υἱός, ἀτὰρ Ταφίοισι φιληρέτμοισιν ἀνάσσω (I announce myself as Mentes, son of Anchialos, the wise, and my lordship is over the oar-loving Taphians, 180–81). Telemachos asks about Mentes' relationship with Odysseus (ἠὲ νέον μεθέπεις, ἦ καὶ πατρώϊός ἐσσι ξεῖνος, (Are you here for the first time, or are you a friend of my father's from abroad? 175–76). And Mentes replies in the same terms (ξεῖνοι δ' ἀλλήλων πατρώϊοι εὐχόμεθ' εἶναι ἐξ ἀρχῆς, Your father and I claim to be guest-friends by heredity from far back, 187–88). If we consider again the questions which Odysseus asks his mother in the Underworld at 11.170–79, we note that Antikleia's response in each case picks up one or more elements of her son's question. Odysseus has asked how she herself had died (171–73):

τίς νύ σε κὴρ ἐδάμασσε τανηλεγέος θανάτοιο;
ἢ δολιχὴ νοῦσος, ἦ Ἄρτεμις ἰοχέαιρα
οἷς ἀγανοῖς βελέεσσιν ἐποιχομένη κατέπεφνεν;

What doom of death that lays men low has been your undoing?
Was it a long sickness, or did Artemis of the arrows
come upon you with her painless shafts, and destroy you?

She replies that hers was neither a quick nor a slow death (198–200):

οὔτ' ἐμέ γ' ἐν μεγάροισιν ἐΰσκοπος ἰοχέαιρα
οἷς ἀγανοῖς βελέεσσιν ἐποιχομένη κατέπεφνεν,
οὔτε τις οὖν μοι νοῦσος ἐπήλυθεν ...

nor in my palace did the lady of the arrow, well-aiming,
come upon me with her painless shafts, and destroy me,
nor was I visited with sickness, ...

But it was her longing for Odysseus which took her life's spirit from her (202–3). Odysseus asks whether his inheritance is still in the hands of his father and his son, or whether someone else holds it (ἦ ἔτι πὰρ κείνοισιν ἐμὸν γέρας, ἦέ τις ἤδη ἀνδρῶν ἄλλος ἔχει, 175–76). Antikleia answers that no one yet holds his fine inheritance (σὸν δ' οὔ πώ τις ἔχει καλὸν γέρας, 184). And he asks whether Antikleia continues to stay by her son (ἠὲ μένει παρὰ παιδὶ, 178). Antikleia answers that she does (μένει, 181).

I have drawn attention above to Tannen's comments on repetition in connection with the production of questions in everyday English and have related them to the patterns we observe in strings of Homeric questions. In the generation of answers, too, we naturally rely on prepatterned material which has been laid down in the question, to facilitate the task. Homer, as we have observed from the examples above, does the same.

Elsewhere I have discussed the question-answer sequence from a structural point of view, arguing that in everyday discourse in Western cultures speakers seek economical ways of handling the material of talk.[51] We observe a preference for contiguity, identified and described by Schegloff and Sacks, who propose that this preference has its roots in a mutual desire for co-operative talk.[52] I have suggested, rather, that we aim at co-operative talk *with minimum effort.* When we ask a question to which we expect an answer, we place it (along with any relevant explanatory material) near the end of our speaking turn, so that the addressee is not required to store the question in short-term memory for more than a moment: for example, at 1.179–212, only after Athene/Mentes has replied to Telemachos' questions of 170–77, does she introduce a question of her own, at 206–12, the end of the passage. The question is uttered at 207. On the other hand, when a speaker does not expect an answer to a (rhetorical) question, he or she may not pause after asking it but may continue talking.[53]

In everyday conversation, when two questions have been asked, the order of answers is likely to correspond to the reverse order of the questions (although this is not invariably so). That is, the last question asked is likely to be the first addressed; and the first question

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[51] See E. Minchin, 'How Homeric is Hysteron Proteron?', *Mnemosyne* 44 (2001), 635–45.

[52] See Schegloff and Sacks, 'Opening up Closings', at 295–99.

[53] See, for example, 1.346–47, 391.

is addressed last.[54] In dealing with questions in reverse sequence the second speaker is able to economize on the effort of remembering. Only the first question need be stored in short-term memory, until the speaker can return to it. Unless there is a pressing need to revise the order of response, strings of questions are handled in the same way: it is generally easier for us to work backward through the questions we have been posed (as long as this number is restricted) than in the other direction. It may be argued that this simply reflects the force of habit. I suggest, however, that such habits are formed only when there are cognitive advantages, whether for us in conversation or for Homer as he mimicked the patterns of everyday talk. Thus, in the example above, in which Odysseus asks his mother (11.170–79) about the manner of her death, the security of his property, and his wife, Antikleia responds to these questions in reverse order.[55] Such a string of questions is atypical of our own conversation patterns; but it is interesting to observe that the response to this extraordinary sequence is, once again, the reverse pattern typical of everyday talk. Once more we find in Homer a stylization of conversational sequences. Without doubt, this is the appropriate strategy, in cognitive terms, if the poet is, in Lord's words (above), to 'meet the needs of rapid composition'. In oral epic, therefore, the *hysteron-proteron* pattern of question and answer has its own pleasing–almost rhythmical–regularity. As we have seen, even long strings of questions are systematically listed and are duly cleared (for the most part, in reverse order), with informative answers set out in a measured fashion. Indeed, the extended question and answer pattern of four or more questions (for example, at *Od.*1.170–79), which is marked by a careful response to each question element (at 1.180–94), is evidence of the poet's preparation in advance for the moment of performance.

[54] The reasons for this, as I have argued in 'How Homeric is Hysteron Proteron?' are more cognitive and pragmatic than aesthetic. Cf. also the questions at Plato, *Prt.* 309b3–4 and the response at 5; and at *Phdr.* 227a1–3 ("Ω φίλε Φαῖδρε, ποῖ δὴ καὶ πόθεν;—Παρὰ Λυσίου, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦ Κεφάλου, πορεύομαι δὲ πρὸς περίπατον ἔξω τείχους .... Where are you going, my dear Phaedrus, and where have you been?–I have been with Lysias, the son of Cephalus, Socrates, and I am going for a walk outside the walls ...).

[55] See also 4. 642–56; 7.237–97 (although the first question posed is evaded for the moment).

Conclusions

Let us list the conclusions we have reached to this point about Homer's habits in posing questions and offering answers in the epic world:

(I) A significant proportion of questions and answers (70% of the total) follow in an exemplary way the principle of the adjacency pair as proposed by Schegloff and Sacks. When a question is asked, the addressee for the most part responds promptly and appropriately. On the other hand, 30% of questions do not meet with informative answers. Many questions are rhetorical; some are countered by formalized counter-questions. This proportion, in the context of this particular story, is–to a degree–more representative of talk in literature than talk in the everyday world.

(II) Explanatory material is integrated into questions both in Homer's epics and in conversation in Western cultures today. Yet such material appears in Homer more frequently than in Plato's dialogues or in our own everyday talk. For the poet the regularity of this practice ensures that he clarifies motivation. It also allows him to transmit evaluative material internally (through the words of his actors) rather than externally (in his own voice). Thus he gives the audience the sense of a first-hand experience of unfolding events; he involves the audience in the action.

(III) Homer prefers to ask questions in multiples rather than singly. The sustained strings he produces are not a common conversational mode either in Plato or in Western cultures today. But like us he uses double questions (especially pairs of questions in which a topic is first identified and then expanded) and alternate questions. The frequency with which he uses such structures, however, suggests stylization of everyday conversational patterns. I have noted other patterns as well. These are patterns of repetition, be it verbal, syntactic, or intonational. These patterns without doubt underpin the poet's ability to generate speech readily in the context of performance. We, too, in casual conversation, draw on words and phrases and intonation patterns that we have stored in short term memory. And our purpose is the same: to maintain the continuity of our speech with some economy of mental effort.

(IV) As far as the generation of answers is concerned, whether in Homer or in everyday talk in Western cultures, most second pair parts refer back to the question asked and use material from that question. Thus the composition of answers, as answers, is simpler for us all than was the composition of the original question.

(V) The order in which strings of questions are answered has been shown to be varied. Homer, however, like us and like Plato, shows a preference for answering later questions before earlier ones. The so-called 'device' of hysteron-proteron is a practical, mind-based, strategy of everyday talk which Homer has mimicked in his composition of the adjacency pair of question and answer.

We note therefore a significant proportion of exemplary adjacency pairs in Homer (almost comparable with Plato's literary habit), a ritualized use of explanatory material, a complex but predictable range of options for the presentation of multiple questions and a further range of rational and predictable options for the generation of answers. We can find analogies for all these regularities in everyday discourse in English-speaking Western cultures. We have data that suggest that the everyday discourse of the ancient world included these same patterns; and they indicate that these patterns occurred with greater frequency in the discourse of Homer. I propose, therefore, that these epic strategies are formalized versions of the everyday conversational habits of the poet of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, of other practitioners of this tradition, and of all the members of their audiences. Rhythmical and/or structural patterns *based on everyday talk* have been developed to facilitate and sustain poetic composition in an oral context. From the poet's point of view these practices in their origins were a response to the demands of the moment. For the audience of the poems, on the other hand, the stylization of question-forms–along with their predictable rhythm–evokes a world of small ceremonies; it suggests a conversational etiquette that is altogether pleasing in its regularity and its careful formality.

APPENDIX

Questions and question strings in the Odyssey

1.60–62	Athene to Zeus
1.64–67	Zeus to Athene
1.158	Telemachos to 'Mentes'
1.169–77	Telemachos to 'Mentes'
1.206–7	'Mentes' to Telemachos
1.224–26	'Mentes' to Telemachos
1.298–300	'Mentes' to Telemachos
1.346–47	Telemachos to Penelope
1.391	Telemachos to Antinoös
1.405–9	Eurymachos to Telemachos
2.28–32	Aigyptios to Men of Ithaka
2.312–13	Telemachos to Antinoos
2.332–33	one suitor to another
2.363–65	Eurykleia to Telemachos
3.22	Telemachos to 'Mentor'
3.71–74	Nestor to Telemachos & 'Mentor'
3.214–17	Nestor to Telemachos
3.230	'Mentor' to Telemachos
3.248–52	Telemachos to Nestor
4.28–29	Eteoneus to Menelaos
4.116–19	Menelaos to himself
4.138–40	Helen to Menelaos
4.312–14	Menelaos to Telemachos
4.316–31	Telemachos to Menelaos
4.371–72	Eidothea to Menelaos
4.379–81	Menelaos to Eidothea
4.395–96	Menelaos to Eidothea
4.443	Menelaos to Telemachos, Peisistratos
4.462–63	Proteus to Menelaos
4.465–70	Menelaos to Proteus
4.487–90	Menelaos to Proteus
4.492	Proteus to Menelaos
4.551–53	Menelaos to Proteus
4.632–33	Noëmon to Antinoös
4.642–47	Antinoös to Noëmon
4.649–51	Noëmon to Antinoös

4.681–83	Penelope to Medon
4.707 and 710	Penelope to Medon
4.804	'Iphthime' to Penelope
4.810	Penelope to 'Iphthime'
4.832–34	Penelope to 'Iphthime'
5.22–24	Zeus to Athene
5.87–88	Kalypso to Hermes
5.100–1	Hermes to Kalypso
5.204–5	Kalypso to Odysseus
5.299	Odysseus to himself
5.339–40	Leukothea to Odysseus
5.465	Odysseus to himself
6.25	Athene to Nausikaa
6.57–59	Nausikaa to Alkinoös
6.119–21	Odysseus to himself
6.149	Odysseus to Nausikaa
6.199–200	Nausikaa to handmaidens
6.276–77	Nausikaa (as a Phaiakian) to Odysseus
7.22	Odysseus to child/Athene
7.237–39	Arete to Odysseus
8.153	Odysseus to Laodamas
8.208	Odysseus to Phaiakians
8.335–37	Apollo to Hermes
8.352–53	Hephaistos to Poseidon
8.572–86	Alkinoos to Odysseus
9.14	Odysseus to Alkinoös
9.252–55	Kyklops to Odysseus & men
9.279–80	Kyklops to Odysseus
9.351–52	Odysseus to Kyklops
9.403–6	Kyklopes to Kyklops
9.447–48	Kyklops to ram
9.494	companions to Odysseus
10.64	Aiolos to Odysseus
10.281–84	Hermes to Odysseus
10.325	Kirke to Odysseus
10.337–41	Odysseus to Kirke
10.378–80	Kirke to Odysseus
10.383–85	Odysseus to Kirke
10.431–34	Eurylochos to Odysseus' men
10.501	Odysseus to Kirke

10.573–74	Odysseus to audience
11.57	Odysseus to Elpenor
11.92–94	Teiresias to Odysseus
11.144	Odysseus to Teiresias
11.155–62	Antikleia to Odysseus
11.170–79	Odysseus to Antikleia
11.210–14	Odysseus to Antikleia
11.336–37	Arete to Phaiakians
11.370–72	Alkinoös to Odysseus
11.397–403	Odysseus to Agamemnon
11.457–61	Agamemnon to Odysseus
11.463	Odysseus to Agamemnon
11.473–76	Achilles to Odysseus
11.553–55	Odysseus to Aias
12.112–14	Odysseus to Kirke
12.117	Kirke to Odysseus
12.287–90	Eurylochos to Odysseus
12.450	Odysseus to Alkinoös
13.168–69	Phaiakians to each other
13.200–4	Odysseus to himself
13.232–35	Odysseus to Athene
13.328	Odysseus to Athene
13.417–19	Odysseus to Athene
14.115–16	Odysseus to Eumaios
14.186–89	Eumaios to Odysseus
14.364–65	Eumaios to Odysseus
14.496–98	'Odysseus' to companions
15.167–68	Peisistratos to Menelaos
15.195–96	Telemachos to Peisistratos
15.263–64	Theoklymenos to Telemachos
15.326–27	Eumaios to Odysseus
15.347–50	Odysseus to Eumaios
15.383–88	Odysseus to Eumaios
15.431–33	Phoinikian man to Phoinikian woman
15.509–11	Theoklymenos to Telemachos
16.57–58	Telemachos to Eumaios
16.70	Telemachos to Eumaios
16.95–98	Odysseus to Telemachos
16.137–41	Eumaios to Telemachos
16.187	Odysseus to Telemachos

16.222–23	Telemachos to Odysseus
16.421–25	Penelope to Antinoös
16.461–63	Telemachos to Eumaios
17.44	Penelope to Telemachos
17.219–20	Melanthios to Eumaios
17.375–79	Antinoös to Eumaios
17.382–85	Eumaios to Antinoös
17.446	Antinoös to Odysseus
17.545	Penelope to Eumaios
17.576–78	Penelope to Eumaios
18.31	Iros to Penelope
18.223–24	Penelope to Telemachos
18.333	Melantho to Odysseus
18.357–59	Eurymachos to Odysseus
18.393	Eurymachos to Odysseus
19.24	Eurykleia to Telemachos
19.66–67	Melantho to Odysseus
19.71–73	Odysseus to Melantho
19.104–5	Penelope to Odysseus
19.162–63	Penelope to Odysseus
19.165–66	Odysseus to Penelope
19.325–28	Penelope to Odysseus
19.482	Odysseus to Eurykleia
19.492	Eurykleia to Odysseus
19.500	Odysseus to Eurykleia
19.525–29	Penelope to Odysseus
20.33	Athene to Odysseus
20.42–43	Odysseus to Athene
20.129–30	Telemachos to Eurykleia
20.166–67	Eumaios to Odysseus
20.178–79	Melanthios to Odysseus
20.191–93	Philoitios to Eumaios
20.351	Theoklymenos to suitors
21.85–87	Antinoös to Eumaios & Philoitios
21.110	Telemachos to Penelope
21.168	Antinoös to Leodes
21.193–98	Odysseus to Eumaios & Philoitios
21.259	Antinoös to Odysseus
21.289–91	Antinoös to Odysseus
21.314–16	Penelope to Eurymachos

21.333	Penelope to Eurymachos
21.362–63	suitors to Eumaios
22.12–14	Narrator to Audiencc
22.132–33	Agelaos to suitors
22.231–32	Athene to Odysseus
23.15–17	Penelope to Eurykleia
23.70	Eurykleia to Penelope
23.97–99	Telemachos to Penelope
23.184	Odysseus to Penelope
23.264–65	Odysseus to Penelope
24.95	Agamemnon to Achilleus
24.106–14	Agamemnon to Amphimedon
24.256–57	Odysseus to Laertes
24.287–90	Laertes to Odysseus
24.297–301	Laertes to Odysseus
24.403–5	Dolios to Odysseus
24.407	Odysseus to Laertes
24.473–76	Athene to Zeus
24.478–80	Zeus to Athene
24.514	Laertes to gods

REPERFORMANCE SCENARIOS FOR PINDAR'S ODES

BRUNO CURRIE

Introduction

In the late 1980s and early 1990s there was a vigorous controversy over how Pindar's odes were first performed, whether solo or by a chorus.[1] The controversy subsided without being finally resolved. Its legacy seems to be a broad consensus on three points. First, that choral performance was the general rule for the first performance. Second, that (notwithstanding the rule just formulated) some epinicians may have been performed solo.[2] Third, that all reperformances of epinicians were solo. My concern is with the third of these; the question of reperformance is both important for the understanding of Pindar's odes and offers an opportunity for useful reflection on early classical Greece as a performance-oriented culture.

It must be said at the outset that not all scholars are even agreed that epinicians were reperformed.[3] Here I will take this for granted: it seems in fact to be presupposed in a number of odes.[4] My discussion will take as its starting point the clear sense that both Pindar and Bacchylides

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1 See especially M. Heath & M.R. Lefkowitz, 'Epinician Performance', *CPh* 86 (1991) 173-91; C. Carey, 'The Victory Ode in Performance: The Case for the Chorus', *CPh* 86 (1991) 192–200.

2 E.g. E. Robbins, 'Public Poetry', in *A Companion to the Greek Lyric Poets* ed. D.E. Gerber (Leiden, New York, Cologne 1997) 221–87 at 257; J.S. Clay, 'Pindar's Sympotic *Epinicia*', *QUCC* 62 (1999) 25–34 at 33.

3 A.P. Burnett *The Art of Bacchylides* (Cambridge MA. & London 1985) 77; E. Pöhlmann, 'Zur Überlieferung griechischer Literatur vom 8. bis zum 4.Jh.', in *Der Übergang von der Mündlichkeit zur Literatur bei den Griechen*, ed. W. Kullmann & M. Reichel (Tübingen 1990) 11–30 at 22.

4 E.g. *N.*4.13–16, *I.*2.44–45; Bacch. 3.96–98, 9.81–82. See H. Fraenkel *Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy* (New York 1975) 464 n. 44; H. Maehler *Die Lieder des Bakchylides* I *Die Siegeslieder* II *Kommentar* (Leiden 1982) 60–61; C. Carey, 'The Performance of the Victory Ode', *AJPh* 110 (1989) 545-65 at 548; *id.* 'Pindar and the Victory Ode', in: L. Ayres (ed.) *The Passionate Intellect. Essays on the Transformation of Classical Traditions* (New Brunswick 1995) 85–103 at 86 n. 4.

have that their victory odes may be 'immortal'.[5] It is by virtue of their odes' immortality that the poets claim to confer 'immortal fame' on the laudandus.[6] In turn, it is because he receives 'immortal fame' that in many odes the laudandus can be equated with the heroes.[7] Some scholars have seen this proclaimed immortality of the odes as depending on their written form.[8] However, in the culture of limited literacy of the fifth century B.C., continual reperformance seems more likely to have been the issue than the survival of any written text.[9]

The relative importance of epinician reperformance compared to the first performance has also been questioned; thus Ilja Pfeijffer in his recent commentary on three odes of Pindar has written:

> The impact of a Pindaric ode on subsequent audiences can be compared to a pebble that is thrown into a pond, causing concentric circles of rippling water, the intensity of which decreases the further away one gets from the centre. An ode had the deepest significance for its first audience attending the official celebration for which it was written.[10]

There is force in this objection. Yet it applies chiefly, I think, to a particular type of reperformance scenario: the informal reperformance scenarios, with which I will begin.

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[5] *I.*4.40–41; Bacch. 9.82–84.

[6] *O.*10.91–96, *P.*1.92–98, *N.*7.11–16, etc.; Bacch. 3.90–98; 13.58–66, etc.

[7] Cf. J. Pòrtulas, 'La condition héroïque et le statut religieux de la louange', *Entretiens Hardt* 31 (1985) 207–43 at 211; G. Nagy *Pindar's Homer. The Lyric Possession of an Epic Past* (Baltimore and London 1990) 140; E. Krummen *Pyrsos Hymnon. Festliche Gegenwart und mythisch-rituelle Tradition bei Pindar* (Berlin & New York 1990) 149 & n. 3; C. Dougherty *The Poetics of Colonization. From City to Text in Archaic Greece* (New York & Oxford 1993) 111, 116–17.

[8] So schol. *N.*4.10a; W. Mullen *Choreia: Pindar and Dance* (Princeton 1982) 42; Pöhlmann 'Zur Überlieferung griechischer Literatur' 22–23.

[9] Cf. J. Herington *Poetry into Drama: Early Tragedy and the Greek Poetic Tradition* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London 1985) 48–50, 55–56, 60, 207–10; W.V. Harris *Ancient Literacy* (Cambridge, Mass. 1989) esp. 85–86; R. Thomas *Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece* (Cambridge 1992) 114–15, 119, 122–23; E. Csapo & W.J. Slater *The Contexts of Ancient Drama* (Ann Arbor 1994) 2. However, greater importance is attached to the role of written texts of Pindar by Thomas Hubbard (in this volume).

[10] I.J. Pfeijffer *Three Aeginetan Odes of Pindar. A Commentary on* Nemean *V*, Nemean *III, &* Pythian *VIII* (Leiden, Boston, & Cologne 1999) 10. Pfeijffer's main concern, to which I am sympathetic, is to emphasize the importance of the odes' immediate historical context to their interpretation.

Informal Reperformance Scenarios

The informal reception of Pindar's odes will have begun immediately after their first performance. The odes could be exported by various means from the site of the original performance.[11] *N.*5.2–3 speaks of 'sweet song' going forth from Aegina 'on every boat'. At *O.*9.21–26 the laudator says he will send his message in every direction swifter than a high-spirited horse or a winged ship.[12] The image of the ode's dispersal by boat occurs elsewhere too.[13] Two explanatory models, mutually compatible, come to mind.

First, there is the possibility of oral diffusion. The odes may have been dispersed by travellers who were present at the ode's first performance and retained it in their memory.[14] Even making allowance for the capacity of ancient memories, this may seem a unlikely model.[15] However, it gains plausibility from comparison with the alleged dissemination of Euripides' tragedies in Sicily at the end of the fifth century. Reputedly, the Sicilians would quiz all comers from mainland Greece for any scraps of Euripides which they knew by heart, and then pass these on from one to another by word of mouth; moreover, some Athenian servicemen who were captured in Sicily in 413 B.C. were said to have won their freedom by singing (parts of?) songs of Euripides.[16] We are not obliged to grant this anecdote uncritical credence, but even if we do not, the conditions it presupposes for its acceptance are unlikely to be wholly implausible. It is possible that the Athenians in question had served in a Euripidean chorus, possible too that recitation of just the lyric portions is meant. However that may be, Pindar seems to have a similar concept of human conduits for his poetry: in *O.*6, Aineias, apparently the chorus-trainer and Pindar's deputy, brings the ode to Stymphalos, for which office he receives the striking designation 'message stick of the Muses' (91 σκυτάλα Μοισᾶν).[17] A living person,

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[11] See Herington *Poetry into Drama* 189–91 ('The Sending of Lyric Poems').

[12] Cf. Theogn. 245–50.

[13] *N.*6.32; Bacch. 16.2–4. See Fraenkel *Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy* 430; D.E. Gerber, 'Pindar, *Nemean* Six: A Commentary', *HSPh* 99 (1999) 33–91 at 66. Cf. *P.*2.67.

[14] Cf. W. Rösler *Dichter und Gruppe. Eine Untersuchung zu den Bedingungen und zur historischen Funktion früher griechischer Lyrik am Beispiel Alkaios* (Munich 1980) 103–4 n. 176.

[15] On the ancient memory, see Harris *Ancient Literacy* 30–33.

[16] Plut. *Nic.* 29.2–3; Satyrus *Life of Euripides*, P. Oxy. 1176 fr. 39.xix.11–34. Cf. Csapo & Slater *Contexts of Ancient Drama* 3–4, 8–9 no. 9; Harris *Ancient Literacy* 33.

[17] Cf. Herington *Poetry into Drama* 190. Compare too Archil. 185.1–2 *IEG* with S.R. West, 'Archilochus' Message-Stick', *CQ* 38 (1988) 42–48.

it seems, who knows the ode by heart fulfils the purpose of a written transcript.[18]

Secondly, there is the possibility that written texts of Pindar's odes were transported overseas. We have to wait until the turn of the fifth century B.C. for evidence of a trade in books: Xenophon describes the Ten Thousand as finding among the cargo of wrecked ships at the Black Sea 'many papyrus rolls with writing on them' (*Anab.* 7.5.14). Something like this, on a smaller scale, may have been going on earlier in the century.[19] Certainly, letters were conveyed between individuals in this period, although it is unclear how common this was.[20]

After its dispersal, by whatever means, an ode could become embedded in the oral fabric of the new host society. It might be learned in schools (Aristophanes *Clouds* 966–68).[21] Schools were a context of mixed literacy and orality. School teachers possessed texts of poems, and it has been thought likely that there was a school text of Pindar.[22] But apart from learning literacy skills, pupils also learned songs by heart.[23] This performative competence, which was valued in a predominantly oral culture, could be called on subsequently in various adult contexts. One might be invited to perform a song impromptu after a family dinner. This scenario is depicted in Aristophanes' *Clouds*, where Strepsiades requests a victory ode of Simonides from his son Pheidippides: 'After we had had dinner... I asked him to take the lyre and sing a song of Simonides: how "the Ram was shorn"' (*Clouds* 1354–56 = Simonides *PMG* 507). In a less familial setting, a victory ode might be requested from the participants at a symposium. This model is attested

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[18] Differently, Hubbard (this volume, p. 92) finds here a reference to the poem's existence as a written text.

[19] For the trade in books, see further Ar. *ran.* 52–54, 1105–18; Plat. *apol.* 26d–e. Cf. Eupolis fr. 304.3 K; Aristomenes fr. 9 K; Nicophon fr. 19 K. Harris *Ancient Literacy* 85 n. 92. See Hubbard (this volume) for an interesting new view of the dissemination of texts in this period.

[20] See S. Lewis *News and Society in the Greek Polis* (London 1996) 142–52.

[21] C. Kugelmeier *Reflexe früher und zeitgenössicher Lyrik in der Alten attischen Komödie* (Stuttgart & Leipzig 1996) 41–44, cf. 27–32. Cf. Hubbard (this volume, pp. 81, 86–88).

[22] In general, Herington *Poetry into Drama* 45–46, 203–5. School text of Pindar: Nagy *Pindar's Homer* 112. Cf. Pöhlmann 'Zur Überlieferung griechischer Literatur' 23.

[23] For reading and writing at school, see Hdt. 6.27.2 (Chios); Xen. *Cyr.* 1.2.6. Attic red-figure vases: Harris *Ancient Literacy* 97, Table 2. Pupils learning songs by heart: Ar. *nub.* 966, cf. *eq.* 987–96; Plat. *legg.* 810e–811a. See Harris *Ancient Literacy* 58–59, 96–102. On schools, cf. M. Griffith '"Public" and "Private" in Early Greek Institutions of Education', in: Y.L. Too (ed.) *Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity* (Leiden, Boston, & Cologne 2001) 23–84 at 66–71.

for non-epinician lyric. Our source again is Aristophanes, this time a verse from the fragmentary *Banqueters*, where an unidentified speaker says, 'sing, I pray, taking some skolion from Alcaeus or Anacreon' (Ar. 235 *PCG*). The term 'skolion' here denotes a lyric composition by a canonical poet, reperformed solo at a symposium by one of the diners accompanying himself on the lyre.[24] Such performance of skolia was a widespread custom in archaic and early classical Greece.[25] This constitutes a significant reperformance scenario for Pindar's odes; but it may be that scholars have exaggerated its importance.

It has, in fact, some paradoxical consequences. These secondary performers must often have been quite indifferent to the laudandus of the ode. On this model, it will have been the musical and poetic connoisseurship of aristocrats throughout the Greek world, not any interest in the laudandus, that guaranteed reperformance of the ode.[26] The point is made by Ibycus, who signals the dependence of the fame of his laudandus Polykrates on his own fame as poet (282.47–48 *PMG*). But what was the nature of this connoisseurship, and would it guarantee faithful reproduction of the ode? We are given the rare chance of a control by a poem of Alcaeus, which has not only been preserved on papyrus in its original form, but is also quoted by Athenaeus as an Attic 'skolion' (Alcaeus fr. 249 L-P and *Carmina convivalia* 891 *PMG*, quoted by Athenaeus 15 695a). This particular case does not inspire confidence: in the first place, the skolion is a mere excerpt from the original, and in the second place the wording of the original has been modified in various, non-trivial, respects. Both the excerpting and the modification aim to make the skolion more generic, less anchored in the 'here and now' than the original composition.[27]

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24 Nagy *Pindar's Homer* 107 'This word *skolion*, as used in the time of Aristophanes, is an appropriate general designation for the performance, self-accompanied on the lyre, of compositions by the great lyric masters'. Cf. A.E. Harvey, 'The Classification of Greek Lyric Poetry', *CQ* 49 (1955) 157–75 at 162–63 (162 'any of [the great lyric poets'] poems which were suitable for reperformance after dinner, whether intended for this purpose ... or not, could be sung as σκόλια'); Herington *Poetry into Drama* 49–50, 208.

25 A 'custom': Schol. Ar. *vesp.* 1222. Cf. Eupolis fr. 148.1–2 *PCG*; Cic. *Tusc.* 1.4. Theognis envisages his poetry being reperformed by others at symposia: Theogn. 239–40 *IEG*. Parts of tragedies could also reperformed at symposia: Csapo & Slater *Contexts of Ancient Drama* 7–8 nos 7–8.

26 Nagy *Pindar's Homer* 113 (Pindar's compositions reperformed as 'Classics'), 114 '[re]performance of a canonical poet'.

27 See Rösler *Dichter und Gruppe* 97–98; E. Fabbro, 'Sul riuso di carmi d'autore nei simposi attici (*Carm. conv.* 8 P. e Alc. fr. 249 V.)', *QUCC* 41 (1992) 29–38. Cf. the relationship of Alcae. fr. 141 *PLF* to Ar. *vesp.* 1234–35.

A Pindaric ode which was reperformed under such conditions is likely to have come under comparable pressures. The parts of the poem that had the greatest appeal for these secondary performers and their audiences were the gnomic, ethical passages and the poetic *tours de force*: precisely the parts that had least to do with the laudandus himself. In fact, we do find that the extant citations of Pindar by authors of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. are largely confined to the 'bravura openings' and 'purple patches': these were evidently the parts that these performers most liked to perform and their audiences to hear.[28]

The ode would be vulnerable in another way too: to changing musical tastes. In Athens, at least, such changes could be rapid. Athenaeus cites Eupolis as raising a protest, within at most 30 or so years of Pindar's death, that Pindar's poetry was no longer being performed there: 'The comedian Eupolis says that the compositions of Pindar are now consigned to silence by the philistinism of the masses' (Eupolis 398 *PCG*, at Athenaeus 1.3a).[29] Even allowing for comic exaggeration, this protest should be allowed some basis in reality. Pindar's confidence in the immortality of his victory odes would seem to have been built on shaky foundations if he relied just on their reperformance as skolia at symposia. It is precisely this kind of informal reperformance scenario against which the objections of Ilja Pfeijffer carry weight.

As a postscript to these informal performance scenarios, we may mention another informal model by which a victory ode could be taken up by an oral culture. This is a model which renounces all fidelity to the text: it concerns the ode's ability to spark off subsequent oral performances distinct from Pindar's ode, whether these are songs (*aoidai*) or stories in prose (*logoi*). This model is prominent in Pindar's odes. Thus, *O.*11.4–5 refers to 'honey-voiced songs, the beginning of subsequent stories (*logoi*)'; *P.*6.18–19 states that the victory ode 'will proclaim your

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[28] See T. Cole *Pindar's Feasts or the Music of Power* (Rome 1992) 15; Pfeijffer *Three Aeginetan Odes* 10; Carey 'Pindar and the Victory Ode' 90. Also, J. Irigoin *Histoire du texte de Pindare* (Paris 1952) 16. Cf. K.A. Morgan, 'Pindar the Professional and the Rhetoric of the ΚΩΜΟΣ', *CPh* 88 (1993) 1–15 at 12 'In such surroundings there is a danger that Pindar's song may sink into the undifferentiated mass of sympotic and informal poetry. That is, once it has lost its original occasion it may lose its specificity and uniqueness'. On the familiarity with Pindar's poems in Athens before Alexandrian editions (Aristophanes, Plato), see Irigoin *Histoire du texte de Pindare* 14–16; Nagy *Pindar's Homer* 108; Gentili *et al. Pindaro. Le Pitiche* (Verona 1995) lxxii-lxxiii; Carey 'Pindar and the Victory Ode' 90; G.O. Hutchinson *Greek Lyric Poetry. A Commentary on Selected Larger Pieces* (Oxford 2001) 427–28.

[29] Herington *Poetry into Drama* 208; Nagy *Pindar's Homer* 106.

victory in the chariot, making it glorious in the stories (*logoi*) of men'; *P.*1.92–94 claims that 'the posthumous vaunt of fame alone declares the way of life of departed men to both story-tellers (*logioi*) and poets (*aoidoi*)'; *N.*6.29–30 says 'when men have departed, songs (*aoidai*) and stories (*logoi*) preserve their fine deeds'. 'Story-tellers' (*logioi*) are mentioned again at *N.*6.45.[30] These oral performances include anecdote, report, and gossip: the kind of oral tradition which, later in the century, would be tapped by Herodotus.[31] This seems to have been a way, envisaged by the odes themselves, in which the laudandus could attain lasting fame thanks to the ode. It has nothing to do, however, with the continuing survival of the ode. On this model, the ode provides a one-off influx into an ever-flowing stream of oral tradition, only to disappear into that stream itself. Prominent as this model is in the odes, it seems to be something separate from the notion that the ode confers immortal fame because the ode itself is immortal.[32]

So far we have seen little to justify the epinician poets' confidence in the immortality of their odes. While the odes clearly aimed to make the laudandus' fame resonate widely (*I.*1.50–51, to cite but one example, emphasizes the role of 'citizens *and foreigners*'), it was surely at the epicentre of its production that an ode had the chances of surviving longest. Another type of reperformance scenario brings us closer to that epicentre: what I will call 'semi-formal' reperformance scenarios.

Semi-formal Reperformance Scenarios

The laudandus' family, unlike the performers in the informal reperformance scenarios we have been considering, was both situationally close to the original performance and had a vested interest in an ode's reperformance. Many scholars are agreed on the probability that the text of a victory ode would have remained in the possession of the victor's

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30 See in general H. Gundert *Pindar und sein Dichterberuf* (Frankfurt am Main 1935) 46. Gerber 'Pindar, *Nemean* 6' 64. Gentili *et al.*, *Pindaro. Le Pitiche* 362. Nagy *Pindar's Homer* 221–24 esp. 224 'The medium of *logioi*... is at least ideologically that of performance'.

31 On Hdt.'s use of λόγιοι ἄνδρες, see N. Luraghi *The Historian's Craft in the Age of Herodotus* (Oxford 2001) 6–7, esp. 157 & n. 49; 26–27 (O. Murray). J. Gould *Herodotus* (London 1989) 27 '[Hdt.] talks of his sources as *logioi*... It is clear that we are dealing with an oral tradition'.

32 Cf. Burnett *Art of Bacchylides* 77–78.

family.[33] If, as has been suggested, one of the main functions of written poetic texts in this period was to serve as a transcript for reperformance, we may have here a hint here that the family could be involved in the reperformance of an epinician.[34]

There are hints in the odes to support such a view. First, there is *I*.2.43–46: 'let no-one ... ever condemn to silence either a father's excellence or this song, since I did not fashion it to remain idle'; here, the addressee of the ode, Thrasyboulos, seems to be charged with the duty of constant reperformance of this epinician in honour of his father Xenokrates. But the clearest indication of a family's role in overseeing the reperformance of an epinician comes in *N*.4. The importance of the evidence of this ode for epinician reperformance has been recognized, but its implications have not, perhaps, been sufficiently explored. Two passages in this ode deserve close scrutiny; the first is verses 13–19:

... εἰ δ' ἔτι ζαμενεῖ Τιμόκριτος ἁλίῳ
σὸς πατὴρ ἐθάλπετο, ποικίλον κιθαρίζων
θαμά κε τῷδε μέλει κλιθεὶς
⟨υἱὸν⟩[35] κελάδησε καλλίνικον
Κλεωναίου τ' ἀπ' ἀγῶνος ὅρμον στεφάνων
πέμψαντα καὶ λιπαρᾶν
εὐωνύμων ἀπ' Ἀθανᾶν.

[33] Irigoin *Histoire du texte de Pindare* 8; Fraenkel *Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy* 429 'The text became an hierloom in the family'; Gentili *et al*., *Pindaro. Le Pitiche* lxxii. There is, however, no direct evidence for the possession of a text of an epinician by the laudandus' family: cf. Irigoin *Histoire du texte de Pindare*: 8 n. 1. Certainly, 'family archives' were a significant form of textual preservation in the archaic and classical periods: see Herington *Poetry into Drama* 46, 203 ('Texts in Family Archives').

[34] Herington *Poetry into Drama* 50 '[most archaic and early classical poetry that survived into the Hellenistic age] was often re-performed subsequent to the first production ... [Otherwise,]... in the era before private reading became a habit, what would be the point of making or preserving a written poetic text at all, if the papyrus was destined only to decay in a closet, voiceless?'. Cf. Thomas *Literacy and Orality* 123–27; L. Pratt, 'The Seal of Theognis, Writing, and Oral Poetry', *AJP* 116 (1995) 171–84 at 175. Specifically on epinician poetry, Fraenkel *Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy* 430 'From such manuscripts the poem could be re-awakened into life at any time'. Cf., on drama, Csapo & Slater *Contexts of Ancient Drama* 4 'In most cases ... the oral and the book tradition are inextricably mixed'. Cf. modern theories of Theognis' 'seal' (Theogn. 19–23), according to which Theognis deposited a 'sealed' text of his poetry in a temple as safeguard of authenticity in the context of oral tradition: see Pratt 'Seal of Theognis'. Note that Hubbard (this volume, p. 82–84) argues for an elite contemporary readership for Pindar's odes, in which case they will have had another function than just as transcripts for performance.

[35] An emendation of Bergk; the manuscripts have ὕμνον.

> If your father Timokritos were still being warmed by the blazing sun, he would have devoted himself to this song and, playing an elaborate tune on the lyre, would have often celebrated his victorious son, who has brought with him a wreath of crowns from the games at Kleonai and from brilliant and famous Athens.

This passage implies that *N.*4 would have been reperformed 'often' by the laudandus' father, if he were still alive. The interpretation of τῷδε μέλει κλιθείς is critical. To many recent interpreters the participle κλιθείς has suggested the image of 'reclining' at a symposium.[36] This derives apparent support from the use of the same participle at *O.*1.92, of Pelops 'reclining' (in his tomb) by the river Alpheos. But it seems more likely that at *N.*4.15 κλιθείς is used in a metaphorical sense to mean 'having devoted himself to'.[37] We may compare the semantics of the verb προσκεῖμαι, which has the basic meaning 'I lie by or upon', but also means 'I am devoted to' (LSJ *sv.* II.2.). Pausanias uses the verb to say 'I am devoted to the poetry of Homer', (2.21.10 πρόσκειμαι ... τῇ Ὁμήρου ποιήσει). This provides a good semantic parallel to Timokritos' 'devoting himself to this song'.[38] Timokritos on this interpretation would, if he were still alive, have 'devoted himself to' Pindar's song and 'often' reperformed it. The supposed image of 'reclining' in κλιθείς may thus be illusory. If it is, then so is the suggestion of a sympotic setting for these hypothetical reperformances of *N.*4.

Most scholars, however, have assumed a sympotic setting, and have assimilated Timokritos' hypothetical reperformances of *N.*4 to the model represented by Aristophanes *Clouds* 1354–56, where Strepsiades requests from Pheidippides a performance of an epinician of Simonides after they have finished dinner (see above). Thus scholars have assumed that Timokritos is to sing solo, accompanying himself on the lyre, and have assumed that this was in general the medium for the reperfor-

[36] Morgan 'Pindar the Professional' 12 '"leaning upon this song"... the image is surely that of reclining at a symposium'; similarly J.S. Clay, 'Pindar's Sympotic *Epinicia*', *QUCC* 62 (1999) 25–34 at 33 n. 20; etc. Rather differently, J.B. Bury *The Nemean Odes of Pindar* (London 1890) 69 '*Leaning against this strain*, as against a pillar or support'. Differently still, Cole *Pindar's Feasts* 98 'basing himself' on 'a musico-poetic sequence (*melos*)'; cf. 99 n. 20 (Cole suggests that *melos* does not refer to the ode *N.*4; this does not convince me).

[37] So LSJ *sv.* κλίνω II.6. Cf. W.J. Slater *Lexicon to Pindar* (Berlin 1969) *sv* κλίνω 'relying on (this song)', followed by W.H. Race *Pindar* (2 vols, Cambridge Mass. & London 1997) 2.35. The scholion on *N.*4.21c seems to imply a metaphorical understanding: 'having inclined, that is, having applied, himself to this *melos*, that is, to this ode ...'.

[38] Cf. Thuc. 1.93.7: Themistokles is 'devoted to' the navy.

mance of Pindar's odes subsequent to their first (choral) performance.[39] However, another passage, *P.*1.97–98, which seems to envisage a sympotic setting for the reperformance of encomia at symposia (this is the implication of 'lyres in banqueting halls'), seems in fact to envisage not a solo singer, but a chorus ('in gentle fellowship with boys' voices'). Furthermore, we should remember that 'The lyre could be used both for choral and monodic performances'.[40] In theory, at least, it is possible that Timokritos at *N.*4.13–16 is being conceived in the role of 'leader' (*exarchos*) of a chorus.[41] There is no allusion to a chorus here, but then the spotlight is understandably on the dead father. At this stage I merely flag the possibility that Timokritos' (hypothetical) reperformances of *N.*4 may have been choral; we will return to it later.

There is a second passage in *N.*4 which has an important bearing on the question of epinician reperformance. This is verses 89–92:

> τὸν Εὐφάνης ἐθέλων γεραιὸς προπάτωρ
> † ὁ σὸς ἀείσεται, παῖ †.
> ἄλλοισι δ' ἅλικες ἄλλοι· τὰ δ' αὐτὸς ἀντιτύχῃ,
> ἔλπεταί τις ἕκαστος ἐξοχώτατα φάσθαι.

> Him [Kallikles] your aged grandfather, Euphanes, will gladly celebrate in song, my boy. Different people have different contemporaries; but each person hopes to express best what he himself has met with.

This passage presents a crux of text and interpretation. Verse 90 as transmitted makes good sense, but is unmetrical. Many editors have

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[39] M. M. Willcock *Pindar, Victory Odes* (Cambridge 1995) 96 'This statement gives rare evidence for the possible separate, and (it seems) non-choral, performance of Pindar's poems'. Cf. M. Davies, 'Monody, Choral Lyric and the Tyranny of the Hand-Book', *CQ* 38 (1988) 52–64 at 56–57 & n. 35; N.J. Richardson, 'Panhellenic Cults and Panhellenic Poets', *Cambridge Ancient History* (2nd ed.) 5 (1992) 223–44 at 239; L. Kurke *The Traffic in Praise. Pindar and the Poetics of Social Economy* (Ithaca & London 1991) 5 n. 17; R. Thomas, 'The Place of the Poet in Archaic Society', in: A. Powell (ed.) *The Greek World* (London & New York 1995) 104–29 at 11●, 125 n. 36; Morgan 'Pindar the Professional' 11–12; M.R. Lefkowitz *First Person Fictions. Pindar's Poetic 'I'* (Oxford 1991) 194–95; A. Lardinois, 'Who Sang Sappho's Songs?', in: E. Greene (ed.) *Reading Sappho. Contemporary Approaches* (Berkeley & Los Angeles) 150–72 at 157 n. 36; Clay 'Pindar's Sympotic *Epinicia*' 33; M. Heath, 'Receiving the κῶμος: The Context and Performance of Epinician', *AJPh* 109 (1988) 180–95 at 187 n. 18; Nagy *Pindar's Homer* 107, 113, 115.

[40] Quotation from Lardinois 'Who Sang Sappho's Songs?' 153 n. 15. Cf. E. Fabbro *Carmina convivalia Attica* (Rome 1995) xvi.

[41] As assumed, apparently, by Mullen *Choreia* 34 (who, however, ignores θαμά in taking *N.*4.13–16 to refer to the original performance). For persons playing the part of *exarchos* in Pindar, cf. the poet himself (e.g. *N.*3.11–10, and often); Aineias in *O.*6; Nikasippos in *I.*2; Epharmostos in *O.*9. At *P.*4.295–97, on the other hand, Damophilos may be envisaged as giving solo performances with the lyre at symposia in Cyrene.

adopted Hermann's emendation, σὸς ἄεισέν ποτε, παῖ, 'your [grandfather] once sung, boy'. This introduces a past tense; however, the future tense ἀείσεται, 'will sing', is found in both the manuscripts and the scholia.[42] The future tense should certainly be retained.[43] A way of doing so is offered by Mommsen's transposition: ἀείσεται, παῖ, ὁ σός, 'your [grandfather], boy, will sing'. This emendation takes ὁ σός, 'your', from the beginning to the end of the verse, neatly repairs the metre, but leaves everything else intact.[44] Mommsen's transposition is taken up by Race in his recent Loeb edition; it seems in fact the only convincing restauration of the text. Then Euphanes, the laudandus' 'father's father' (προπάτωρ, 89), 'will sing' a song for Kallikles, the laudandus' 'mother's father' (μάτρῳ, 80). (Discussion of the complications of the family tree is relegated to an Appendix.) Kallikles once won a victory at the Isthmian games (verses 87–88), but now he is dead (verse 85). The majority of commentators have assumed that Euphanes, like Kallikles, is dead. When they have weighed the future tense 'will sing' (90), they have assumed that he is to sing of Kallikles in the underworld.[45] It seems better to assume that Euphanes was still alive when *N*.4 was composed. He is described as 'elderly' (89), which makes better sense of a living person than a dead one. Timasarchos, moreover, won his Nemean victory as a 'boy' (90): that is, between 12 and 16 years.[46] There would be nothing surprising in a young Timasarchos having a living grandfather.[47]

We may reasonably infer that Euphanes is alive and is to sing a song celebrating the dead Kallikles. That song is evidently an epinician celebrating Kallikles' Isthmian victory. The family appears, then, to have commissioned an epinician poet approximately a generation before Pindar: this situation would be paralleled by the Corinthian Oligaithidai, for whom Simondes once composed an epinician (for

[42] Schol. N.4.144a, c.

[43] So Bury *Nemean Odes of Pindar* 79; L.R. Farnell *The Works of Pindar* 2 (London 1932) 272.

[44] For the correption of παῖ, cf. 38 ὑπέρτεροι and 79 ἔμμεναι in the same ode, and cf. generally B. Snell & H. Maehler *Bacchylidis carmina cum fragmentis* (Leipzig 1970) xx.

[45] So schol. *N*.4.144a; D.S. Carne-Ross *Pindar* (New Haven & London 1985) 119–20; Willcock *Pindar, Victory Odes* 108. An apparent exception is Race *Pindar* 2.43 n. 3.

[46] παῖς is only used for adult victors to form a patronymic, when it means 'son of', rather than 'boy' (e.g. *P*.2.18 Δεινομένειε παῖ, 'son of Deinomenes'). The reference to the trainer at *N*.4.93–96 also suits a boy victor.

[47] There is no difficulty in προπάτωρ, 'grandfather' being used of a living family member: cf. Plat. *leg.* 931d5-e6.

Xenophon's father) and Pindar subsequently composed *O.*13 (for Xenophon).[48] The epinician for Kallikles which will be performed by Euphanes must be a reprise of an old epinician, whose premiere will have taken place shortly after Kallikles' victory. The reperformance by Euphanes announced at *N.*4.90 surely coincides with the occasion of *N.*4: 'he will sing' (90) is most taken naturally to refer to a later stage in the same poetic programme as *N.*4 belonged to. We may, further, wonder how often Euphanes had already performed this epinician for Kallikles. It seems a natural assumption that if Timokritos 'would have' performed Pindar's epinician (*N.*4) for his son Timasarchos 'often', then Euphanes also had already performed the epinician for Kallikles 'often'.

If *N.*4 and the reperformance of the epinician for Kallikles were part of the same poetic programme, it follows that this performance scenario was an organized affair, involving at least the extended clan. It is for this reason that I distinguish this reperformance scenario as 'semi-formal' from the informal reperformances of skolia at Attic symposia. *N.*4 raises three features of particular interest. First, *N.*4 would have been reperformed 'often' by Timokritos if he were alive (this is stated in verses 13–16). Second, Euphanes may have already reperformed the epinician for Kallikles often by the time *N.*4 was first performed (this is a natural inference from the statement that Timokritos 'would have' reperformed the epinician for Timasarchos 'often'). Third, Euphanes was to reperform the epinician for Kallikles on the same occasion at which *N.*4 was performed (this is the natural implication of 'he will sing', verse 90). It is not a great leap from here to a further, intriguing possibility: that both these family epinicians were to be reperformed regularly on the same occasion.

If so, we may wonder what kind of occasion this was. It has been suggested that the anniversary of an athletic victory would have provided a suitable occasion for the reperformance of a victory ode.[49] However, the text of *N.*4 offers a clue to the context of its first performance: the performing first person says, 'I am being dragged by a charm in my heart to touch on the new moon' (35). Festivals were celebrated at the start of

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[48] See W.S. Barrett, 'The Oligaithidai and Their Victories (Pindar, *Olympian* 13; *SLG* 339, 340)', in: *Dionysiaca* (Cambridge 1978) 1–20; D.A. Campbell *Greek Lyric* 3 (Cambridge Mass. & London 1991) 406–9.

[49] Herington *Poetry into Drama* 56; E. Stehle *Performance and Gender in Ancient Greece: Non-dramatic Poetry in its Setting* (Princeton 1997) 22.

the (lunar) month, so 'new moon' here seems to be metonymy for 'festival'.[50] It seems then that *N.*4 was to be (first) performed on the occasion of a local Aeginetan festival. According to the arguments above, this festival will also have been the occasion for Euphanes' reperformance of the epinician for Kallikles, and probably also the occasion envisaged for the (counterfactual) reperformances of *N.*4 by the dead Timokritos.

This reconstruction must, obviously, remain tentative. Even so it provokes a further question: would the performance and reperformance of epinicians at this festival have been a private or public affair? Recent scholarship has taught us to be cautious in the application of this dichotomy: in the archaic and classical periods, 'private' aristocratic occasions could typically have a public dimension.[51] Thus, when Kleisthenes, the sixth-century tyrant of Sicyon, arranged the marriage of his daughter Agariste, he feasted not just the suitors, but 'all the Sicyonians' (Hdt. 6.129.1). In the fifth century, both athletic and military victors could feast whole communities, as did Leophron and Alkibiades at Olympia and Konon at Athens.[52] Aristotle mentions 'feasting the city' as a way for an aristocratic citizen to exercise the virtue of 'magnificence' (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1122b23). Pindar says that 'the city too enjoys festivities at the celebrations of the Eratidai', that is, the victor's family (*O.*7.93–94).[53] Yet it is unthinkable that a family would feast a city *regularly* at its own expense. We might then think instead of the festival alluded to at *N.*4.35 as a public affair, at which the family was able to bring on a chorus which it had privately financed and trained, undertaking a kind of voluntary (and self-interested) *choregia*. We may recall that 'choral performance was one of the ways in which presti-

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[50] Farnell *Pindar* 2.266; P. von der Mühll, 'Bemerkungen zu Pindars Nemeen und Isthmien', *MH* 14 (1957) 127–32 at 130; Carne-Ross *Pindar* 115; Willcock *Pindar, Victory Odes* 100; Race *Pindar* 2.37 n. 4; Lefkowitz *First-Person Fictions* 48. Verse 35 then expresses the duty of the laudator 'to "get down to business" with the particularities of the occasion' (A.M. Miller '*N.* 4.33–43 and the Defense of Digressive Leisure', *CJ* 78 (1983) 202–20 at 207–8). For ὧραι (*N.*4.34) of a festival, cf. *I.*2.23.

[51] See P. Schmitt Pantel, 'Sacrificial Meal and *Symposion*: Two Models of Civic Institutions in the Archaic City?' in: O. Murray (ed.) *Sympotica. A Symposium on the* Symposion (Oxford 1990) 14–33; Clay 'Pindar's Sympotic *Epinicia*', *passim*; M. Vetta, 'Il simposio: la monodia e il giambo', in: G. Cambiano, L. Canfora & D. Lanza (eds) *Lo spazio letterario della Grecia antica* I (Rome 1992) 177–218; Hutchinson *Greek Lyric Poetry* 361, 364.

[52] Athen. 1.3e; Suda *sv.* Ἀθήναιος; Plut. *Alc.* 11–12.

[53] On the implications of *O.*7.93–94 for public performance, cf. Carey 'Pindar and the Victory Ode' 95. Clay 'Pindar's Sympotic *Epinicia*' 27–29 assumes on the basis of *O.*7.1–8 that *O.*7 was performed at a (public) symposium.

gious families traditionally staged their centrality in their community and their right to speak for it, to identify its interest with their own'.[54] If the festival of *N.*4.35 was a public one, then the likelihood that the odes were chorally performed becomes greater, and the possibility flagged above, that Timokritos is envisaged as playing the role of *exarchos*, now becomes interesting (verses 13–16; we might think of Euphanes at 89–90 as playing the role of *exarchos* too). This is, admittedly, a speculative reconstruction, and in any case, this family is likely to have been exceptional: they are said to enjoy the reputation on Aegina of being 'a servant of victory songs' (77–79). This is clearly a special claim to fame: it is to be understood in the light of the roles which Timokritos and Euphanes are shown as playing in verses 14 and 90.[55] It does not follow, then, that the scenario reconstructed for *N.*4 has repercussions for other odes.

However, one possible implication for a pair of other odes, *Isthmians* 4 and 3, may be mentioned briefly. Some editors have seen these as a single continuous ode.[56] But the current consensus is that they are two separate odes, composed for the same laudandus, Melissos of Thebes. Uniquely in the Pindaric corpus, we have here two odes composed in the same metre. It has plausibly been suggested that *I.*3 was composed later than *I.*4, after Melissos had won a further victory. Yet *I.*3 was evidently not meant simply to become a new prelude to *I.*4: the two odes seem to have been constructed in such a way as to retain their independence. So why choose the same metre for two distinct odes? An attractive answer, suggested by G.A. Privitera, is that the same chorus was meant to perform both odes at the minimum of training and expense.[57] But this expedient would, I suggest, recommend itself especially if *I.*4 were scheduled for (regular) choral reperformance, so that *I.*3 could be performed by the same chorus on the same occasion alongside the earlier ode. This (no less hypothetical) state of affairs would parallel *N.*4's

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[54] Stehle *Performance and Gender* 25.

[55] See Willcock *Pindar, Victory Odes* 107 (differently, Bury *Nemean Odes of Pindar* 78). For πάτρα as an Aeginetan term for 'clan', see T.J. Figueira, *Aegina. Society and Politics* (Salem 1981) 313.

[56] E. Thummer *Die Isthmischen Gedichte* I (Heidelberg 1968) 170–75; B. Snell & H. Maehler *Pindari carmina cum fragmentis* I *Epinicia* (Leipzig 1987) 144–48.

[57] So G.A. Privitera, 'Le vittorie di Melisso nelle Istmiche III e IV', *Helikon* 18–19 (1978–79) 3–21 at 21. Compare and contrast J.B. Lidov, 'The Poems and Performance of Isthmians 3 and 4', *CSCA* 7 (1974) 175–85 at 178, 179. Cf. I.A. Rutherford *Pindar's Paeans: A Reading of the Fragments with a Survey of the Genre* (Oxford 1997) 12 n. 36; Willcock *Pindar, Victory Odes* 70–71.

insertion into the same poetic programme as the epinician for Kallikles. And this possibility of (regular) choral reperformance of epinicians leads into my next reperformance scenario.

Formal Reperformance Scenarios

The third and last reperformance scenario I wish to consider involves formal choral reperformances organized by the *polis*. I must add that the three reperformance scenarios I consider by no means exhaust the possibilities: another significant reperformance scenario might be regular reperformance at the site of the games, whenever those games were subsequently celebrated. This scenario suits, for instance, *P*.6's stylization of itself as a 'treasure-house of songs' in Delphi which will always proclaim the laudandus' fame (verses 5–18); this reperformance possibility receives attention from Thomas Hubbard, in this volume, pp. 75–80. My third reperformance scenario takes its cue from the fact that epinician poetry is *public* poetry.[58] The public dimension of epinician poetry is obvious in a formulation like that of *I*.8.8 'let us sing something sweet before the people', using the verb δαμόομαι, 'sing before the people', a significant designation for an epinician performance (Stesichorus had earlier used the noun δαμώματα for songs 'sung in public', 212 *PMG*). Several other odes of Pindar and Bacchylides indicate the involvement of the δᾶμος ('people'), the πόλις ('city'), the πολῖται ('citizens'), or the ἄστυ ('city') in the performance of the ode, either as performers or as the audience.[59] It seems very likely that some of Pindar's odes were first performed at public festivals.[60] We are entitled to wonder therefore whether public festivals were a possible scenario for reperformance.

It may be relevant that written texts of epinicians could be deposited in temples. This practice is attested by the Rhodian historian Gorgon (*FGrH* 515 F18, cited by a scholion on *O*.7), who claims that *O*.7 was

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[58] E.L. Bundy *Studia Pindarica* I–II (Berkeley 1962) 35; Maehler *Die Lieder des Bakchylides* I.i.2–3, 5; Carey 'Pindar and the Victory Ode' 95 'In some cases it seems that the victory celebration was shared by the whole city'.

[59] See *N*.10.22–23; *O*.7.93–94; *N*.2.24; Bacch. 11.10–12. Cf. *N*.9.31.

[60] See esp. Krummen *Pyrsos Hymnon*, *passim* and 275–76. Thus, *I*.4 may have been performed at the Theban Herakleia: Krummen *Pyrsos Hymnon* 93. *P*.5 at the Cyrenean Karneia: Krummen *Pyrsos Hymnon* 114–16. *O*.3 at a Theoxenia in Acragas: Krummen *Pyrsos Hymnon* 235–36. *N*.1 at the Aitnaia: schol. *N*.1.7b; B.K. Braswell *A Commentary*

dedicated 'in golden letters' in the temple of Athena Lindia on Rhodes: 'Gorgon says that this ode [*sc.* *O.*7] was dedicated in the temple of Athena Lindia in golden letters'. The choice of 'golden letters' may hint at the hoped-for immortality of the ode.[61] We hear that another song of Pindar, his hymn to Zeus Ammon (fr. 36 S-M), was engraved on a stele at the temple of Ammon in Libya (Paus. 9.16.1). Throughout the Archaic and Classical periods we find sanctuaries functioning as repositories for texts.[62] We may speculate about the purpose of such a practice. One purpose might be to dedicate the song to the deity.[63] Another might be to make a text available for later consultation and copying. However, a third possible purpose would be to enable a publicly-owned text to serve as the basis for future, publicly organized performance. This possibility is suggested by legislation passed by Lykourgos in Athens in the fourth century, whereby texts of the tragedies of Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides were to be placed in the public treasury in order to serve as the basis for reperformances (Ps.-Plut. *Mor.* 841 f).[64]

John Herington has suggested that the whole community would have an interest in reperforming epinicians. In his words, 'The glory and virtue of an entire community of men, heroes and gods are normally at stake in a Pindaric ode, and one would conjecture that so long as that community lasted intact there would be a pressing demand for the ode's reperformance'.[65] A city's festivals were, in theory, celebrated in perpetuity. By becoming an integral part of a festival's programme, a song could claim with some legitimacy to become 'immortal'. Any person who was celebrated in such a song would attain 'immortal fame'. We find a clear fifth-century expression of this idea in the

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on Pindar Nemean One (Fribourg 1992) 37. *N.*10 at the Argive Heraia / Hekatombaia: cf. verses 22–23. *P.*11 at the Theban Daphnephoria: P.-A. Bernardini in Gentili *et al.*, *Pindaro. Le Pitiche* 286. *N.*11 at a festival of Hestia on Tenedos: cf. verses 1–9. It should be noted, though, that in each case the proposed festival performance context can be contested.

[61] Possible Orphic implications of this use of gold are explored by Hubbard, this volume, pp. 91–93, though 'in golden letters' need not mean 'in gold leaf'.

[62] See Herington *Poetry into Drama* 46, 201–3 ('Sanctuaries as Repositories of Texts'). Notably, paeans could be dedicated in temples: Rutherford *Pindar's Paeans* 144.

[63] Rutherford *Pindar's Paeans* 144–45.

[64] Csapo & Slater *Contexts of Ancient Drama* 4, 10 no. 14.

[65] Herington *Poetry into Drama* 56. Cf. Thomas 'Literacy and Orality' 119 '[Pindar's odes] would be performed publicly by the victors' cities to a large and patriotic audience, then almost certainly re-performed. They honoured the city and the family of the victor as much as the victor himself'.

second stasimon of Euripides' *Alkestis*, where the chorus console the eponymous heroine that she will be sung of in Sparta every time the Karneia festival is celebrated: 'often will minstrels celebrate you in song, extolling your glory both on the seven-toned mountain lyre and in hymns of praise without the lyre, when in due course at Sparta the season of the recurring month Karneios comes around, as the moon rises all through the night' (445–51). It is worth, then, examining Pindar's odes for any indication that the perpetuation of the laudandus' fame may be due to the regular reperformance of the ode at a festival. I single out three passages for consideration. First, *I*.4.37–44:

> But Homer has honoured [Aias] among mankind: he set straight the record of all his prowess and declared it with his staff of divine verses for aftercomers to perform. For if someone expresses something well, that thing moves with immortal voice: the gleam of noble deeds goes both across the all-fruitful earth and over the sea, imperishable for all time. I hope that *I* may light on favourable Muses, so as to ignite such a beacon of song also for Melissos.

Homer's 'divine verses' are said to be reperformed by subsequent performers: 'for aftercomers to perform' (39 λοιποῖς ἀθύρειν).[66] ἀθύρειν is a verb of performance, meaning 'to play, to perform'.[67] The image of Homer 'declaring Aias' virtue with his *staff*' (38) brings to mind the rhapsode's staff.[68] Homer thus seems to be pictured here as a prototype of the rhapsodes; the rhapsodes were in fact Homer's 'aftercomers' (39) in classical times. But the important point is that it was at public festivals (the Panathenaia in Athens, other festivals in other cities) that rhapsodes reperformed Homeric poetry.[69]

[66] Gundert *Pindar und sein Dichterberuf* 127 n. 219 compares λοιποῖς ἀθύρειν with *Od.* 3.204 ἐσσομένοισιν ἀοιδήν, cf. 8.580.

[67] Cf. ἄθυρμα at *P*.5.23; Bacch. 9.87. *Pace* Race *Pindar* 2.167 'to enjoy' and Willcock *Pindar, Victory Odes* 80 'to make their entertainment from'.

[68] Cf. W. Burkert, 'The Making of Homer in the 6th Century B.C.: Rhapsodes versus Stesichorus', in: *Papers on the Amasis Painter and his World* (Malibu 1987) 43–62 at 49 '[Pindar] makes Homer himself a rhapsode, "singing to the staff"'. Cf. schol. *I*.4.63c–h; Krummen *Pyrsos Hymnon* 85; Willcock *Pindar, Victory Odes*: 80; Race *Pindar* 2.167 n. 2. Here Pindar alludes to the (folk) etymology of ῥαψῳδός 'rhapsode' from ῥάβδος 'staff'; at *N*.2.2 he alludes to its etymology from ῥάπτειν 'to stitch'. Although modern scholars carefully distinguish Homer as an orally-composing bard from the later rhapsodes, classical authors are not always careful with the distinction (cf. Plat. *resp.* 600d5–6, *legg.* 658b7–8).

[69] At the Panathenaia: 'Plat.' *Hipparch.* 228b7-c1. Other cities: Sicyon, early vi B.C.: Hdt. 5.67. At the Delia on Delos: *h. Hom.* 3.149–50. At the Asklepieia at Epidauros: Plat. *Ion* 530a. See Herington *Poetry into Drama* 175–76; R. Kannicht, 'Thalia. Über

I.4.37–44 seems to encourage the following conclusions. First, that Homer's poetry guarantees the fame of his 'laudandus', Aias, through subsequent performance (39 λοιποῖς ἀθύρειν). Second, that the reperformance of Homer's poetry was in fact guaranteed, in the sixth and fifth centuries, by its being an official component of public festivals: it was these festivals which provided a regular occasion for rhapsodic performances. Third, that Pindar employs this as the model for the immortal fame which his ode can bestow on his laudandus. This passage therefore does not bear out the claim of Anne Burnett that 'a victory ode could never have the same kind of immortalizing power that the epic poems had'.[70] Rather, Pindar seems here to equate his victory ode with Homeric epic precisely in point of their immortalizing power. We may also note that *I*.4 is an ode for which a case has been made for (first) performance at a public festival, the Theban Herakleia.[71] We might wonder whether the same festival could have served as an occasion for reperformance.[72]

The second passage to consider is *I*.5.21–33. This passage begins with the epinician topos 'the laudandus deserves his praise', and then continues:

> For the brave fighters among the heroes also won the reward of renown: their fame is celebrated amid lyres and the full-toned harmonies of oboes for time unbounded. By Zeus' will they have provided a theme of song for poets as they are worshipped: the mighty sons of Oineus have honour in the splendid sacrifices of the Aetolians, Iolaos the horseman in Thebes, Perseus in Argos, and ... Kastor and Polydeukes by the streams of the Eurotas.

The laudator here justifies praising the laudandus by adverting to the heroes of old: these 'are celebrated ... for time unbounded' with lyres and oboes. Pindar often mentions 'lyres and oboes' as the musical accompaniment to his own odes.[73] Moreover, the expression κλέονται ... μυρίον χρόνον (28–29) is tantamount to the 'undying fame' that the laudator typically hopes to bestow on his laudandus (compare Ibyc. 282.47 *PMG*; Bacch. 13.65). The treatment of the heroes at *I*.5.21–

den Zusammenhang zwischen Fest und Poesie bei den Griechen', in: W. Haug & R. Warning (eds) *Das Fest* (Munich 1989) 29–52 at 40.

[70] Burnett *Art of Bacchylides* 77 (Burnett also denies the reperformability of epinicians).

[71] Krummen *Pyrsos Hymnon* 93.

[72] This possibility would be consonant with the suggestion made above that *I*.3 and *I*.4 were to be (regularly) reperformed on the same occasion by the same chorus.

[73] See M.L. West *Ancient Greek Music* (Oxford 1992) 346.

33 therefore mirrors the ideal fate of the laudandus. But, again, it is festivals which provide the context in which the heroes are celebrated 'for all time'; it is the permanence of these festivals that guarantees the permanence of the heroes' celebration. We may note in this case that the festivals in question are the cults of the heroes themselves.

My third and last example is *P.*2.13–20:

> The voices of the Cyprians celebrate Kinyras often, whom golden-haired Apollo loved with his heart, the priest-ram of Aphrodite … But you, son of Deinomenes, are sung of by the maiden of Western Locri in front of the houses.

In this passage the Cyprians' singing of Kinyras is strikingly compared with the Locrian maiden's singing of Hieron. Repeat performance is conveyed in the words 'the voices of the Cyprians celebrate Kinyras often' (15 κελαδέοντι … πολλάκις). This expression has an equivalent in each of other passages we have just considered. In *I.*4.39 we are told that Homer has celebrated Aias' excellence 'for aftercomers to perform' (λοιποῖς ἀθύρειν) and in *I.*5.27–28 that the heroes' 'fame is celebrated … for time unbounded' (κλέονται … μυρίον χρόνον). But what is the context for the Cyprians' song of Kinyras at *P.*2.13–15? Kinyras is a cult hero, buried in the sanctuary of Aphrodite at Paphos on Cyprus (Ptolemy of Megalopolis *FGrH* 161 F1). It seems that *P.*2.13–15 envisages the Cyprians' celebration of him 'often' in the context of his cult. Words for 'often' occur regularly, in Pindar and elsewhere, in connection with the repeated celebration of festivals.[74] Kinyras, celebrated repeatedly in the context of his cult, invites comparison with the several heroes celebrated in the context of their cults in *I.*5.

What then about the singing of the laudandus Hieron by the Locrian maiden? The verb ἀπύειν is generally used of choral singing.[75] Therefore we should probably understand 'the Locrian maiden' of a girls' chorus. 'Before the houses' seems to indicate a public context for their singing. The occasion for a chorus of Locrian girls to sing outside their houses must be a festival, and the present tense 'you are sung of' (19 ἀπύει, lit. 'she sings') suggests an habitual, repeated action, which the symmetry with verse 15, 'they celebrate often', supports. Just as the hero Kinyras is celebrated 'often' by choruses of Cyprians at a festival, his own hero cult, so Hieron, the Locrians' saviour, is sung of repeatedly

[74] Cf. Pind. *Pae.* 6.16 θαμινά, *pae.* 2.98 θαμά, *pae.* 12.5–8 θαμά, *N.*11.6–7 πολλὰ μὲν …, | πολλὰ δὲ…· λύρα δέ …, *P.*3.78 θαμά; Eur. *Hipp.* 1428 ἀεί, *Alc.* 445 πολλά.

[75] Cf. *P.*5.104, *O.*5.19; Aesch. *Pers.* 122; Eur. *suppl.* 800.

by girls' choruses at Locri, apparently also at a festival.[76] These songs of the Locrian girls are, of course, separate from *P.*2.

Consideration of passages like *P.*2.13–20 and *I.*5.21–33 led Hermann Gundert in 1935 to the conclusion that 'Pindar likes to think of continued existence in song as bound up with celebration in choruses'.[77] Most modern scholars, however, seem to rule this possibility out, countenancing only informal solo reperformance at symposia.[78] The three passages just considered do not *prove* that any of Pindar's odes were reperformed chorally at *polis* festivals; but the interpretation of such passages gains considerably from the possibility. Regular reperformance of a victory ode at a festival would give the ode a much stronger claim to 'immortality' than informal reperformance at symposia; it would also give special point to the equation of the laudandus with thc heroes.

It is worth noting, finally, that historical persons who received cult in the classical period were often worshipped in the context of an existing festival. The most famous examples are Lysander, who received cult on Samos at the Heraia festival (Plut. *Lys.* 18.2–4 = Duris *FGrH* 76 F71), and Demetrios Poliorketes, who received cult in Athens at the Dionysia (Plut. *Dem.* 12.2).[79] Wc might then see a parallel between, on the one hand, those laudandi of Pindar who were celebrated regularly at a *polis* festival with chorally-performed epinicians and, on the other hand, those heroized or deified historical persons who were celebrated at *polis* festivals with cult songs and an actual cult. Thus conceived, poetic immortality would converge with, rather than diverge from, cul-

[76] In fact, we hear of a festival at Locri in the 470s B.C. with which both Hieron and Locrian maidens were associated. In 478–76 B.C., the Locrians, hard pressed in war with Rhegium, vowed if they prevailed to prostitute their maiden daughters at a festival of Aphrodite: Justin (Trogus) 21.3.2. Hieron's intervention saved the Locrians in this war: scholia on Pind. *P.*2.36c, *P.*2.38, and *P.*1.99a. Subsequently, the Locrian festival of Aphrodite may have provided the context for the celebration of Locri's saviour Hieron. I discuss the circumstances of this controversial Locrian vow further in a forthcoming book, *Pindar and the Cult of Heroes* (Oxford).

[77] Gundert *Pindar und sein Dichterberuf* 33 (translated from the German).

[78] Cf. Nagy *Pindar's Homer* 114 'It is clear that there would have been no rationale for recommissioning a chorus to reperform such a composition since the original occasion would have been archetypal from the standpoint of the lyric poetry'. Cf. Pöhlmann 'Zur Überlieferung griechischer Literatur' 22; Heath & Lefkowitz 'Epinician Performance' 185 (on *P.*10.55–59) 'subsequent informal performance of the ode by individual singers'.

[79] On Lysander, see C. Habicht *Gottmenschentum und griechische Städte* (2nd ed. Munich 1970) 244–45, 271. On Demetrios, see R.C.T. Parker *Athenian Religion. A History* (Oxford 1996) 259 n. 13; J.D. Mikalsson *Religion in Hellenistic Athens* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 1998) 93.

tic immortality.[80] It makes a crucial difference that the immortality conferred by Pindar's odes depended on their continued reperformance, rather than on their being continually read. A song-and-dance performance, unlike a private act of reading, amounts to a substantive, public act. It could qualify as a religious act, tantamount even to sacrifice. Pindar himself speaks, notably, of '*sacrificing* a dithyramb' (fr. 86a S-M). Pindar's patrons, supposing they were celebrated in regular choral performances, would be associated with a form of ritual honour. In this way the immortality promised by Pindar might be seen as offering an approximation to cult.

APPENDIX

A note on the genealogy of the Theandridai (in explication of N.*4.80, 89)*

(1) Euphanes. I have taken Euphanes to be Timasarchos' 'father's father' (προπάτωρ, 89). LSJ gloss προπάτωρ, which occurs only here in Pindar, as 'forefather, ancestor'. The Pindar lexica (J. Rumpel *Lexikon Pindaricum* (Leipzig 1883) *sv.*; Slater *Lexicon to Pindar*, *sv.*) translate προπάτωρ as 'grandfather'. For προπάτωρ as 'father's father', see Hesychius *sv.*, and compare too *id.*, *sv.* προμήτωρ ('mother's father'). On the other hand, the scholion *N.*4.144b takes Euphanes to be Timasarchos' 'mother's father', i.e. his maternal grandfather. The scholiast would thus make Euphanes the father of both Timasarchos' mother and Kallikles, whom they take to be Timasarchos' mother's brother (schol. *N.*4.129a). In that case, Timosarchos would have 'devotees of victory songs' on both sides of his family: his own father Timokritos (13–16) and his mother's father Euphanes (89–90). The interpretation I have offered would put all the musicians on the father's side.

(2) Kallikles. Kallikles is the μάτρῳ (80) of Timasarchos. This could denote just 'relative on the mother's side' (so at *O.*6.77 and *N.*10.37): see Slater *Lexicon to Pindar*, *sv.*; LSJ *sv.* 2, 3. The scholia *N.*4.129abc take it to mean 'mother's brother', i.e. maternal uncle; they are followed by Willcock *Pindar, Victory Odes* 107. I have taken it instead to mean 'mother's father', the meaning at *O.*9.63. As Timasarchos' 'mother's father', Kallikles would belong to the same generation as his 'father's father' Euphanes (compare *N.*4.91 ἅλικες 'contemporaries').

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[80] For an influential study of these two concepts of immortality, see G. Nagy *The Best of the Achaeans* (Baltimore 1979).

THE DISSEMINATION OF EPINICIAN LYRIC: PAN-HELLENISM, REPERFORMANCE, WRITTEN TEXTS

Thomas K. Hubbard

How did epinician poems that maintain a pretense of being intended for local performance on a single occasion in response to a single event come to be preserved for posterity and circulated among a wider public? The relatively undeveloped state of the book trade in the first half of the fifth-century makes it unlikely that these odes were gathered into books by Pindar and Bacchylides themselves, and the order of Pindar's books as we have them seems to owe more to Alexandrian principles of cataloging.[1] However, it also seems unlikely that these poems merely survived as isolated texts in family hands or civic archives until being gathered together by the Alexandrians two centuries later. I wish to argue here that Pindar's epinicia were from the very beginning designed for a pan-Hellenic audience, and I shall propose a hypothetical model for their pan-Hellenic diffusion within Pindar's lifetime.

There is no question that Pindar's odes for the Sicilian potentates were familiar enough to be parodied contemporaneously by Bacchylides (3.85–87) and a generation later by Aristophanes (*Birds* 924–45). In the *Knights* (1264–66, 1329; cf. *Ach.* 637–39) Aristophanes parodies at least two other poems of Pindar.[2] Parody by definition presupposes

[1] The *Vita Thomana* (I, 7 Drachmann) attributes the order of Pindar's poems to Aristophanes of Byzantium. See J. Irigoin, *Histoire du texte de Pindare* (Paris, 1952), 35–37. J. Latacz, 'Die Funktion des Symposions für die entstehende griechische Literatur', in *Der Übergang von der Mündlichkeit bei den Griechen*, edd. W. Kullmann & M. Reichel (Tübingen, 1990), 245–46, has argued that papyrus collections of the lyric poets' works must have circulated from the very beginning, but if this were true in Pindar's case, one wonders why so self-conscious an author would not have evolved significant patterns for arranging his poems (as Roman poets later did) that the Alexandrian editors would have felt obliged to respect. On the status of the book trade in the fifth-century, see E.G. Turner, *Athenian Books in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C.* (London, 1952), 16–23, and T. Kleberg, *Buchhandel und Verlagswesen in der Antike* (Darmstadt, 1967), 3–10.

[2] Bacchylides parodies the opening of *O.*1, an ode Pindar wrote for the same patron, as well as *O.*2.86, for Hieron's sometime rival Theron. The *Birds* passage cites a hyporcheme for Hieron (fr. 105 S-M) and appears to rely on the audience's knowledge that Pindar composed many such poems for the Syracusan tyrant. Σ Aristoph., *Eq.* 1264b (Mervyn Jones & Wilson) tells us that *Eq.* 1264–66 are taken from Pindar (= fr.

a broad audience acquainted with the work parodied. Comic parody can also imply that a type of poetry is perceived as out of fashion and overblown by modern standards; Eupolis (fr. 398 PCG) explicitly says that Pindar is no longer sung due to current lack of taste, which implies, however, that he was popular in Athens a few decades earlier, closer to his own time. Revising a suggestion made 50 years ago by Norman O. Brown, I have recently argued that Pindar's Aeginetan odes, *P.*8 and *N.*8, were familiar to Sophocles and made the object of pointed allusion in *Ajax*, a play which was at most only a few years later than *P.*8.[3]

It is well-recognized that Pindar's epinicia promise victors poetic immortality, as we see most clearly in *P.*3.110–15 and by implication in many other passages:[4]

> If a god should hand me soft-living wealth,
> I would have the hope of finding lofty fame in time to come.
> We know Nestor and Lycian Sarpedon, the talk of men,
> From ringing epic verses, such as skilled carpenters
> Joined together. By famous songs does manly excellence
> Turn out long-lasting, a prize easy for few to earn.

Such self-confident predictions reveal a poet who feels assured that his work will outlive a single performance and extend beyond a merely local audience. *N.*5.1–5 self-consciously proclaims that the poem will spread out from Aegina on board every ship:

> I am no statue-maker, such as to build honorific images standing on
> their very base,
> always to remain unmoved.
> But aboard every freighter and in every little boat, O sweet song,
> Go forth from Aegina spreading the news

89a S-M), as Σ Aristoph., *Ach.* 637 (Wilson) tells us in regard to fr. 76 S-M, parodied both at *Ach.* 637 and *Eq.* 1329. This last citation, from Pindar's dithyramb for Athens, might be argued to be familiar to the audience in virtue of repeated performance at Athens, but that seems less likely for Pindar's Hieron odes or prosodion for Artemis (fr. 89a S-M). Σ Aristoph., *Vesp.* 308b (Koster) identifies this line as an adaptation of Pindar, fr. 189 S-M.

[3] T.K. Hubbard, 'Pindar and Sophocles: Ajax as Epinician Hero', *EMC* NS 19 (2000), 315–32. Cf. N.O. Brown, 'Pindar, Sophocles, and the Thirty Years' Peace', *TAPA* 82 (1951), 1–28. For other examples of Pindar's influence in the fifth-century, see W. Schmid-O. Stählin, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur* (Munich, 1929), I:1, 616–17.

[4] See also *P.*1.89–100; afterlife in Pindar's poetry is surely implied in *O.*10.91–105, *I.*1.64–68, *I.*2.43–48, and, as I argued in *The Pindaric Mind* (Leiden, 1985), 160, must be the point of the afterlife myth in *O.*2.53–83. Bacchylides is particularly bold and explicit in his predictions of survival beyond death through poetic celebration: see 3.90–98, 9.79–87, 10.9–14, 13.63–66, 13.175–92.

That Pytheas, the mighty son of Lampon,
Won a crown at Nemea for the pancratium.

O.9.21–27 says that Pindar will spread the fame of Locrian Opus faster than any ship or horse can travel:

And I, setting that much-loved city ablaze
With my fiery songs,
Will send this message everywhere
More swiftly than a proud-spirited horse
Or a winged ship,
If I tend the choice garden of the Graces
With the help of some fated skill.

As this last passage shows, the praise of a city's institutions and mythology is not merely self-congratulatory, but is meant to resonate before a pan-Hellenic audience. Indeed, the bulk of *O*.9 is devoted to presenting the otherwise obscure local myth of the city's eponymous king and his genealogy in a way that connects it with the traditions of pan-Hellenic epic, inasmuch as Opus, himself of foreign origin, opens the city to other foreigners, most notably Menoetius, father of the Iliadic hero Patroclus.

Bacchylides also emphasizes the immediate geographical diffusion of his praise. Although the papyrus is very fragmentary at this point, poem 10 appears to open with an address to *Phêma* (10.1–2 'Report, for you visit the tribes of men ...'), and then proceeds to describe the patron's commissioning of the present poem, which is '... an immortal ornament of the Muses, a joy shared by all men, revealing your excellence to the dwellers of the earth' (10.11–14). Bacchylides' poem is thus an agent of *Phêma* which itself visits the tribes of men. Poem 2 also addresses *Phêma* in the first line and styles the poem as her instrument, carrying a message about Argeius' Isthmian victory back to Ceos. Similarly, Bacchylides 13.175–81 personifies *Areta* as an agent of transmission:

Excellence, shining to all,
Is not obscured, hidden
Beneath the unilluminated veil of night,
But fertile with
Tireless glory,
Roams through both land
And much-traversed sea.

These generic lines are immediately followed by specific application to Aegina and the victor Pytheas, as they are celebrated by the present chorus (13.182–91). Moreover, both poems 10 and 13 make a point of

portraying the victory as a token that glorifies the athlete's city in the eyes of all the Greeks (10.15–20, 13.77–83).

Given their pan-Hellenic audience, epinicia can function as 'public relations' advertisement. Indeed, it is significant that most of Pindar's epinicia were composed for individuals or states whose positions within the broader Greek world were problematic and thus in need of public relations.[5] Aristocratic exiles like Megacles of Athens, Damophilus of Cyrene, or Ergoteles of Cnossus commissioned epinicia to rehabilitate their reputations. Aegina, the state for which Pindar undertook more commissions than for any other, was a relatively new power within Greece, whose 'new wealth,' as T.J. Figueira has shown, was entirely built on commerce, including such disreputable pursuits as piracy and slave-trading;[6] particularly during the latter part of Pindar's career, it was under the heel of Athens and isolated from its fellow Dorian states, to whom it looked in vain for help. Thebes and other Northern Greek states, including Locrian Opus, were disgraced for their active collaboration with the Persians. Even before the Persian War, the Thessalians were looked down upon as rude and unsophisticated;[7] it is no surprise that Pindar's earliest dateable poem, *P.*10, as well as some of Simonides' epinician commissions, were for Thessalian patrons. The Sicilian rulers and their lieutenants were despised as 'tyrants' by the mainland Greeks, and were moreover blamed for not contributing to the Greek cause in the Persian War.[8] The utility of Pindar's epinicia as propaganda on behalf of such embattled regimes can be seen in *P.*1 especially: the poem responds to Athenian charges about Hieron's failure to aid the rest of Greece against the Persians by supporting his claims to have been busy rescuing Greek civilization from the barbarians in the West, namely the Carthaginians and Etruscans (see vv. 71–80). Moreover, the ode advertises the newly christened Syracusan colony of Aetna as a pan-Dorian

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[5] I have elaborated this thesis at greater length in 'Pindar and Athens after the Persian Wars', in *Gab es das Griechische Wunder? Griechenland zwischen dem Ende des 6. und der Mitte des 5. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.*, ed. D. Papenfuss & V.M. Strocka (Mainz, 2001), 387–400.

[6] T.J. Figueira, *Aegina: Society and Politics* (Salem, NH, 1986), 166–70, 202–14.

[7] See H.D. Westlake, *Thessaly in the Fourth Century B.C.* (London, 1935), 40–46, and J.H. Molyneux, *Simonides: A Historical Study* (Wauconda, 1992), 133. Plut., *De Aud. Poet.* 15C–D, reports that Simonides said the Thessalians were 'too ignorant to be deceived by me.'

[8] See Hdt. 7.157–67. Plut., *Themist.* 25.1, attributes to Theophrastus an anecdote about Themistocles challenging Hieron's right to compete in the Olympic games of 476 BCE; Aelian, *VH* 9.5, connects it with Gelon's failure to aid the Greek cause four years earlier.

mecca for settlers from throughout the Peloponnese (see vv. 61–66), who were to form half the city's new population (Diod. Sic. 11.49.1). Both these political programs in *P.*1 presuppose the ode's immediate diffusion far beyond Sicily.

Having established that epinician odes are intended to glorify a family or state before a pan-Hellenic audience, we must proceed to inquire about the mechanisms of pan-Hellenic circulation. It has long been assumed, based upon topographical references and various forms of *deixis*, that the odes were performed only in the victor's home city. This may very well have been the original site of performance in most cases, and Bruno Currie's paper in this volume gives us some scenarios for local reperformance. But I would propose that there was often also reperformance at the site of the athletic victory during the festival's next convocation two or four years later. John Herington assembled the evidence for long traditions of reperforming other lyric forms down to Hellenistic times.[9] More recently, Ian Rutherford has suggested that the inclusion of what appear to be verbalized stage directions in some of Pindar's paeans anticipates reperformance and perhaps even a reading audience in need of markers to help them imagine a performance.[10] Inasmuch as paeans presume to be ritualistic dedications to the god, iterative reperformability must be assumed, as in all rituals, whether reperformance actually takes place or not.

Epinicia are also in a sense ritualistic dedications to a god in exchange for the divine favor manifested in the victory. In the epinician context, such ritualistic reperformance would most likely occur at the athletic festivals and would serve the same function as a commemorative statue, the comparandum of *N.*5.1–5. As we know from the bronze charioteer at Delphi dedicated by Polyzalus to commemorate Hieron's victory and many other commemorative dedications recorded by Pausanias,[11] prominent families and states desired through this medium to make their achievement a conspicuous and everlasting matter of pan-Hellenic display at the athletic venues. Indeed, we can readily imagine the unveiling of such statues being accompanied by choral song and celebration. Not only does *N.*5.1–5 compare the epinician performance

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[9] J. Herington, *Poetry into Drama* (Berkeley, 1985), 207–10.

[10] I. Rutherford, *Pindar's Paeans* (Oxford, 2001), 175–78.

[11] Paus. 6.1–18 (over half the book) is devoted to the description of victors' statues just at Olympia, and Pausanias (6.1.2) tells us that he has only mentioned the most notable.

to such an athletic memorial, but other passages, such as *N.*3.10–14 and *N.*8.13–16, use the same image and term, ἄγαλμα, to refer to the song and its performance. As Louis Gernet long ago demonstrated, this term is related to the verb ἀγάλλειν and thus implies honor and glorification, especially of a god.[12] *P.*8.25–32 speaks of 'dedicating' a lengthy praise of Aegina and the Aeacidae by means of lyre and voices; the verb ἀνατί-θημι is elsewhere almost a technical term for material dedications made to a god.[13]

Indeed, the earliest inscribed bases of victory statues and other commemorative offerings, such as votive plaques and cauldrons, provide the formulaic elements naming the victor, father, city, contest, and divine patron, from which elements the genres of epinician eprigram and ultimately epinician lyric developed. The history of the epinician genre is thus in its origins epigraphic, commemorative, dedicatory, and most importantly, located at the athletic venue. L. H. Jeffery collected some primitive Boeotian examples of inscribed dedicatory cauldrons dating as far back as the early seventh century.[14] Joachim Ebert has gathered together a larger corpus of epinician epigrams, mostly inscribed on statue bases, some sixth-century in date.[15] Compare, for example, an early sixth-century inscription from Nemea (*SEG* 11.290 = Ebert no. 2):

> Aristis dedicated me to lord Zeus, son of Cronus,
> Four times victorious in the pancratium at Nemea,
> The son of Pheidon of Cleonae.

Pausanias (6.10.6 = Ebert no. 4) preserves a similar inscription from Olympia, for a victory which he dates to 516 BCE:

> Cleosthenes, son of Pontis from Epidamnus, dedicated me,
> Victorious with horses in the fair contest of Zeus.

He informs us that this epigram accompanied a monumental sculpture of the chariot, charioteer, and victor, and was inscribed on the side of the chariot itself. Anyone who scans Ebert's corpus of agonis-

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[12] L. Gernet, '"Value" in Greek myth', in *Myth, Religion, and Society,* ed. R. L. Gordon (Cambridge, 1981), 114–15.

[13] For epigraphic parallels, see my discussion of this passage in 'Pindar and the Aeginetan Chorus', *Phoenix* 41 (1987), 2–3, especially n.6.

[14] L.H. Jeffery, *The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece* (Oxford, 1961), 91. B.B. Powell, *Homer and the Origin of the Greek Alphabet* (Cambridge, 1991), 145–48, adds some further examples.

[15] J. Ebert, *Griechische Epigramme auf Sieger an gymnischen und hippischen Agonen* (Berlin, 1972).

tic epigrams will be struck by the many parallels to the conventions of Pindar's epinician lyric, and Pindaric critics have found it a veritable goldmine. In an influential article of 1989,[16] J.W. Day proposes that every time a passerby reads out loud such an epigram, whether agonistic or epitaphic, he in a sense re-enacts the original ritual recognition of the man honored and brings that moment back to life: every reading is therefore a type of ritual reperformance. Pindar frequently presents his song as a re-enactment of the victor's crowning and proclamation by the herald of the games, as we see, for example, in *O.*11.11–16:[17]

Know now, Hagesidamus,
Son of Archestratus, for your boxing,
In addition to your crown of golden olive,
I shall in celebration create an adornment of sweet songs,
Honoring the race of the Epizephyrian Locrians.
Join the revel with me at that place ...

In this sense, an epinician poem is always already a reperformance and re-evocation of a ritualized moment that transpired in a pan-Hellenic space. It is only appropriate that it should itself be reperformed in that same athletic venue, thereby iterating and renewing that ritual moment before the same audience. Indeed, the last line of this passage, by inviting the listeners to join the revel in Locris, referred to as ἔνθα, appears to be addressing a non-Locrian audience in a venue other than Locris.

Similar in nature is the imperative of Bacchylides 2, which exhorts *Phêma* ('Report') to travel to Ceos and tell of Argeius' Isthmian triumph. This command can only be meaningful on the assumption that the poem did not make its debut at Ceos, but at the site of the games. Critics have long believed that poem 2 was a composition on the spot immediately after Argeius' victory, since it is by far the shortest epinician in the corpus of both Pindar and Bacchylides, and a much longer poem (Bacchylides 1) was written for the same victory.[18] The fact

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[16] J.W. Day, 'Rituals in Stone: Early Greek Epigrams and Monuments', *JHS* 109 (1989), 16–28.

[17] See F.J. Nisetich, '*Olympian* 1.8–11: An Epinician Metaphor', *HSCP* 79 (1975), 59–68, for Pindar's repeated references to crowning with song as re-enactments of the ritual moment at the games.

[18] See F.G. Kenyon, *The Poems of Bacchylides* (London, 1897), xxvii; H. Maehler, *Die Lieder des Bakchylides, Erster Teil* (Leiden, 1982), II, 10; A.P. Burnett, *The Art of Bacchylides* (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), 39; D.A. Campbell, *Greek Lyric IV* (Cambridge, Mass., 1992), 125 n.1. R.C. Jebb, *Bacchylides: The Poems and Fragments* (Cambridge, 1905), 189, disagreed

that the victor was from Bacchylides' own island may explain why the poet was readily available at such short notice with a group of Cean boys as part of the city's contingent at the Isthmian games, who could be quickly trained as a chorus to celebrate the success of one of their fellows.

Bacchylides 6.4–9, from another very short poem for a Cean victor, specifically cites as a precedent previous songs performed at Olympia for Cean athletes.[19] The pan-Hellenic gatherings were certainly a locus of epideictic verbal displays, as we know from Gorgias' and Lysias' *Olympic Speech* and Isocrates' *Panegyricus;* like Pindar's epinicia, these speeches were designed to praise a particular city before a pan-Hellenic audience. Lucian (*Herodotus or Aëtion* 1–2) tells us that Herodotus recited his histories before audiences at Olympia; Diogenes Laertius (8.63) relates that even the works of Empedocles were recited at Olympia. In Pindar's own time, we are informed that Themistocles delivered a speech at the Olympics of 476 in which he attacked Hieron for not contributing to the Greek cause against the Persians four years earlier:[20] in this speech, we see blame, the epideictic complement to praise, again oriented toward a particular state in the eyes of a pan-Hellenic audience.

We do find elements of Olympic myth and etiology incorporated into *O.*1, 3, and 10 in ways that would resonate with special significance before an Olympic audience; the theme of belatedness in *O.*10 does seem consistent with an initial performance four years after the original victory. In a forthcoming article, Lucia Athanassaki argues that the unusual direct address to the hero Pelops in *O.*1.36–51 deictically marks the ode's performance at the shrine of Pelops in Olympia, in the hero's numinous presence,[21] even as, I would add, the address to Heracles in

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and regarded the poem as a *prosphonetikon.* However, Jebb, 297, did believe that Bacch. 7 may have been performed at Olympia (see also Maehler, II, 133), since it opens by invoking the 16th day of the month, when crowns were awarded there; however, the past tense of ἐκόσμησας in 7.11 tells against this view.

[19] This assumes that we construe the dative Ὀλυμπίᾳ with the main verb ἄεισαν, as nearly all commentators do. See Kenyon, *Bacchylides* (n. 17 above), 62; Jebb, *Bacchylides* (n. 18 above), 295; Maehler, *Lieder des Bakchylides* (n. 17 above), II, 130; Burnett, *Art of Bacchylides* (n. 18 above), 40; Campbell, *Greek Lyric* (n. 18 above), 155. It could also be taken *apo koinou* with the verb and participle, with the same result; it seems very unlikely to go with the participle alone, since it is further away and is part of the same colon as the main verb.

[20] See n.8 above.

[21] L. Athanassaki, 'Spatiotemporal Transitions of the Speaking "I" in Pindar's *First*

*N.*7.86–101 points to his shrine on Aegina as the locus of performance. This need not exclude *O.*1 also being performed in Syracuse, since the poem's opening address focuses attention on the hearth and table of Hieron; in Athanassaki's interpretation, the text verbally foregrounds both sites of performance.

References to the epinician *kômos* can also provide indexical illumination of the performative context. In addition to *O.*11, discussed above, witness *O.*8, which begins with an invocation to Olympia, renewed in v.9:

> O forested grove of Pisa on the banks of the Alpheus,
> Receive this revel and its dedication of the crown.
> For great fame always comes to the man whom your glorious prize attends.

Indeed, the explicit reference to *stephanophoria* here must designate a ceremonial dedication of the victor's crown as a votive offering at Olympia;[22] this may also be the point of the reference to the crown in *O.*11.13. *N.*9.1–3 begins a poem celebrating victory in a relatively minor local festival, the Sicyonian Pythia: the image of a victory revel from Sicyon all the way to Aetna in Sicily does suggest performance in both places, and possibly at some other Peloponnesian localities as well. Chromius' entry of a chariot team in this minor local festival and his decision to embellish it with an epinician ode by Pindar, who normally wrote to celebrate victories only in the four major games, may, as I have elsewhere argued,[23] have been related to his and Hieron's program of recruiting Peloponnesian Dorians to form half the population of the new Syracusan colony. The possibility of this poem's reperformance in a variety of Peloponnesian locales raises the question whether other odes for Hieron and his lieutenants might also have been performed by a roving troupe of Syracusan choristers, not unlike Thespis' theater company (Horace, *AP* 275–77) or the itinerant band of Stesi-

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Olympian', forthcoming in *Arethusa.*

22 On the significance of *stephanophoria* in Pindar's epinicia, see L. Kurke, 'The Economy of *Kudos*', in *Cultural Poetics in Archaic Greece,* edd. C. Dougherty & L. Kurke (Cambridge, 1993), 140–41. However, she mistakenly believes that such dedication of crowns always took place at a shrine in the victor's home city; this passage proves that it could also occur at the site of the victory.

23 T.K. Hubbard, 'Remaking Myth and Rewriting History: Cult Tradition in Pindar's *Ninth Nemean*', *HSCP* 94 (1992), 79–82, 107–11.

chorean performers proposed by Burkert.[24] The pan-Dorian content of *P.*1 and the appeal to Arcadian connections in *O.*6 make them attractive candidates for inclusion in such a foreign repertoire.

If we accept that some or even all of Pindar's epinicia were reperformed to commemorate the victories at the athletic venues a few years later, it would explain why and how the odes could claim pan-Hellenic stature and attention. However, it may not in itself be enough to justify Pindar's claims to immortalize the victor in the eyes of pan-Hellenic posterity. For this, we need to explain how Pindar envisioned his odes' preservation and broader dissemination. We may find an analogy in Theognis' famous elegy promising immortality to Cyrnus (237–54), which stands as the first explicit poetic claim to perpetuate the fame of a *laudandus*. It has long been thought that this elegy and the *sphragis* elegy (19–26) were intended respectively as the original epilogue and prologue to a collection of poems published by Theognis himself.[25] Wolfgang Rösler notes that the events and personalities of the Theognid poems are vague and generic, such as to be suitable for a pan-Hellenic audience, rather than specifically Megarian.[26] For Rösler, textuality and pan-Hellenism are related developments. He calls attention to Athenaeus' testimony (1.3A), supported by other sources, that Polycrates and Peisistratus assembled large libraries; this, together with the evidence concerning a Peisistratean recension of the Homeric poems and the advent of a prose literature among the pre-Socratics and earliest logographers, does suggest the beginnings of a literary culture with books and written texts in the late sixth century, even if the book trade did not become popularized and commercial until a century later.[27]

[24] W. Burkert, 'The Making of Homer in the Sixth Century B.C.: Rhapsodes versus Stesichorus', in *Papers on the Amasis Painter and his World* (Malibu, 1987), 51–53.

[25] See T. Hudson-Williams, *The Elegies of Theognis* (London, 1910) 76; F. Jacoby, *Theognis* (Berlin, 1931) 130–31; B. Lavagnini, *Aglaia: Nuova Antologia dei Frammenti della Lirica Greca* (Torino, 1949), 68–69, 76; F. S. Hasler, *Untersuchungen zu Theognis* (Winterthur, 1959), 111–21; W. Rösler, *Dichter und Gruppe: Eine Untersuchung zu den Bedingungen und zur historischen Funktion früher griechischer Lyrik am Beispiel des Alkaios* (Munich, 1980), 81–86. On the other hand, J. Kroll, *Theognis-Interpretationen* = Philologus Suppl. 29.1 (Leipzig, 1936), 67–87, saw 19–26 as the epilogue. Without declaring an opinion on the relative position of these poems, R. Reitzenstein, *Epigramm und Skolion* (Giessen, 1893), 264–69, also saw them as evidence for a collection intended by its author for publication as a book.

[26] Rösler, *Dichter und Gruppe* (n. 25 above), 78–79.

[27] Rösler, *Dichter und Gruppe* (n. 25 above), 47–49, drawing on J. Platthy, *Sources on the Earliest Greek Libraries* (Amsterdam, 1968), 100–4, 152, who gives a full list of ancient sources. C. Wendel, *Die griechisch-römische Buchbeschreibung* (Halle, 1949), 20–23, argues

These developments are parallelled by the depiction of book rolls in school scenes on Attic vases of the early fifth century, suggesting that many of the earliest books were also works that could be educationally valuable.[28] At least one vase, about 460 in date, suggests that even lyric compositions would become school texts and that boys could take written copies of these home with them to assist their study and recital.[29]

The role of the tyrants was central in the evolution of the first libraries, as well as the copying and collection of the earliest books. In *Pindar's Homer*, Gregory Nagy emphasizes the tyrants' desire to create a permanent historical identity for themselves by not merely patronizing the arts, but especially by commissioning forms and genres, such as oracular poetry, encomia, local epic, and early historiography, that could record and preserve their place in the memory not only of their own cities, but of all Greece.[30] As Nagy argues, they were the first to pan-Hellenize the local and occasional.

In *The Tyrant's Writ*, Deborah Steiner argues for a dichotomy in the Athenian cultural construction of writing, whereby written communication is typically associated with either secret messages or self-conscious display by tyrants and oriental despots, as opposed to the free and oral exchange of ideas that marks democratic discourse in Athens itself.[31]

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that Thrasybulus of Miletus also founded such a library. B.M.W. Knox, 'Books and Readers in the Greek World: From the Beginnings to Alexandria', in *The Cambridge History of Classical Literature, Vol. I: Greek Literature*, ed. B.M.W. Knox & P.E. Easterling (Cambridge, 1985), 4–9, argues for substantial early circulation of books on other grounds, principally the vast quantity of archaic lyric poetry that was preserved until Alexandrian times.

[28] See H.R. Immerwahr, 'Book Rolls on Attic Vases', in *Classical, Medieval and Renaissance Studies in Honour of B.L. Ullmann*, ed. C. Henderson, Jr. (Rome, 1964), I, 17–48, and 'More Book Rolls on Attic Vases', *Antike Kunst* 16 (1973), 143–47. One finds numerous illustrations in F.A.G. Beck, *Album of Greek Education* (Sydney, 1975), and a convenient list in W.V. Harris, *Ancient Literacy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), 97; see also the discussion of K. Robb, *Literacy and Paideia in Ancient Greece* (Oxford, 1994), 185–88. It is likely that only the elite received much education at this period, and the books may have been as much for the schoolmaster's use as that of the students.

[29] An interesting kylix by the Sabouroff Painter (Amsterdam 8210 = *ARV*² 838.27, discussed by Immerwahr, 'More Book Rolls', 144, illustrated as Fig. 1 and Pl. 32.1) shows a boy's mother using a book roll apparently to check the boy's singing of a lyric piece. This suggests that instruction even in musically performed genres was coming to rely on written texts to insure accuracy.

[30] G. Nagy, *Pindar's Homer: The Lyric Possession of an Epic Past* (Baltimore, 1990), 157–98, 410.

[31] D.T. Steiner, *The Tyrant's Writ: Myths and Images of Writing in Ancient Greece* (Princeton, 1994), especially 127–85.

Her model may be criticized as too reductive to be valid as a historical generalization, given, for instance, the prevalence of written laws and inscriptions as characteristic appurtenances of Athenian democracy. However, where it may have some appeal is as an exegesis of Herodotus' individual ideological construction of writing vs. orality, a construction which was surely rooted not so much in the notion that writing was somehow un-Greek as in the perception that the Greek tyrants had been the first to employ it on a large scale as an instrument for codifying and legitimizing their political and cultural hegemony.

It is in this context that we must view the earliest explicitly encomiastic lyric, that of Polycrates' court poet Ibycus. S151.39–48 PMGF promises Polycrates immortal fame parallel to that of the heroes of the epic past, to whom he is likened in beauty. As in Pindar, the fame of the *laudandus* is specifically linked with that of the *laudator* (vv. 47–48 'Even you, Polycrates, will have undying fame/ In measure with my song and my fame'). S166 and 176 PMGF may even be epinician, given the prominence of athletic events in their narrative.[32] S221 PMGF, a commentary on an encomium for one Callias,[33] exhibits several conventions familiar to Pindarists: the poet's *ponos*, the ineffective mutterings of the envious opposition, and the poet's encomiastic vaunt despite the opposition. It seems likely that the tyrants and aristocrats who went to so much expense to have such poetry created to perpetuate their memory would also spend whatever sums were necessary to preserve and even distribute those compositions to the widest possible audience.

This process provides the model for what I envision happening also during the generation of Pindar and Bacchylides. Many of their patrons were in fact tyrants or hereditary ruling clans, like the Aleuadae of Thessaly. But even wealthy families from Thebes or Aegina could have afforded as part of the commission to have scribes generate multiple copies of the text which might be distributed throughout Greece, perhaps through the agency of Thebes' or Aegina's *proxenoi* in each city. Pindar refers to the institution of *proxenia* at least four times in his extant work; indeed, some of his patrons or members of their family

[32] See J.P. Barron, 'Ibycus: *Gorgias* and Other Poems', *BICS* 31 (1984), 20–22, who adds S220 and fr. 323 PMGF as possible traces of what were once epinicia.

[33] Barron, 'Ibycus' (n.32 above), 20–22, notes the contiguity of S221 to S220, which features athletic vocabulary in vv. 19–22 (note also πόνου in v. 23). Since poems tend to be grouped by theme or genre, this collocation is significant. He suggests that this Callias may be the Athenian son of Phaenippus, for whom an Olympic horse-victory is recorded in 564 BCE.

are praised for themselves being *proxenoi* of neighboring cities.[34] In some cases, the role of *proxenos* may have been as much that of a cultural attaché as of a consul, sponsoring the city's itinerant artists and intellectuals in foreign locales and distributing their works to music teachers, poets, and potential patrons.[35] Indeed, literary figures, as distinguished and influential citizens, might be prime candidates to be chosen as *proxenoi*. In the *Antidosis* (166), Isocrates tells us that Pindar himself was named a *proxenos* of the Athenians in recognition of his honorific poems on the city's behalf. As the name implies, a *proxenos* is involved in the business of *xenia*, and as many critics have observed, Pindar's odes style themselves as guest-friend gifts to their patron;[36] it is only appropriate that their distribution in other parts of Greece might also be embedded in the economy of gift-exchange among foreign *xenoi* and *proxenoi*. What better public relations could a city or family purchase for itself than to have poems full of its praise disseminated by its semi-official emissaries in every Greek city? Particularly if these poems had recently been performed in a pan-Hellenic venue, at which relatively few citizens could have been present, but about which many might hear reports, the texts would be objects of interest with a serious claim on people's attention in every Greek state. Given the limited extent of ancient literacy and the advanced degree of literacy necessary to read a Pindaric ode,[37]

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[34] *O.*9.83–85, *N.*7.64–65, *I.*4.7–9, *Parth.* 2.39–43. Translators often water the term down and render it as little more than a synonym of *xenia*, but I believe (contrary to the earlier view I expressed in *Pindaric Mind* [n.4 above], 157 n.93) that each usage must refer to the political office: for the same conclusion, at least with regard to *O.*9 and *N.*7, see Σ *O.*9.123c (Drachmann), and C. Carey, 'Pindar and the Victory Ode', in *The Passionate Intellect: Essays on the Transformation of the Classical Heritage Presented to Professor I. G. Kidd*, ed. L. Ayres (New Brunswick, NJ, 1995), 94 n.16. *N.*7.65 may refer to Pindar's own *proxenia*; the use of *xeinos* only four lines earlier suggests that Pindar did not regard the two words as merely redundant synonyms. Both *I.*4 and *Parth.* 2 refer to *proxenia* as an office transmitted within a family, and relating specifically to ἀμφικτιόνες (suggesting citizens of a particular nearby city or town, as distinguished from all foreigners). *O.*9 refers to the *proxenia* of Lampromachus, presumably a cousin or brother of the victor; this is unlikely to be a reference to general *xenia*, since Pindar usually reserves praise of that quality to the person who commissioned the ode, whereas this reference is submerged within a catalogue of victories, with προξενίᾳ as a term of praise parallel to ἀρετᾷ.

[35] On the institution of *proxenia*, see C. Marek, *Die Proxenie* (Frankfurt a.M., 1984), and J. Herman, *Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City* (Cambridge, 1987), 130–42.

[36] See W. Schadewaldt, *Der Aufbau des pindarischen Epinikion* (Halle, 1928), 314–17; Hubbard, *Pindaric Mind* (n.4 above), 156–58; L. Kurke, *The Traffic in Praise: Pindar and the Poetics of Social Economy* (Ithaca, 1991), 135–59.

[37] Harris, *Ancient Literacy* (n.28 above), 65–115, gives a pessimistic assessment of the extent of literacy in the fifth-century even in as rich and cultured a city as Athens.

written texts of such poems are by definition gifts only the member of a select elite might appreciate;[38] receiving a presentation copy as a gift from abroad would be a recognition of the recipient's status as a man of international reputation sufficient to be a *xenos* of the *laudandus* who sent the poem. The effect would be not unlike receiving an autographed copy of an author's book today.

Surely the commerical book trade attested at the end of the fifth-century was not, as Havelock and his followers have imagined, a sudden, revolutionary creation *ex nihilo* like Gutenburg's printing press or television or the internet, but was a gradual process of written texts coming to be used for more and more purposes; limited, informal, patronage-based circulation of short texts among selective pan-Hellenic networks who shared common interests must have preceded the more popularized market in books of which we hear only a few decades later. Even some 400 years later, in the context of a culture where a developed commercial book trade certainly did exist, such informal copying and distribution of texts by an author's patron is well attested in Cicero's letters as a means for disseminating philosophical or rhetorical works that might have limited popular appeal: Atticus, in addition to being Cicero's closest literary advisor, maintained a workshop of scribal slaves who copied Cicero's works and made them available to a limited circle of friends and interested parties, who in turn would loan them to other friends for copying.[39] Neither Atticus nor Cicero appear to have been motivated by any thought of financial gain; for Cicero, the motive was to extend his literary reputation, and Atticus considered it sufficient profit to be the closest friend and confidant of a man whom he regarded as a great statesman and literary genius.

Closer in time to Pindar is the fourth-century rhetorician and historian Anaximenes of Lampsacus. Pausanias 6.18.5 tells us that he had a quarrel with the historian Theopompus and therefore played a dirty

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Even if most urban Athenians might have possessed enough elementary literacy to inscribe a politician's name on an *ostrakon*, that is not the same as the degree of literacy necessary to read a manuscript of as demanding an author as Pindar. First-semester Greek students today can do the former, but not the latter.

[38] This would be analogous to the prestige value of inscribed vases, on which, see Harris, *Ancient Literacy* (n.28 above), 52. He notes that vases would sometimes even feature nonsense inscriptions to increase their value by making their owner appear literate.

[39] Still of fundamental use is the collection and analysis of the relevant letters by R. Sommer, 'Pomponius Atticus und Ciceros Werke', *Hermes* 61 (1926), 389–422.

trick on his rival by forging a book in Theopompus' style, casting bitter abuse on the Athenians, Spartans, and Thebans, the three great powers of the day. After writing this scandalous work, which was sure to give offense to the greatest number of people, he signed Theopompus' name to it and sent it out to various Greek cities (διέπεμψεν ἐς τὰς πόλεις). What Pausanias' anecdote assumes is the normality of this practice of an author sending his book free of charge to prominent people throughout the Greek world.

Others have proposed different models to explain the survival and diffusion of Pindar's texts. Almost all theories have relied on some measure of written circulation, since the length, dialectal variety, and metrical complexity of the odes make oral tradition an unreliable instrument of preservation. Christopher Carey believes that performers' texts were copied by professional musicians and interested amateurs.[40] Egert Pöhlmann suggests that Pindar's house was preserved as a kind of shrine and archive to which tourists would make a pilgrimage in order to produce personal copies of his works.[41] Wilamowitz emphasized the role of family archives and temples as repositories.[42] The textual historian Jean Irigoin proposed that such repositories, as well as civic archives, preserved the poems until they were assembled into regional collections: based on the allusions to Pindar in Aristophanes and Plato, he reconstructs an 'Attic edition' of at least five poems from different genres.[43] He does not specify who was responsible for compiling these regional editions or what their mechanics of distribution might have been. All of these scenarios suggest that the survival of Pindar's odes was almost by accident, entirely dependent on the agency of third parties, rather than by any calculated design of either the poet or patron. It should perhaps not surprise us that professors are so willing to imagine fifth-century incarnations of themselves busily traipsing about the Mediterranean collecting and copying texts. Although the model I have proposed may be no less speculative than any other, it does have the merit of placing the transmission and diffusion of the poems closer to

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[40] Carey, 'Victory Ode' (n.34 above), 90.

[41] E. Pöhlmann, 'Zur Überlieferung griechischer Literatur vom 8. bis zum 4. Jh.', in *Der Übergang von der Mündlichkeit bei den Griechen*, edd. W. Kullmann & M. Reichel (Tübingen, 1990), 22–23. However, the legends about Pindar's house are not beyond question: see W.J. Slater, 'Pindar's House', *GRBS* 12 (1971), 141–52.

[42] U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Die Textgeschichte der griechischen Lyriker* (Berlin, 1900), 37–40.

[43] Irigoin, *Histoire du texte* (n.1 above), 8–21.

their date of composition and contemporary interest; it also places the responsibility for transmission in the hands of the parties most directly interested in guaranteeing their visibility and survival.[44] None of the posthumous dissemination-scenarios hypothesized by scholars in the past are sufficient to justify the absolute certainty of immediate and everlasting pan-Hellenic fame that Pindar claims for his patrons and poems.

Some 50 years ago Irigoin suggested schools as the destinations for the first written texts of Pindar's odes.[45] More recently, Nagy has also called attention to the importance of schools in the preservation of Pindar's work. Citing Aristophanes (*Clouds* 961–68) and Plato (*Protagoras* 325E–326C) as primary evidence, Nagy postulates in the fifth-century a developing split between the institutionalized public training of ephebic choruses, such as performed drama and dithyramb at the City Dionysia, and more elite, traditional, private cithara-teachers who trained the sons of the aristocracy, either one-on-one or in small groups, to learn by heart and perform solo lyric compositions, including those originally meant for choral performance.[46] In Plato's dialogue, Protagoras specifically lists *diexodoi*, *epainoi*, and *encomia* concerning noble men of the past as among the first works of poetry a child is to learn. I would add to Nagy's scenario the observation that a similar bifurcation developed in the realm of physical education, whereby public gymnasia are created and regulated by the state for the benefit of the *dêmos,* whereas more privileged youths would frequent the *palaestra*, a private establishment where training was more individualized and in many cases pederastic.[47] Indeed, pederasty, unquestionably an elite practice

[44] In this regard, what I am proposing is not unlike the scenario Turner, *Athenian Books* (n.1 above), 17–20, suggested for the distribution of the earliest prose books by sophists and philosophers: he believed that the sophists themselves commissioned multiple copies that they would send *gratis* to distinguished individuals as a way of drumming up interest in their teaching, for which they would receive pay. He likens this to our practice of sending scholarly offprints to those who we think might be interested.

[45] Irigoin, *Histoire du texte* (n.1 above), 9. Plutarch, *De Musica* 1142B (= Aristoxenus, fr. 76 Wehrli) shows that Pindar was still taught at least in Theban schools during the fourth century BCE.

[46] Nagy, *Pindar's Homer* (n.30 above), 404–12. D. Pritchard, 'Participation in the Tribally Organized Dithyrambic Contests of Classical Athens', forthcoming in *CQ*, suggests that the dichotomy may not have been so stark, since publicly financed choruses were also, under his calculations, mainly composed of well-educated children of the elite. Even so, public choral training was at least ideologically a step in the direction of opening up literary education to the *dêmos.*

[47] J. Delorme, *Gymnasion: Etude sur les monuments consacrés à l' éducation en Grèce* (Paris,

in this period, as I have argued elsewhere,[48] was also key to private musical education, as is clear from the *Clouds* passage as well as numerous vase paintings which characterize the interaction between music teacher and student as intimate and erotic.[49] To the extent that Pindar's

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1960), 24–30, associates the foundation of public gymnasia with cities' needs to prepare the young for an expanded hoplite force. D.G. Kyle, *Athletics in Ancient Athens* (Leiden, 1987), 71–101, sees the major periods of building activity as the fifth century, under Cimon and Pericles, and the fourth century, under Lycurgus. On the connection of gymnasia with democratic developments, see S.C. Humphreys, 'The Nothoi of Kynosarges', *JHS* 94 (1974), 90–91; M. Golden, *Sport and Society in Ancient Greece* (Cambridge, 1998), 144; N. Fisher, 'Gymnasia and the Democratic Values of Leisure', in *Kosmos: Essays in Order, Conflict, and Community in Classical Athens* (Cambridge, 1998), 84–94. Ps.-Xenophon, *Const. Ath.* 2.10 provides key evidence for the association in the fifth-century. The elite and pederastic character of the *palaestra*, on the other hand, is clear from the setting of Plato's *Lysis* (206E–207B) and *Charmides* (153A–154C), as well as references in Attic comedy (Aristoph., *Nub.* 973–76, *Vesp.* 1023–28, *Pax* 762–63, *Av.* 139–42). See the discussions of Delorme, *Gymnasion* (this note) 19–20, 35; K.J. Dover, *Greek Homosexuality* (Cambridge, Mass., 1978), 54–55; F. Buffière, *Eros adolescent* (Paris, 1980), 561–72; C. Reinsberg, *Ehe, Hetärentum und Knabenliebe im antiken Griechenland* (Munich, 1989), 179–80; D.T. Steiner, 'Moving Images: Fifth-Century Victory Monuments and the Athlete's Allure', *CA* 17 (1998), 126–29; Fisher, 'Gymnasia' (this note), 94–104.

[48] T.K. Hubbard, 'Popular Perceptions of Elite Homosexuality in Classical Athens', *Arion* ser. 3, 6.1 (1998), 48–78.

[49] On the pederastic character of Greek aristocratic education generally during this period, see H.I. Marrou, *A History of Education in Antiquity*, trans. G. Lamb (New York, 1964), 57–59. While it is easy to understand why boys undergoing athletic instruction are depicted nude on vases, there was no necessary reason why students of music and literature should be so presented, unless to emphasize their role as beautiful objects of their teacher's gaze: see the interior of a kylix by the Eretria Painter (Paris G457 = *ARV*² 1254.80 = A. Lezzi-Hafter, *Der Eretria-Maler* [Mainz, 1988], no. 21), pointedly parallelled to athletic scenes on the sides of the cup. For other examples of classroom nudity, see the interior of a kylix by a painter related to Apollodorus (Basel BS465 = *Beazley Addenda*² 398 = *CVA Switzerland* VI, pl. 19.1), a chous by the Berlin Painter (New York 22.139.32 = *ARV*² 210.186 = Beck, *Album* [n.28 above], Fig. 104), a kylix of the Cage Painter (Paris G318 = *ARV*² 348.3 = Beck, Fig. 57), the interior of a kylix by the Akestorides Painter (Leiden PC91 = *ARV*² 781.3 = Beck, Fig. 121), a kylix by the Tarquinia Painter (Tarquinia RC1121 = *ARV*² 866.1), a chous by the Shuvalov Painter (London E525 = *ARV*² 1208.38 = Beck, Fig. 80), an unattributed chous (Brussels A1911 = Beck, Fig. 69), and a South Italic marble grave relief datable to c. 400 BCE (Munich G481 = Beck, Fig. 122). Even in cases where the pupil is fully clothed, the erotic relation to his teacher can be clear: see a kylix by the Telephus Painter (Munich 2669 = *ARV*² 818.26 = Beck, Fig. 120), where a boy sings in front of his seated teacher, who plays the flute, while an Eros crowns the boy from the rear, or a kylix by Douris (Getty 86.AE.290 = Beazley, *Paralipomena* 375.51bis = D. Buitron-Oliver, *Douris* [Mainz, 1995], no.93), where suitors and love gifts enter the classroom. An interesting series of terracotta figurines show teacher-student couples huddled closely together, often with the teacher's arm or hand around the (typically naked) boy's shoulder: see Berlin TC8033 (= Beck, Fig. 67), Paris MYR287 (= Beck, Fig. 74), Athens 4899 (= Beck, Fig. 82), London, Life Coll. 31 (= Beck, Fig. 83). The most famous and flamboyant sculptural exam-

poetry reinforces an aristocratic ethos of both physical and musical culture through paradigmatic exempla worthy of emulation, it would have provided ideal texts for character-building instruction in such schools, whose very *raison d' être*, as Nagy sees, much like that of private schools today, was to inculcate in the privileged young a sense of elite identity in counter-distinction to the levelling democratic norm of the civic chorus. However, inevitably, inasmuch as the instructional songs used in such schools ceased to be chorally performed on public occasions and instead become part of a large monodic repertoire for performance at elite symposia in the company of one's *hetairia,* the role of the sample text and thus of written preservation became more significant.

I quote Nagy at this point: 'Yet if the traditions of composition in performance were breaking down, then the need for sample performances would become greater and greater. Which means that education itself would become gradually transformed: the learning of techniques of composition through performance could shift to the learning of sample compositions through reading. Once the performance tradition becomes obsolete, the text is no longer a demonstration of ability to perform: rather the text becomes simply a sample piece of writing, potentially there to be imitated by other sample pieces of writing. Still the written text can present itself as not just a sample composition, but a sample composition *as potential performance*.'[50] What work could better invite visualization as 'potential public performance' than Pindar's choral lyric? But at the same time, through the ambiguities of the first-person, of which recent Pindaric scholarship has made us all too aware,[51] the text allows itself to be reperformed as monody in a more private and intimate setting. It is through this type of reperfor-

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ple is of course Heliodorus' late Hellenistic group of Pan teaching music to a naked Daphnis (the most famous example of which is in the Museo Nazionale, Naples). Red-figure scenes of Heracles and his music teacher Linus typically show the young hero naked (see *LIMC* IV, 833, especially nos. 1667–73), raising the possibility that his reason for attacking Linus may have been related to unwanted physical intimacies rather than punishment.

[50] Nagy, *Pindar's Homer* (n. 30 above), 405–6.

[51] For the most recent installments in the protracted debate over Pindar's first-person and the question of choral vs. monodic performance, see K. Morgan, 'Pindar the Professional and the Rhetoric of the κῶμος', *CP* 88 (1993), 1–15; G.B.D' Alessio, 'First-Person Problems in Pindar', *BICS* 39 (1994), 117–39; M. Anzai, 'First Person Forms in Pindar: A Re-examination', *BICS* 39 (1994), 141–50; M.R. Lefkowitz, 'The First Person in Pindar Reconsidered—Again', *BICS* 40 (1995), 139–50. The last provides a review of the previous scholarship.

mance, facilitated by the pan-Hellenic circulation of written texts, that Pindar likely imagined his work conferring immortality on its *laudandus*.

Several passages within Pindar's poetry suggest that he viewed his poems as material artifacts to be distributed throughout all Greece contemporaneously with their composition. Not only *N.*5.1–5, but also *N.*6.30–34, from another poem for a wealthy Aeginetan trading family, characterizes victory songs as cargo shipped across the sea at the family's initiative:

> Songs and stories transport/preserve the fair deeds of the Bassidae,
> Which are not few in number. A race famous of old,
> Shipping out their own encomia,
> They are able to provide the Pierides' plowmen with much source of song
> Thanks to their proud accomplishments.

Note the ambiguity of the verb ἐκόμισαν in the first line of this passage, equally attested in Pindar with the meanings 'transport' and 'preserve.'[52] Given the context, it must here be meant to have both implications, since it is precisely by transporting the encomia of the Bassidae to faraway places that their fair deeds are preserved. *P.*2.58–68 also refers to the song as cargo sent accross the sea:

> If anyone now says that another man in all Greece from all of history
> Was ever born greater than you in possessions and honor,
> He wrestles in vain with an imbecile's mind.
> I shall embark on a garlanded ship, singing loudly
> Of your excellence ...
> Hail! This song is being sent (πέμπεται) over the gray sea
> Like Phoenician exports.

Vv. 67–68 have been misinterpreted in the past as Pindar's declaration that he was not present in Syracuse for the ode's performance.[53] But I believe, by analogy with *N.*5.1–5 and *N.*6.30–34, this text actually

[52] See W.J. Slater, *Lexicon to Pindar* (Berlin, 1969), 284–85.

[53] See L. Schmidt, *Pindar's Leben und Dichtung* (Bonn, 1862), 193; F. Mezger, *Pindars Siegeslieder* (Leipzig, 1880), 50; C.A.M. Fennell, *Pindar: The Olympian and Pythian Odes* (Cambridge, 1893), 157; G. Fraccaroli, *Le Odi di Pindaro* (Verona, 1894), 367–68 n.2; U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Pindaros* (Berlin, 1922), 289; L.R. Farnell, *The Works of Pindar* (London, 1932), II, 128; C.M. Bowra, *Pindar* (Oxford, 1964), 135; J. Péron, *Les images maritimes de Pindare* (Paris, 1974), 151; G. Kirkwood, *Selections from Pindar* (Chicago, 1982), 147. On the other hand, W. Mullen, *Choreia: Pindar and Dance* (Princeton, 1982), 29–31, correctly observes that πέμπω is often used by Pindar in the sense of 'escort' or 'deliver', and therefore need not imply the sender's absence at all.

refers to the pan-Hellenic diffusion of Hieron's praise, which the poet has just enunciated in the most ringing terms in vv. 58–63; indeed, v.60 makes it clear that Pindar is situating Hieron's excellence in a perspective that is both pan-Hellenic (ἀν' Ἑλλάδα) and timeless (τῶν πάροιθε). The seafaring image of v.62 (ἀναβάσομαι στόλον) tells us that Pindar is indeed aboard this ship along with his cargo of praise; note also vv. 3–4 ('I come, bringing this song from shining Thebes').

*N.*6.30–34 presents the family of the victor as responsible for shipping songs throughout Greece. *P.*2.58–68 places greater emphasis on the poet's own participation and presence in the process of shipment. *I.*5.62–63, from the very end of the poem, suggests that the audience also plays a role in spreading the encomiastic message. After briefly turning to praise of the victor's brother and trainer Pytheas, the poem concludes:

> Take a crown for him, bring him a woolly fillet,
> And at the same time send forth (σύμπεμψον) this new winged song.

Who is addressed in these lines? Surely not the boy victor. It could be that the boy's father Lampon is exhorted to copy and circulate this poem as a way of "crowning" his sons' athletic achievements, on the analogy of *I.*2.43–46, also at the end of a poem, where Thrasybulus is exhorted not to let the present song of praise for his late father be silent, but to perform it and circulate it through the same network of worldwide hospitality for which his father had just been praised (*I.*2.35–42). But Lampon is never addressed as a second-person in *I.*5, so it seems more likely that the second-person here is a generalized address to anyone who hears or receives a copy of the ode to pass it on to others and thereby participate in a metaphorical reenactment of the victors' crowning.[54]

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[54] For a similar interpretation of this passage, see Mullen, *Choreia* (n.53 above), 30–31. The scholia were already confused about the addressee of these lines: Σ *I.*5.78 (Drachmann) relates that some say it is the Muse, others the island of Aegina. C.A.M. Fennell, *Pindar: The Nemean and Isthmian Odes* (Cambridge, 1899), 189, regarded it as a self-address to the poet himself; more recently, see G.A. Privitera, *Pindaro: Le Istmiche* (Milan, 1982), 202, for the same view. J.B. Bury, *The Isthmian Odes of Pindar* (London, 1892), 103, thought it either the Muse or the poet. For all of these specific addressees, one would need an identifying vocative. A self-referential address would seem otiose, since by mentioning Pytheas in his poem and delivering the poem to Lampon, Pindar (or his Muse) has already 'crowned' Pytheas and sent the song. The point of leaving the second-person unspecified must be to challenge all of us to read ourselves into it; compare *O.*10.1–3, where we literally begin to read the poem inscribed in Pindar's mind.

Steiner collects many examples of inscribed objects that Pindar uses as metaphors for his own poetic creation: steles, statues, statue bases, inscribed crowns, metallic cups, even a Delphic treasure house in *P.*6, containing within it many votive plaques and inscriptions.[55] She stops short of drawing from these metaphors any conclusion about the written preservation of Pindar's poetry, but it seems to me a logical inference. Most obvious is *O.*10.1–3, which plays quite explicitly with the poem's textual identity as a written document:

> Read for me the Olympic victor,
> The son of Archestratus, where his name has been inscribed
> Upon my mind!

It is significant that Pindar foregrounds the issue of written preservation in an ode that is throughout preoccupied with the themes of time, memory, truth, and immortal fame, as if to suggest that he saw writing as a key element to all of these qualities.[56]

Surprisingly, Steiner does not discuss the poet's address to the chorus-trainer Aeneas in *O.*6.87–91:

> Aeneas, now arouse your companions
> First to sing loudly Hera Parthenia,
> Then to determine if by our truthful words
> We avoid the old reproach of being Boeotian pigs.
> For you are an upright messenger, a code-stick of the fair-tressed Muses,
> a sweet mixing bowl of resounding songs.

Aeneas is called a σκυτάλα of the Muses, a Laconian message stick around which an inscribed tape needs to be wound to be properly deciphered. Again, Pindar is acutely aware of the status of his poem as a written document, but he implies that its full significance can only be realized when performed under the supervision of a skilled *chorodidaskalos* like Aeneas. Each of the three passages I have just quoted (*P.*2.58–68, *O.*10.1–3, and *O.*6.87–91), devise different strategies for asserting poetic presence and authority even through the disengaged and potentially alienated medium of written circulation.

The scholia tell us that *O.*7 was inscribed in gold leaf and dedicated in the temple of Athena at Lindos, a practice normally reserved for sacred texts. If true, the story suggests that written preservation of a Pindaric ode as a *ktêma eis aei* was valued beyond any reckoning of

[55] D.T. Steiner, 'Pindar's "Oggetti Parlanti"', *HSCP* 95 (1993), 159–80.

[56] See G. Kromer, 'The Value of Time in Pindar's *Olympian* 10', *Hermes* 104 (1976), 420–36, and my remarks in *Pindaric Mind* (n.4 above) 61–70.

expense. Indeed, this anecdote illustrates one final association of writing I would like to consider, namely its sacral character. We have observed this feature already with regard to the inscriptions on statue bases or votive cauldrons dedicated to the god responsible for an athletic victory. However, writing takes on a more hermetic and exclusive character in the sacred texts of the Orphics, whose existence is well attested in vase painting, as well as in the famous gold leaves of Hipponion and the Olbia fragments.[57] One source (Ps.-Alcidamas, *Odysseus* 24) even credits Orpheus as one of the inventors of writing. It is generally agreed today that the afterlife myth of Pindar's *O.*2 was influenced by Orphic doctrine,[58] and in a much-discussed passage at the end of the myth (*O.*2.83–88), Pindar refers to the exclusiveness of his poetry, as if it were itself a kind of mystery text:

> Many swift arrows are beneath my arm,
> Inside my quiver,
> Speaking to those who understand. But for everyone to learn the whole story
> In every detail, there is need of messengers. Wise is he who knows much by nature.
> Ambitious men who merely learn, with their penchant to tell all,
> Chatter away like crows against the divine bird of Zeus.

As with the image of the *skutala* in *O.*6, Pindar's symbolic figures need a *hermaneus* to be understood in full by anyone other than the select few, the initiates, those who know 'by nature.' In *O.*6 the *skutala* was the chorus-trainer Aeneas. Glenn Most has argued that in the usage of Pindar's time, the term *hermaneus* could not mean 'interpreter' in our sense, but 'announcer', 'translator', 'herald', or most broadly 'one who expresses things out loud,' which might suggest, on one level, the actual performers of Pindar's song.[59] In other words, Pindar's coded arrows of symbolic language can speak to the initiates by themselves, just as the sacred texts of the Orphics do, but for full understanding by the general public, they need to be performed by a chorus in a civic or pan-Hellenic space. If my interpretation of this overdetermined and multi-layered passage is correct in identifying at least one strand of its many-threaded reference,[60] then Pindar here acknowledges exactly the

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[57] See the excellent discussion of Steiner, *Tyrant's Writ* (n.31 above), 194–201.

[58] See H. Lloyd-Jones, 'Pindar and the After-Life', in *Pindare = Entretiens sur l' antiquité classique* 31 (Vandoeuvres-Geneva, 1985), 245–83.

[59] G.W. Most, 'Pindar, *O.*2.83–90', *CQ* NS 36 (1986), 308–13.

[60] In addition to Most's article (n. 59 above), see the excellent study of W. H. Race,

bifurcation of audience and performative future we have posited: on the one hand a publicly peformed choral event accessible to all, on the other a more selective, elite, even anti-democratic audience of well-born initiates who can read Pindar as a sacred text whose precepts, if followed, held out the promise of true immortality.[61]

'The End of *Olympian* 2: Pindar and the *Vulgus*', *CSCA* 12 (1981), 251–67. Although neither Most nor Race would ncessarily agree with the line of interpretation offered here, both have made important contributions to understanding some of this passage's many implications.

[61] The author is indebted to audiences in Melbourne, Philadelphia, Charlottesville, New York, Münster, Munich, Berlin, and Urbana-Champaign for their questions and contributions at various stages in the paper's development.

MEMORY, TIME, AND WRITING: ORAL AND LITERARY ASPECTS OF THUCYDIDES' *HISTORY*

James V. Morrison

In *Preface to Plato* (1963), Eric Havelock pointed to Plato as one of the first composers in Greece to be writing for a reading audience, rather than composing for public performance. Perhaps a generation earlier than Plato, Thucydides comments upon his work as a written composition. The third word of his history is *xunegrapse*: Θουκυδίδης Ἀθηναῖος ξυνέγραψε τὸν πόλεμον ('Thucydides the Athenian has written down the war'–1.1.1).[1] Havelock thinks Thucydides' remark that his work is 'a possession forever' (1.22.4) 'surely identifies the permanent influence of a MS stylistically composed for readers, as against the more ephemeral effects of a composition designed for recitation at an oral "competition."'[2] Yet now that we make distinctions in epic poetry among the categories of oral, oral-derived, and written composition combined with oral recitation, in the case of Thucydides the polarity between oral composition and written manuscript may be too stark.[3] Forty years after *Preface to Plato*, it may be best to view Thucydides as a transitional figure, who apparently has come to appreciate the potential of written literature, while his work still exhibits certain features of oral discourse and culture.

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[1] L. Edmunds, 'Thucydides in the Act of Writing,' in *Tradizione e Innovazione Nella Cultura Greca da Omero All' Eta Ellenistica. Scritti in Onore di Bruno Gentili* (Rome, 1993), 831–52 argues that the prefix *sun-* in *suggrapho* 'does not refer to putting things together in writing, to a process of composition, but is either confective ("to achieve the writing of") or intensive ("to write down")' (836). See also W.R. Connor, *Thucydides* (Princeton, 1984), 28 note 25 and S. Hornblower, *Thucydides* (Baltimore, 1987), 8 note 2.

[2] A.E. Havelock, *Preface to Plato* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1963), 54 note 8. He also remarks that 'Thucydides was the first Attic author to extrapolate written memoranda into continuous written discourse, just as Plato and Isocrates were the first to adapt sustained oral teaching to the same end' (56 note 16), though Antiphon, Thucydides' reputed teacher, seems to have preceded them all.

[3] For a quick synopsis of the distinctions in epic poetry, see J.M. Foley, *Homer's Traditional Art* (University Park, Pennsylvania, 1999), 14–18.

In order to discuss oral and written features in Thucydides, we must look at several very important and much-debated passages. I will focus only on the issues pertinent to orality and literacy. I begin by examining Thucydides' explicit remarks on sources and their evaluation. Then the topics of memory, time, and writing are explored, and two cases are analyzed: Thucydides' autobiographical remarks and his investigation of the sixth-century past regarding the Pisistratids. Finally, I speculate tentatively regarding the style and reception of Thucydides' work. From this exploration, I would like to test the claims Thucydides makes for his history: that his work is truthful, accurate, and superior to other accounts. Ultimately this paper asks the question: to what extent do these claims derive from the *History*'s status as a written document?

Sources and Evaluation

One problem we face is that Thucydides generally does *not* indicate: who his sources were *or* how many sources he has drawn on *or* whether he himself was present at a speech or event *or* on what basis the version he presents is viewed as superior to other versions. In light of this, let's begin with Thucydides' section on Methodology, in which he discusses the status of speech and narrative.

> καὶ ὅσα μὲν λόγῳ εἶπον ἕκαστοι ἢ μέλλοντες πολεμήσειν ἢ ἐν αὐτῷ ἤδη ὄντες, χαλεπὸν τὴν ἀκρίβειαν αὐτὴν τῶν λεχθέντων διαμνημονεῦσαι ἦν ἐμοί τε ὧν αὐτὸς ἤκουσα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοθέν ποθεν ἐμοὶ ἀπαγγέλλουσιν· ὡς δ' ἂν ἐδόκουν ἐμοὶ ἕκαστοι περὶ τῶν αἰεὶ παρόντων τὰ δέοντα μάλιστ' εἰπεῖν, ἐχομένῳ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τῆς ξυμπάσης γνώμης τῶν ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων, οὕτως εἴρηται. τὰ δ' ἔργα τῶν πραχθέντων ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ παρατυχόντος πυνθανόμενος ἠξίωσα γράφειν, οὐδ' ὡς ἐμοὶ ἐδόκει, ἀλλ' οἷς τε αὐτὸς παρῆν καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀκριβείᾳ περὶ ἑκάστου ἐπεξελθών.
>
> As to what the various participants said either before or during the war itself, it was difficult to recall what precisely was said both for me regarding speeches I heard myself and for my informants reporting to me about speeches made elsewhere; each has spoken in the way I thought each would have spoken what was especially required in the given situation, while holding as close as possible to the overall sense of what was actually said. About the actions of the war, however, I considered it my responsibility to write neither what I learned from the chance informant nor to reconstruct events according to ideas of my

> own, but rather from examining what I witnessed myself and what I learned from others with the utmost possible accuracy in each case.
> (1.22.1–2)[4]

A couple of observations. First, Thucydides' evidence comes in part from oral sources. Here the historian explicitly mentions that when he was absent, he learned about speeches from the report of others; when Thucydides was not present at an event, again he relies upon informants–often apparently several, for he emphasizes that he does not limit his investigation to the first witness he happens to encounter. In speaking of oral sources, we should, of course, distinguish oral reports based on eyewitness experience such as these from an oral tradition that recollects events from earlier generations.[5] I would emphasize the importance of oral reports to the creation of Thucydides' *History*. All the events and speeches in Athens from 424–404 must have been reported to Thucydides by others due to his exile.

Second, Thucydides draws upon his own experience. The historian tells us that he was present at some of the speeches and some of the events: 'I myself heard ... I myself was present ...' (αὐτὸς ἤκουσα ... αὐτὸς παρῆν ...). Later regarding the plague, Thucydides will insist upon what he experienced and saw with his own eyes. '*I myself caught the plague and saw* others suffering from it *myself* (αὐτός τε νοσήσας καὶ αὐτὸς ἰδὼν ...)' (2.48.3).[6] We will return to Thucydides' personal experience below.

Third, though not mentioned at 1.22.1–2, there is written evidence, including the historian Hellanicus, who is explicitly referred to (1.97.2),

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[4] Translations are adapted from Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, tr. S. Lattimore (Indianapolis, 1998). J.M. Marincola, "Thucydides 1.22.2," *CP* (1989) 216–21 argues that the phrase οὐδ' ὡς ἐμοὶ ἐδόκει ('nor to reconstruct events according to ideas of my own ') should be understood as Thucydides' promise that he will not resort to the 'imaginative reconstruction' which other historians have resorted to.

[5] See S.P. Small, 'Artificial Memory and the Writing Habits of the Literate,' *Helios* 22 (1995) 159–66 on 'experienced events' versus 'reported events' (165 note 13). More generally, oral sources are referred to with phrases such as: ἀκοῇ ἴσμεν and ἀκοῇ λεγόμενα (1.4.1, 1.23.3, 7.87.5; cf. 1.20). M.I. Finley, 'Myth, Memory, and History,' *History and Theory* 4 (1956) 281–302 considers Thucydides' confrontation with older oral tradition (296–99). W.V. Harris, *Ancient Literacy* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1989), 80 remarks that Thucydides 'still preferred oral testimony to written.' Cf. A. Momigliano, 'Time in Ancient Historiography,' in *Essays in Ancient and Modern Historiography* (Oxford, 1977), 179–204 on 'the preference for oral tradition and visual observation' (192).

[6] S. Hornblower, *A Commentary on Thucydides*. 2 vols. (Oxford, 1991–1996), I 321 comments: 'a rare autobiographical statement followed by an emphatic claim to autopsy (note the repeated use of "myself").'

and Herodotus, who is not.[7] Other written sources include treaties, letters, and inscriptions, some of which have apparently been transcribed by Thucydides into his work.[8]

Once information is acquired, Thucydides must evaluate it. This assessment entails that all evidence must be tested by critical analysis and comparison with other evidence. Thucydides emphasizes his meticulous labor. 'Judging from evidence which I am able to trust *after my most extensive inquiry* (ἐπὶ μακρότατον σκοποῦντί μοι) ...' (1.1.3). He remarks upon the toil expended seeking and evaluating information, for some reports conflicted with other testimony.

'*Finding out the facts involved great effort* (ἐπιπόνως δὲ ηὑρίσκετο), because eye-witnesses did not say the same things about the same events, but according to favoritism or memory' (1.22.3). A good example of conflicting testimony is found at the opening of book 2 when Thucydides presents both the Thebans' account (that the Plataeans swore oaths regarding the Theban prisoners-of-war) and the Plataeans' account denying such oaths. By its prominent place at the beginning of the war narrative and the unusual fact that Thucydides leaves this dispute unresolved, we may infer that Thucydides is calling attention to this incident. He may well be furnishing the reader with the type of problem historians must address: how to evaluate contradictory oral reports and produce a coherent and accurate written account.[9]

Thucydides also makes deductions and extrapolations from the data based on probability. He frequently signals deductions with the verb δηλόω, in sentences such as: 'The following not least also *makes clear to*

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[7] Regarding Thucydides' dialogue with Herodotus, see especially S. Hornblower, 'Thucydides' Use of Herodotus,' in *ΦΙΛΟΛΑΚΩΝ. Lakonian Studies in honour of Hector Catling*, ed. J.M. Sanders (London, 1992), 141–54 and *Commentary* II, 19–38, 122–45.

[8] Treaties are found at 5.17–20, 5.22–24, 5.46–48, 8.18, 8.37, 8.58; letters at 1.128–29, 1.137, 7.8–15; cf. 8.50; inscriptions at 1.132.2, 6.54.7, 6.59.3. Harris, *Ancient Literacy*, 80–81 comments: 'the written word is belatedly imposing its own logic.' On the function of such evidence in the *History*, see Connor, *Thucydides*, 146, who concludes 'the effect of the documents, then, is ironic for they emphasize the discrepancy between professions of enduring stability and the rapidly shifting reality of events.' See also Hornblower, *Commentary* II, 116–19. On accuracy in transcription, see P.J. Rhodes, 'In Defence of the Greek Historians,' *G & R* 41 (1994) 156–71, esp. 163.

[9] See the discussion in Hornblower, *Commentary* I, 242–43. On Thucydides' difficulties, see also, e.g., 5.74.3 and 7.44.1 (cf. Hdt. 6.14.1). On the contest between Alcibiades and Nicias over 'what they have heard,' see 6.17.6, 6.20.2 (ἐγὼ ἀκοῇ αἰσθάνομαι ...). J.M. Marincola, *Authority and Tradition in Ancient Historiography* (Cambridge, 1997), 69 discusses the limits of autopsy.

me (δηλοῖ δέ μοι) the weakness of ancient times' (1.3.1).[10] Extrapolations are indicated by verbs such as εἰκάζω. '*It is necessary to extrapolate* (εἰκάζειν δὲ χρὴ) for what earlier expeditions were like from this one' (1.9.4).[11]

At this point we might ponder the various claims Thucydides makes for his *History*. These statements bear on his method and also on how he viewed his achievement. After arguing that the Peloponnesian War was the greatest war and the most worth recording (1.1.1), Thucydides also claims that his work will be more accurate and reliable than other accounts of the past. He stresses clarity, truth, and accuracy in his work. For example, regarding clarity (*saphes*), Thucydides' audience will include 'as many as wish to look clearly at past events (τὸ σαφὲς σκοπεῖν)' (1.22.4).[12] With regard to truth (*alêtheia*), Thucydides promises to reveal the 'truest (ἀληθεστάτην) cause of the war' (1.23.6).[13] For accuracy (*akribeia*), Thucydides guarantees that with regard to what he witnessed and what he learned from others, he worked '*with the utmost possible accuracy* (ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀκριβείᾳ) in each case' (1.22.2; cf. 5.26.5).[14]

Thucydides often claims preeminence by contrasting his own work with the work of others and with people's general knowledge. That is, in a polemical tone, Thucydides asserts that others have failed to reach his standards of clarity, truth, and accuracy. Others are likely to receive reports uncritically. 'For people accept *what they hear* from one another *about the past* ... *with a uniform lack of testing* (τὰς ἀκοὰς τῶν προγεγενημένων...ὁμοίως ἀβασανίστως)' (1.20.1). Many avoid the toil needed to attain the truth: 'The search for truth is *so devoid of effort* (οὕτως ἀταλαίπωρος) for the many, that they would rather turn toward what is readily available' (1.20.3).[15]

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[10] Edmunds, 'The Act of Writing,' 848 comments: 'words formed on the base δηλ- are central to the argument of the Archaeology, where they constate manifest, inescapable evidence.'

[11] Hornblower, *Commentary* I, 33 translates *eikazein*: 'form our conjectures.' For faulty extrapolation, see 1.10.2. On Thucydides' 'vocabulary of evidence' more generally, see Hornblower, *Thucydides*, 100–7.

[12] 1.22.4 provides a positive model for clarity, the best possible situation. Regarding difficulties in uncovering the past, see 1.1.3 and 1.9.2.

[13] Cf. 'what was truly said' (1.22.1; cf. 7.14.4). On the opposition between what is true and what is pleasant, see Edmunds, 'The Act of Writing,' 847–48.

[14] Regarding *akribeia*, Hornblower, *Commentary* I, 60 comments: 'there is also present the idea of *precise* conformity with reality.'

[15] Edmunds, 'The Act of Writing,' 846–47 inteprets Thucydides' comments upon 'the many' and 'the few' (who seek the truth) in political terms.

Thucydides' pronouncements made in the Methodology (1.20–23) repeatedly contrast his own finished product with the less reliable and false stories that people pass around. Yet none of these claims for his own work directly derives from the status of Thucydides' *History* as a written document. In conversation and argument, people often claim accuracy and truth for their own accounts, and censure the work of others for lack of clarity or precision. In fact, Thucydides' assertions are the sorts of declarations speakers make in courtrooms or political assemblies before a live audience.[16]

Thucydides makes one other claim that differs in this respect. He announces that his work will have lasting value.

> Yet if [my work] is judged useful by as many as wish to look clearly at both past events and those that at some future time, in accordance with human nature, will recur in similar and comparable ways, that will suffice. *It is composed as a possession forever rather than a competition piece to be heard for the moment* (κτῆμά τε ἐς αἰεὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγώνισμα ἐς τὸ παραχρῆμα ἀκούειν ξυγκεῖται). (1.22.4)

In this passage, Thucydides promises a clear view of the past, usefulness, and significantly, 'a possession forever (κτῆμά τε ἐς αἰεὶ)' rather than 'a competition piece (ἀγώνισμα).' So we must ask: is Thucydides' work 'a possession forever,' *because* of its status as a written work–or is it because Thucydides' work is more accurate and reliable? In order to address this question, I turn to three topics which shed light on Thucydides' enterprise: memory, time, and writing.

Memory, Time, and Writing

Memory is problematic in several ways. Much of Thucydides' information derives from someone's memory, largely that of Thucydides' informants, who remember battles and speeches and then recount those experiences to Thucydides in accordance with their recollections. In a few cases, Thucydides explicitly draws on his own memory of what he

[16] On the influence of political debate on science and historiography, see G.E.R. Lloyd, *Magic, Reason, and Experience. Studies in the origins and development of Greek science* (Cambridge, 1979), 226–67 where he concludes 'this very paradigm of the competitive debate may have provided the essential framework for the growth of natural science' (267). On the competition among intellectuals more generally, see G.E.R. Lloyd, *The Revolutions of Wisdom. Studies in the Claims and Practice of Ancient Greek Science* (Berkeley, 1987), 87–102.

himself witnessed: the plague and some speeches and events, including the loss of Amphipolis (4.102–8). Yet when Thucydides evokes memory, it is seldom specified whether that particular memory is of something seen, heard, or read.[17]

Second, although memory provides the basis for much of Thucydides' evidence, the historian acknowledges some drawbacks. It was hard, Thucydides tells us, for the historian and his informants to remember precisely what people said (1.22.1). Indeed, Thucydides asserts that memory may be faulty, for he also remarks that differing accounts result from favoritism or (lapses of) memory (1.22.2–3).

Particularly interesting is Thucydides' account of the plague in which he links memory and suffering. There was a disagreement over the words of an oracle. One version stated that 'A Dorian war will come, and a plague (*loimos*) with it.' A different version read '... and a famine (*limos*) with it' and there was a dispute over which word was sung (2.54.2–3). In this case, 'plague (*loimos*)' prevailed and Thucydides remarks: 'People shaped their memories in accordance with what they suffered (οἱ γὰρ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς ἃ ἔπασχον τὴν μνήμην ἐποιοῦντο)' (2.54.3). This explanation suggests that memory is pliable and may be adjusted with respect to experience.[18] Yet however faulty, memory clearly leads to much of the information Thucydides has collected. These oral reports of recently experienced events are essential for the sort of 'history' Thucydides is compiling.

Like memory, time plays an equivocal role. In some passages, Thucydides appears to view time as an obstacle blocking his search for truth. He comments on the difficulty of recovering ancient history. 'For it was impossible *because of the amount of time elapsed* (διὰ χρόνου πλῆθος) to discover clearly what happened in the previous era or the still more remote past' (1.1.3). Time may lead to a patriotic and one-sided account. Thucydides speaks of: '*versions that cannot be tested and for the most part are untrustworthy because of time* (ὄντα ἀνεξέλεγκτα καὶ τὰ πολλὰ

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[17] Thucydides says explicitly that he remembers (*egôge memnêmai*) that many said the war would last twenty-seven years (5.26). Memory is often connected to events of great magnitude: 1.23.3, 2.8.3, 2.47.3, 5.66.2, 8.41.2. Edmunds, 'The Act of Writing,' 850 argues that 'when Thucydides speaks of memory, he is usually disparaging, never favorable,' and concludes that ultimately the historian rejects 'not only the poets' account but also their traditional authority, namely, memory' (851). Surely this goes too far, given the importance of recollection for Thucydides' informants' reports.

[18] Cf. the speech of the Peloponnesian leaders at 2.87.4, describing the effect of powerful emotion on memory: φόβος γὰρ μνήμην ἐκπλήσσει ('for panic strikes out memory').

ὑπὸ χρόνου αὐτῶν ἀπίστως) have won victory as patriotic storytelling' (1.21.1).[19] Yet the passage of time is not always the culprit. Thucydides notes: 'people always consider the war in which they are fighting at present to be the greatest' (1.21.2). Here the problem is not time–that a war occurred too far in the past–but that it's too close and the soldiers have no perspective. People make inaccurate assessments because there's no comparative basis against which to judge an ongoing war.

These problems—the inconstancy and malleability of memory, the hindrance of time—could exclusively or predominantly affect Thucydides' interviews with oral informants and consultation of oral traditions. But we need to distinguish between Thucydides' sources (most of which are oral) and what he's created—a written history. When Thucydides claims that his work will be 'a possession forever (κτῆμά τε ἐς αἰεὶ),' is this meant to suggest that *as a written work*, it may be capable of *overcoming* the obstacle of time?[20] We now approach the topic of writing.

I limit my examination here to Thucydides' use of the verb *grapho*. Sometimes this verb refers to the actions of figures in the *History* itself. For example, letters are written by Pausanias, Themistocles, Alcibiades, and Nicias.[21] When Thucydides records Nicias' motivation for writing a letter to the Athenians from Sicily in 414, we learn that he does so out of fear that an oral report would distort his message.

> Because [Nicias] was afraid that the men he sent would not report the facts, *whether because of incompetence in speaking, failure of memory, or speaking to please the crowd* (ἢ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ λέγειν ἀδυνασίαν ἢ καὶ μνήμης ἐλλιπεῖς γιγνόμενοι ἢ τῷ ὄχλῳ πρὸς χάριν τι λέγοντες), he wrote a letter believing that this would be the best way for the Athenians to learn his opinion-- with no lapses in the transmission—and to deliberate about the true situation. (7.8.2; cf. 7.14.4)

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[19] The passage of time may lead to disbelief that is unwarranted (1.10.2; cf. 1.21.1). P. Vidal-Naquet, 'Divine Time and Human Time,' in *The Black Hunter. Forms of Thought and Forms of Society in the Greek World*, tr. A. Szegedy-Maszak (Baltimore, 1986) 46 argues that Thucydides is original in recognizing both 'logical time' (which helps to predict) and 'historical time,' although this means that some passages 'seem to reflect a cyclical concept of time.' On the equivalency of old and difficult, see *palaia ... chalepa* (1.20).

[20] Momigliano, 'Time,' 191 argues that the Greek historian 'records, not what everybody knows, but what is in danger of being forgotten or has already been forgotten. History is to the Greeks and consequently to the Romans an operation against Time the all-destroying in order to save the memory of events worth being remembered. The fight against oblivion is fought by searching for the evidence.' Simonides (PMG 26) claims that not even time which is 'the conqueror of all (*pandamator*)' will obscure his poetic offering to the dead.

[21] The verb *grapho* also refers to inscriptions, *stelai*, and treaties.

We might see this passage (in which Thucydides infers Nicias' motivations) as providing a model for the advantages of written communication over oral report: the 'triad' of skill, fixed remembrance, and objectivity counteracts lapses of memory and any inclination to play to a crowd of listeners. Harris argues: 'we may gain the impression here that both Nicias and Thucydides had made a discovery'—namely, the superiority of writing over trusting to a messenger's memory and later oral report.[22]

Thucydides also uses the verb *grapho* self-referentially. In addition to the third word of the *History* (*xunegrapse*–1.1.1), Thucydides brings a year of the war to an end with a near-formulaic sentence eleven times in the *History*. For example: 'And a second year finished for this war *which Thucydides wrote down* (ὃν Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν)' (2.70.4). The repeated appearance of this basic expression serves not only as a regular reminder of the authorship of this work, but also highlights the fact that this is a written document. Because the *History* is explicitly proclaimed as written, it comes to share in those advantages spelled out in Nicias' triad above.[23]

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[22] Harris, *Ancient Literacy*, 78, and he goes on to say that Thucydides is merely 'explaining it [i.e., this discovery] to the public.' Edmunds, 'The Act of Writing,' 849 believes that 'Nicias' view of the Athenians as presented by Thucydides, is exactly the same as the one that can be attributed to Thucydides himself on the basis of his methodological statements.'

[23] See also 2.103.2, 3.25.2, 3.88.4, 3.116.3, 4.51, 4.104.4, 6.7.4, 6.93.4, 7.18.4, 8.6.5, 8.60.3; cf. 2.1, 4.104, 1.22.2, 1.97.2. In A.W. Gomme, A. Andrewes, K.J. Dover, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*. 5 vols. (Oxford, 1945–1981; hereafter 'HCT'), Dover, *HCT* V, 390 notes the exceptions (2.47.1, 4.116.3, 5.24.2) and argues against the label of 'signature.' Related to this kind of self-reference, A.L. Ford, 'The Politics of Authorship in Archaic Greece,' in *Theognis of Megara*, ed. T.J. Figueira, G. Nagy (Baltimore, 1985) 82–95 presents a fascinating interpretation of Theognis' 'seal' (*sphragis*) as 'an assertion of ownership rather than authorship,' (85) and goes on to explore the political dimension of the poet as 'the Muses' spokesman and as a political envoy' (92–93). See the discussion of writing and property below.

Edmunds, 'The Act of Writing,' uses grammatical tense to analyze Thucydides' use of the verb *grapho*. The primary tenses (present and perfect) allow Thucydides to speak 'of his writing from the point of view of an ideal present time—his work is a possession ἐς αἰεί. If the adverb αἰεί is understood in its distributive sense, the work is a possession for each successive occasion' (837). Marincola, *Authority and Tradition*, 185 note 52 examines *grapho* by distinguishing between first and third person statements: 'the first person is used for statements of opinion, reasoning, inference, autopsy, and methodology, that is, anything that affected the history *qua* history. The third person, on the other hand, is used by Thucydides for formal openings and closings.' On the presence or effacement of the historian in his own work, see N. Loraux, 'Thucydide a écrit la Guerre du Péloponnèse,' *Metis* 1 (1986) 139–61.

Certainly there are potential dangers to written texts.[24] In fact, there are counterexamples to every basic guideline we might deduce from Thucydides' remarks in the passages cited above. Although Nicias turns to writing for objective reporting, written work can be inaccurate, as in the case of Hellanicus' chronology (1.97.2). Thucydides claims personal experience, but eyewitnesses are not always reliable, for they contradict one another. Indeed, even autopsy may be misleading, at least with respect to what we call archaeological ruins (1.10.3).[25] In addition, although Thucydides' work is written, he clearly expects it to be heard, for he candidly acknowledges the aural effect of his type of history: 'And the results, by my avoiding patriotic storytelling, will perhaps seem the less enjoyable for listening (καὶ ἐς μὲν ἀκρόασιν ἴσως τὸ μὴ μυθῶδες αὐτῶν ἀτερπέστερον φανεῖται)' (1.22.4).[26] With these questions raised, let us turn to two topics in somewhat greater detail.

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[24] Harris, *Ancient Literacy*, 90 comments that both Herodotus and Thucydides were 'fully aware of the deceptive possibilities of written texts' (90), noting that letters in Thucydides are frequently 'the instruments of death, betrayal, and deceit' (88).

[25] Thucydides' remarks about poets also set up a tension: poets have a tendency to exaggerate (1.10.3, 1.21.1), yet they are not necessarily untrustworthy (1.10.1). This paper will not explore Thucydides' complex attitude toward poets (and Homer in particular), but we might ask: Does his criticism of poets derive from the oral nature of their work? Or could the poets' lack of reliability derive from the fact that they are performing? Also when Thucydides quotes passages from Homer (3.104), is this done from memory (from hearing a rhapsode?), or is it possible that Thucydides is consulting a text or an inscription, as he would have done with a treaty? M.L. West, 'Cynaethus' Hymn to Apollo,' CQ 25 (1975) 161–70 thinks Thucydides is quoting from memory (170), but see F. Jacoby, 'Der homerische Apollonhymnus,' *SBBerl. Akad.* 15 (1933) 689–92.

[26] A tremendous problem in the fifth century is that 'speak/listen (*legein/akouein*)' may at times be used interchangeably with 'write/read (*graphein/anagignoskein*)'. Gomme, *HCT* I, 136 posits that 'oral reports (*akoas*)' (1.20.1) go beyond 'hearsay' to include 'all that has been said and written of the past," "all that we have heard or read of it."' On the phrase 'it is said (*legetai*),' H.D. Westlake, 'ΛΕΓΕΤΑΙ in Thucydides,' *Mnemosyne* 30 (1977) 345–62 acknowledges that 'the legetai phrase may point to the use of a written source' (356). See further references in R. Thomas, 'Performance and Written Publication in Herodotus and the Sophistic Generation,' in *Vermittlung und Tradierung von Wissen in der griechischen Kultur*, edd. W. Kullmann and J. Althoff (Tübingen, 1993), 225–44 at 234 note 29 and 236 note 31. In this case, however, listening (*akroasin* - 1.22.4) does appear to mean *listening* and not *reading*, though Thucydides does contrast 'a possession forever (κτῆμά τε ἐς αἰεὶ)' with 'a competition piece *to be heard* for the moment (ἀγώνισμα ἐς τὸ παραχρῆμα **ἀκούειν**)' (1.22.4).

Autobiography and the Pisistratids

By looking at Thucydides' own experience, we gain a better appreciation of the historian's opportunities and motivations. In the so-called second introduction, Thucydides asserts that he has written the war from beginning to end—twenty-seven years all the way to the destruction of the long walls in 404. His point is that the whole conflict should be considered one war, for he wishes to correct a misimpression: that there were two separate wars with an intervening truce. 'As for the agreement in the middle part, if anyone ventures to think it was not wartime, his claim will be incorrect' (5.26.2). Again we note the assertive polemic of the superior reporter.

In this section, Thucydides also lays out his credentials for writing such a history.

> I lived through the whole of it when I was of an age to observe and had my mind engaged, *in order to know with some exactness* (ὅπως ἀκριβές τι εἴσομαι); it also happened that I was exiled from my city for twenty years after the command at Amphipolis and, being present at the activities of both sides, especially the Peloponnesians because of my exile, I had leisure to observe affairs better. (5.26.5)

Thucydides refers to his exile for twenty years' duration after Amphipolis, access to both sides, and the leisure of an extended sabbatical—the necessary conditions perhaps for writing accurate history. Westlake remarks that Thucydides may be anticipating objections that he was 'too young to embark on historical research at the outbreak of the war;' similarly his remarks on having had the plague himself and observing others (2.48.3) might be seen as preempting any scepticism regarding his description there.[27]

Thucydides says that during his exile, he had access to both sides and presumably time to check and test his various sources (5.26.5). Let us examine the circumstances that led to his exile. In book four (the year 424), Thucydides himself plays a role in the events leading to the loss of Amphipolis. After mentioning himself as 'the other general, Thucydides, son of Olorus, who wrote this history,' Thucydides describes his own actions on hearing of the Spartan threat to Amphipolis: 'When [Thucydides] heard this, he sailed at once with seven ships which were on the spot, and he wanted above all to get to Amphipolis before its sur-

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[27] H.D. Westlake, 'The Two Second Prefaces of Thucydides,' in *Studies in Thucydides and Greek History* (Chippenham, England, 1989), 97–102 (see 99) and 'Thucydides and the Fall of Amphipolis,' *Hermes* 90 (1962) 276–87 (see 277 note 1).

render, but otherwise to occupy Eion in advance' (4.104.5). There were two consequences of Thucydides' quick response. First, Brasidas made a deal with the people of Amphipolis on more moderate terms than he would have otherwise; and second, although Thucydides arrives too late to save Amphipolis, he did save the city of Eion. 'Brasidas had just taken Amphipolis and came within a night of taking Eion; if the ships had not come to the rescue quickly, it would have been his at dawn' (4.106.4). Thucydides includes both praise for Brasidas and some degree of exculpation for himself.[28] There is, however, no mention of his exile—this gains notice only in book 5—and no record of the discussion in the Athenian assembly which resulted in Thucydides' exile. I will return to the significance of this below.

A second topic pertinent to oral sources, writing, and accuracy: the Pisistratids. In the middle of book six, soon after the Sicilian Expedition is underway, Thucydides expands upon his discussion of the mutilation of the Herms and mocking of the Mysteries (6.53–61). Thucydides criticizes the Athenians' investigation into these crimes on several counts, including the Athenians' failure to gain accurate information, a failure that results in part due to the unreliability of the informants.

> οἱ γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐπειδὴ ἡ στρατιὰ ἀπέπλευσεν, οὐδὲν ἧσσον **ζήτησιν** ἐποιοῦντο τῶν περὶ τὰ μυστήρια καὶ τῶν περὶ τοὺς Ἑρμᾶς δρασθέντων, καὶ **οὐ δοκιμάζοντες τοὺς μηνυτάς**, ἀλλὰ πάντα ὑπόπτως ἀποδεχόμενοι, διὰ πονηρῶν ἀνθρώπων πίστιν πάνυ χρηστοὺς τῶν πολιτῶν ξυλλαμβάνοντες κατέδουν, χρησιμώτερον ἡγούμενοι εἶναι **βασανίσαι** τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ εὑρεῖν ἢ διὰ μηνυτοῦ πονηρίαν τινὰ καὶ χρηστὸν δοκοῦντα εἶναι αἰτιαθέντα **ἀνέλεγκτον** διαφυγεῖν.

> After the fleet sailed, the Athenians in fact had not slackened in their *investigation* of the acts committed regarding the Mysteries and the Herms, and *not testing the informers*, they found everything grounds for suspicion, arresting and putting in prison some very upright citizens because of their own trust in scoundrels, since they felt it more essential to *investigate* the affair *exhaustively* and find out than to let anyone accused, however worthy he seemed, *escape examination* on account of the informer's baseness. (6.53.2)

[28] Note the emphasis on events that occur contrary to expectation (4.103.5, 4.106.1). Although Marincola, *Authority and Tradition*, 182–84 argues that 'there is no overt justification or defense of his action,' (183), see Westlake, 'Thucydides and the Fall of Amphipolis,' J.R. Ellis, 'Thucydides at Amphipolis,' *Antichthon* 12 (1978) 28–35, and Hornblower, *Commentary* II, 338. On the possibility that Brasidas was Thucydides' source for this account, Hornblower, *Commentary* II, 334 comments: 'surely the two men talked between 424 and 422.'

We note that in this description, Thucydides employs terms that he also uses to refer to his own labor as an historian (*zetesis, basanisai, anelengkton*). Just as the historian interviews his informants, the Athenians make an enthusiastic effort to investigate previous events and gather accusations. But in the end, because they did not "test" the informers (οὐ δοκιμάζοντες τοὺς μηνυτάς), the Athenians' efforts fail to yield any conclusive information or just rulings (6.60.5, 6.61.1)–this contrasts pointedly with Thucydides' own success as an historian.

Thucydides moves from this investigation to the Athenian people's opinions about the tyranny of Pisistratus and his sons. Just as the Athenians in 415 relied on reports from informants, so they also relied for their knowledge concerning the Pisistratids on oral report: 'For the people knew from hearing ... (ἐπιστάμενος γὰρ ὁ δῆμος ἀκοῇ ...)' (6.53.3; cf. 6.60.1). Thucydides here expands upon a correction stated early in the *History*: that Hippias not Hipparchus was the son who succeeded Pisistratus as tyrant (1.20.2). In Thucydides' account of the Pisistratids, we find the familiar elements of collecting information and evaluation of evidence. The evidence Thucydides draws on is in part oral, in part written. Thucydides argues that Hippias was the elder brother by emphasizing that Hippias—not Hipparchus–had legitimate sons. Inscriptions on the Altar of the Twelve Gods and on a stele on the acropolis record no children for Hipparchus, yet five children of Hippias are mentioned (6.54–55).[29]

In interpreting this epigraphical material, Thucydides also reveals something of his method in making deductions and arguing from probability. Based on the inscriptions, it is likely (*eikos*), Thucydides argues, that the elder brother married first (6.55.1). Also Hippias's name is listed (*gegraptai*) immediately after his father, Pisistratus. Again it is not unlikely (οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀπεοικότως) that Hippias would be listed in such a spot if he were older and followed Pisistratus as tyrant (6.55.2). It also seems to Thucydides (δοκεῖ μοι) that Hippias—if he had not already been tyrant—would have had some difficulty in establishing himself as

[29] Thucydides tells us that the text of the inscription (*epigramma*) on the Altar of the Twelve Gods 'even still now is legible in faint letters (ἔτι καὶ νῦν δῆλόν ἐστιν ἀμυδροῖς γράμμασι)' (6.54.7). See discussion in Dover, *HCT* IV, 331, who remarks, 'Thucydides is not above pride in the trouble he has taken.' Fortuitously, the inscription has survived: see *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.*, edd. R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, revised ed. (Oxford, 1989) 19–20 (#11). Thucydides also quotes another inscription, the monument (*sema*) in Lampsacus, that commemorates the death of Archedike, Hippias' daughter (6.59.3).

tyrant on the very day of his brother's death (6.55.3). It's no surprise that Thucydides characterizes his account as more accurate. He asserts that no one—even the Athenians themselves—knows the facts concerning the tyrants: 'In describing these events fully, I will demonstrate that neither others nor the Athenians themselves are *saying anything accurate* (ἀκριβὲς οὐδὲν λέγοντας) about their own tyrants or about what happened' (6.54.1).

When Thucydides concludes this digression and returns to the situation in Athens in the year 415, he comments that the people have now become harsh and suspicious (6.60). As far as those in prison were concerned, no reliable information was obtained: 'There is conjecture (*eikazetai*) in both directions, but no one then or later could say anything definite (τὸ σαφὲς) about those perpetrating the deed' (6.60.2). Thucydides concludes that it is unclear whether prisoners were unjustly put to death (6.60.5). Regarding Alcibiades in particular, all that Thucydides will say is that the Athenians *thought* they had clear information about his guilt (6.61.1).[30]

Many aspects of this section deserve further reflection. Regarding the Pisistratids, Thucydides promotes the accuracy of his own account with an explicit reference to an oral source. 'I insist with more accurate knowledge than others through what I have heard (εἰδὼς μὲν καὶ ἀκοῇ ἀκριβέστερον ἄλλων ἰσχυρίζομαι)' (6.55.1). As Connor remarks, an oral report 'can be useful if subjected to careful examination.'[31] This Thucydides does, but the Athenian people have failed to do with their informants regarding the Herms and Mysteries. But there is the larger question: Why this digression? What is the connection between the charges against Alcibiades in 415 and the Athenians' faulty beliefs about Hippias and Hipparchus? Why has Thucydides chosen to juxtapose these two episodes?

Among other links, scholars have pointed to the shared themes of passion (*eros*) and tyranny.[32] I would like to emphasize the Athenians' readiness to listen to and believe false accounts. The Athenian people

[30] Dover, *HCT* IV, 273–88 discusses the evidence from Andocides' 'On the Mysteries' and Plutarch's *Life of Alcibiades*.

[31] Connor, *Thucydides*, 178 note 52. For a discussion of Thucydides' sources, see Dover, *HCT* IV, 323–25.

[32] The Athenians' lust for Sicily (6.24.3, cf. 6.13.1) is linked to the erotic triangle in the sixth century (6.54.1). Alcibiades' alleged aim at tyranny (6.61.7) may have triggered the Athenian people's nervous recollection of earlier Athenian tyrants. See Connor, *Thucydides*, 178–80.

heard Hipparchus was tyrant and they believed it, just as they listened to possibly false accusations against Alcibiades and others and were persuaded without effective testing. In both cases, we find the Athenians accepting misleading and false reports. A third yet implicit point of comparison, I believe, concerns the circumstances of Thucydides' own exile. After Brasidas took Amphipolis in 424, Thucydides was undoubtedly attacked in the Athenian assembly—according to Marcellinus' life of Thucydides, it was Cleon who denounced him.[33] Although the grounds for his exile were presumably advocated in speeches made in the assembly, Thucydides does *not* maintain that oral reports are necessarily inaccurate—much of the *History* is based on oral report. Indeed, regarding the Pisistratids, Thucydides appears to assign as great weight to his oral source (6.55.1) as to the inscriptions in Athens. Thucydides, however, has tested and compared these reports and evidence. Yet on the other side, as Thucydides has demonstrated, *regarding what it hears* the Athenian assembly repeatedly fails to engage in the sort of critical evaluation that Thucydides has engaged in for his own work.

This brings us back to the status of Thucydides' history. In 431 Thucydides decided the impending conflict would be a great event and he would devote himself to recording this war still yet-to-come (1.1.1). When war began, he was also a military man; he then became a general; to reach such a position, surely he must have been an active politician and speaker. Thucydides may well have seen himself as one of Pericles' successors. Yet seven years into the war, exile removed him from political engagement and any chance of leading Athens.

I do not want to make too much out of one passage, but it is worth comparing Thucydides' situation with the circumstances of Nicias in Sicily. Like Thucydides, Nicias was away from Athens; Nicias was also concerned about unreliable speeches made in the assembly; when Nicias wrote his letter in 414, he was writing to guarantee objectivity: he used a written document to combat the sort of speeches often heard in the Athenian assembly. Thucydides found himself in somewhat the same position following the events at Amphipolis. He too relies on writ-

[33] ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι στρατηγήσας ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει ὁ Θουκυδίδης καὶ δόξας ἐκεῖ βραδέως ἀφικέσθαι καὶ προλαβόντος αὐτὸν τοῦ Βρασίδου ἐφυγαδεύθη ὑπ' Ἀθηναίων, διαβάλλοντος αὐτὸν τοῦ Κλέωνος. 'It should be known that Thucydides was general in Amphipolis and was thought to have arrived there slowly—Brasidas took it in advance—so he was banished by the Athenians with Cleon attacking him' (Marcellinus *Life of Thucydides* 46). Cf. Nicias' fear of slanderous attacks in Athens if he were to withdraw from Syracuse (7.48.3).

ing to convey the truth, but it is not simply writing which confers accuracy. The reader (and audience) can rely upon the *History*'s accuracy due to Thucydides' research, testing and questioning of sources, comparing of evidence, and laboring for untold hours.[34] Although Thucydides began his history at the start of the war, he apparently came to appreciate how he might use the written word in order to speak to and correct his fellow Athenians, whom due to years of exile he had been unable to address.[35]

Style and Performance: Oral and Written?

Havelock and Ong have argued that writing changes or restructures thought. Havelock goes so far as to assert that in the absence of writing 'strictly speaking, an historical time sense is impossible.'[36] These claims might lead us to examine the ideas and style of Thucydides in order to gauge his place on the oral-written spectrum. Many have claimed that Herodotus' style is designed for oral delivery while Thucydides' is for reading, but how easy is it to distinguish between oral and written style? We could attempt to answer this by setting Thucydides' work against the categories found in Ong's discussion on the 'psychodynamics of oral discourse.'[37]

The results are decidedly mixed. Thucydides' work may be seen as 'oral' in his adoption of an agonistic, polemical tone; his work, at times, is participatory rather than objectively distanced; and at times the *His-*

[34] W.R. Connor, 'Narrative Discourse in Thucydides,' in *The Greek Historians. Literature and History: Papers Presented to A.E. Raubitschek* (Saratoga, California, 1985), 1–17 argues that Thucydides' authority derives in part from the demonstration of his historical method found in the 'Archaeology' (6–7). See also Loraux, 'Thucydide a écrit,' 147–53.

[35] If we think of Thucydides' intended audience, certainly what many Athenians would remember about Amphipolis was what Cleon said in the assembly against Thucydides. Hornblower, *Thucydides*, 27 quotes Syme's remark: 'exile may be the making of an historian' (*PBA* 48 [1962] 40).

[36] Havelock, 'Preface,' 123.

[37] W.J. Ong, *Orality and Literacy. The Technologizing of the Word* (London, 1982), esp. 36–50. In a remarkable survey of the evidence for literacy in the fifth century, F.D. Harvey, 'Literacy in the Athenian Democracy,' *REG* 79 (1966) 585-635 has no doubts: 'even if Herodotus' work was intended in the first place for public recitation, that of Thucydides was clearly not' (585). G. Crane, *The Blinded Eye. Thucydides and the New Written Word* (Lanham, Maryland, 1996) 7 agrees: Thucydides 'created a work designed primarily for—indeed, only fully comprehensible by—the reflective reader.'

tory is 'situational' rather than abstract.[38] Yet the *History* fails to jibe with the criteria for oral discourse in several ways: at times, Thucydides is objectively distanced, and often highly abstract, by introducing maxims and universal principles regarding human nature.[39] In addition, there are features often identified as written or literary features, such as so-called second-order questions regarding methodology and perhaps the concept of a verbatim recollection of a speech.[40] As Thomas has noted, style can be a slippery term and very difficult to define. While Thucydides' work has been characterized as dense, elliptical, and difficult—and hence intended for reading rather than hearing—Thomas argues that similar stylistic features are also found in sophists such as Gorgias and Antiphon, who 'certainly set great store by performance and recitation.'[41]

I would propose thinking along somewhat different lines: what we might call *stance*, *reminder*, and *promise*. We should acknowledge that on the one hand, Thucydides has adopted the *stance* or attitude of the orator who claims superiority over his rivals—this feature *derives* from the oral culture in which Thucydides was raised. That is, the pose of Thucydides the historian and the claims he makes for his work have been influenced by the atmosphere of public debate and the competitive attitudes typical of a predominantly oral culture. But, to state the obvious, this stance has now become a feature of Thucydides' *written* history.

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[38] Ong, *Orality and Literacy*: agonistic, polemical tone (43); participatory rather than objectively distanced (45); situational rather than abstract (49). R. Nicolai, 'Thucydides' Archaeology: Between Epic and Oral Traditions,' in *The Historian's Craft in the Age of Herodotus*, ed. N. Luraghi (Oxford, 2001), 263–85 compares Thucydides' Archaeology to an oration (264–67) and, for the section on the Pisistratids, describes how 'Thucydides behaves like an orator at a trial: he collects evidence and develops his arguments with the subtle dialectic characteristic of judicial oratory' (282–83).

[39] Ong, *Orality and Literacy*: objectively distanced (45); highly abstract (49).

[40] Small, 'Artificial Memory,' 164 argues against even the idea of a verbatim account for 'the ancient standard of "accuracy" is "gist,"' because 'different criteria are being applied.' R. Thomas, *Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece* (Cambridge, 1992) remarks, 'even as late as the fifth and fourth centuries, the concept of fixed, absolutely verbatim accuracy is surprisingly hard to find' (48).

[41] Thomas, *Literacy and Orality*, 104. On the question of style, Thomas is surely correct in arguing that a difficult style does not necessarily imply that the reception must be 'by the eye,' that is, by means of reading (101–8). A.E. Havelock, *The Literate Revolution in Greece and Its Cultural Consequences* (Princeton, 1982) comments that the speeches in Thucydides 'provide a fascinating study of the interweave between oral and written styles of vocabulary and syntax' (10).

On the other hand, we find a newly emerging appreciation of the potential of the written text. There are the *reminders* of Thucydides, who, as each year of the war comes to a close, recalls our attention to the fact that this is a written work. And these reminders, I believe, lead to an implicit *promise* or guarantee, namely, that writing—at its best—can take one beyond what is possible in oral discourse. Writing can be used to counteract the fallibility of memory; writing can be used to speak the truth with no inclination to seek the favor of a live audience. It may well have been the blow of exile—the physical removal of our intrepid reporter from the Athenian scene—which forced Thucydides to adopt this more distanced relationship with his audience, as he recounts the events of a great war, more worth recording than any previous conflict. In sum, we find a rhetorical stance rooted in oral culture, yet there is an overlay exploring—and advocating–writing's potential that Thucydides asks his audience to contemplate.[42]

It is interesting to note that when Thucydides refers to his own work, he does not (like Herodotus) call it 'history' (*historia*). He refers to what he has produced as a 'possession' (*ktema*—1.22.4). As Harris and Thomas make clear, writing gains great currency in the fifth century, in part as a way for Athenians to proclaim their rights as citizens. One aspect of citizenship is the claim to ownership, thus linking writing and property. In an as-yet-unpublished paper, Carawan adds a third element: exile. Those who were exiled during the Peloponnesian War (like Thucydides) could—upon return–appeal to written records for what had belonged to them. This constellation of writing, property, and exile leads me to think that Thucydides is deliberately using a term, 'possession (*ktema*),' that would resonate with fifth-century Athenians, sensitive to an exile's claim to ownership. Thucydides' account of the war is his 'property,' marked as such by the process of writing. Perhaps we may see the lofty remark, 'a possession forever,' as a proclamation of both authority and ownership: 'It's still *me*, Athenians. This is my monument that will set the record straight. I own it and will claim it as mine when I return!"[43]

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[42] In a fascinating comparison of Herodotus and twentieth-century North Carolinian storytellers, P. Stader, 'Herodotus and the North Carolina Oral Narrative Tradition,' *Histos* (1977–at *www.dur.ac.uk/Classics/histos/1997/stadter.html*) distinguishes *texture, text,* and *context.*

[43] E. Carawan, 'Reminding and Forgetting: The Athenian Amnesty and the Written Record: τὰς περὶ τῶν προτέρων αἰτίας ἐψήλειψαν,' delivered at the Fifth Biennial Conference on Orality and Literacy in Ancient Greece, 'Oral Performance and Its Con-

A few words might also be said concerning the very difficult question of the reception of Thucydides' work, the actual circumstances of reading and/or hearing the *History*. By necessity, what follows will be speculative. As we have seen, Thucydides clearly marks his work as a written document, yet he refers to the effects of 'hearing' it (ἐς ἀκρόασιν–1.22.4). In seeking a possible scenario for the *History*'s reception, I draw one last time upon Thucydides' description of Nicias' letter from 414.

Nicias wrote a letter to guarantee the triad of skill, fixed remembrance, and objectivity. But when that letter arrived in Athens, it was *read aloud* by a secretary (*grammateus*) and *heard* by the Athenians (7.10, 7.16.1).[44] I would suggest that circumstances somewhat analogous to these may have existed for the reception of Thucydides' own work. In a group setting, one of those present would read aloud excerpts from the text of Thucydides' *History*; the rest would listen. The experience for the majority would be aural. Naturally there would have been the opportunity for someone to go back and reread (alone and silently or aloud to those present) difficult passages that required a second or third perusal.[45]

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text,' Melbourne, Australia, July 1–5, 2002. Both Harris and Thomas comment that one of the earliest uses of writing was to mark property; this was extremely common in the fifth century, as Athenians used writing to indicate possession. See Harris, *Ancient Literacy*, 115: 'in spite of the continuing ambivalence of its reputation, writing gained general prestige and gradually came to be associated with the rights of the citizens, their right to exile politicians, their right to know the laws and the proposed laws, and their right to use the law-courts, whether as litigants or as jurors. Thus its use became, at least in Athens, *a mark in theory of a proper citizen and in practice of the urban citizen with property*' [my italics].

[44] Dover, *HCT* V, 385 surmises that this official may be the same one referred to in *Ath. Pol.* 54.5, yet he believes that composing a message in writing 'was still a comparatively unusual procedure in 414.' Nevertheless, Nicias refers to 'many other letters' he has sent (7.11.1)—perhaps this practice was more common than Dover would allow, given the importance of reports and documents in the administration of the Athenian empire.

[45] It is hard for me to believe that Athenians would not have wanted to *hear* the speeches in the *History* (see Cleon's remarks at 3.38). Edmunds, 'The Act of Reading,' 840 remarks that 'the illusion of the presence of the writer would have been strengthened by the practice of reading aloud.' S.F. Flory, 'Who Read Herodotus' *Histories?*' *AJP* 101 (1980) 12–28, who argues that Herodotus probably read aloud only excerpts (14), believes that both Herodotus and Thucydides had a 'relatively exclusive audience' (26). Though focusing on Herodotus, Thomas, 'Performance and Written Publication' argues for the 'context of intense argument, and a careful assumption that there is an audience which listens' (234) and concludes 'oral performances were not merely a survival of a primitive "oral culture", but continued, in different forms, as an important

But that might not be the end of it. In another paper, I pointed out similarities between the historian Thucydides and the philosopher Plato: both were raised in a culture dominated by oral discourse; for somewhat different reasons both turned to composing works meant to be read and read aloud.[46] We know as little about the reception of Plato as that of Thucydides, but consider the following scenario for both Plato's dialogues and Thucydides' work (perhaps especially Thucydides' speeches). As those in the group listened, they would also have the option of responding by joining in the debate, making a pointed objection that one of Socrates' interlocuters or one of Thucydides' speakers fails to make, or proposing a better argument. As we teachers know, the words of Plato's and Thucydides' texts—both in substance and style–are ideal prompts for discussion. I do not think it is going too far to imagine an interactive social setting, somewhat on a par with the Athenian assembly, in which Athenian citizens would listen critically (as they would to Nicias' written report from Sicily) and then engage in serious oral debate on the difficult issues at hand. A primary goal of both Thucydides' *History* and Plato's dialogues may well have been to provoke discussion from the audience.[47] This scenario envisions a sort of 'feedback' loop: oral reports constitute the primary raw material of

medium for the presentation and transmission of knowledge in the latter half of the fifth century' (244). For the limits on reading, see L. Woodbury, 'Aristophanes' *Frogs* and Athenian Literacy: *Ran.* 52–53, 1114,' *TAPA* 106 (1976) 349–57; on silent reading in the fifth century, see B. M. W. Knox, 'Silent Reading in Antiquity,' *GRBS* 9 (1968) 421–35. In thinking of Thucydides' audience as readers, P. Arnold, 'The Persuasive Style of Debates in Direct Speech in Thucydides,' *Hermes* 120 (1992) 44–57, offers a provocative discussion, proposing that even if Thucydides could have remembered all the words of a speech (cf. 1.22.1), he would need to make significant changes in the nature of the language employed in order to 'accommodat[e] rhetorical speech to his contemplative work' (47). The quality of the language–the style itself–must change. To achieve this, 'Thucydides complicated the logic of the speeches and disguised the defects in their arguments even for an audience who can study, contemplate and reread his work at leisure' (46). The density of ideas, the difficulty of argument is required, on this view, if Thucydides is to reproduce something in a written medium for a contemplative reader equivalent to the aural experience of political oratory. Yet I remain unconvinced that Thucydides would have envisioned his primary audience as those who read his work silently to themselves.

[46] J.V. Morrison, 'Preface to Thucydides: Rereading the Corcyrean Conflict (1.24–55),' *CA* 18 (1999) 94–131 (see 126–29). See also R.W. Wallace, 'Book Burning in Ancient Athens,' in *Transitions to Empire*, ed. R.W. Wallace, E.M. Harris (Norman, Oklahoma, 1996), 226–40 on the 'political isolation of Athenian intellectuals' (230–31).

[47] That is, I would question the assertion in N. Loraux, *The Invention of Athens. The Funeral Oration in the Classical City*, tr. A. Sheridan (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1986) 288 that 'Thucydides rejects all forms of oral expression.'

Thucydides' *History*; the work itself is superior to oral reports, because it results from testing, years of work, and the permanence of writing; but access and reaction to the *History* may well have been largely oral for those who heard it and could respond to it in spoken discourse.

Conclusion

> For in giving their lives in common cause, they individually gained *unaging praise and the most conspicuous tomb* (τὸν ἀγήρων ἔπαινον ... καὶ τὸν τάφον ἐπισημότατον), not the one where they lie but the one where *forever* on every occasion for word and deed *their glory is left after them in eternal remembrance* (ἡ δόξα ... αἰεὶ ... αἰείμνηστος καταλείπεται); for the whole earth is the tomb of famous men, and *not only the inscription of steles* (οὐ στηλῶν μόνον ... ἐπιγραφή) in their own country mark it, but even in foreign lands *an unwritten memory* (ἄγραφος μνήμη), in mind rather than in monument, lives on beside each man. (2.43.2–3)

Thucydides here preserves a version of Pericles' words; he evokes a specific occasion from 431; Pericles promises an unwritten memory of those who have died. It is hard not to think of this as a competitive claim against the epic poets who promised imperishable glory (*kleos aphthiton*).[48] Recently Bosworth has argued that of all Thucydides' speeches, the Funeral Oration would have been the one heard by the most Athenians and the one most likely heard by Thucydides himself.[49] This raises the question: might Thucydides' version be pretty close to what Pericles actually said? Or could it at least echo many of the sentiments of the great statesman? Pericles' expressions were certainly memorable and it is at least plausible that Thucydides would preserve his more remarkable metaphors and figures.[50]

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[48] Loraux, *Invention of Athens*, 51 comments: 'the resemblance between the *kleos aphthiton* (imperishable glory) of the aristocrats ... and the *athanatos mneme* (immortal memory) of the city is too evident to be gratuitous.' Pericles also speaks of 'unwritten laws' (*agraphoi nomoi*—2.37.3) and the future recollection of the current, mighty Athenian empire: 'Its memory shall remain forever for later generations (ἐς ἀίδιον τοῖς ἐπιγιγνομένοις ... μνήμη καταλελείψεται)' (2.64.3).

[49] A. B. Bosworth, 'The Historical Context of Thucydides' Funeral Oration,' *JHS* 120 (2000) 1–16 advances the idea that even the generalities of Pericles' 'Funeral Oration' 'are not timeless platitudes but sentiments totally appropriate to the contemporary political climate ... there is much in the historical record of 431 that gives real bite to the rhetoric' (16).

[50] In the *Demoi*, Eupolis describes Pericles: 'he was the only speaker/who would leave a sting in his hearers (καὶ μόνος τῶν ῥητόρων/τὸ κέντρον ἐγκατέλειπε τοῖς ἀκροωμένοις).'

If so, there may well be an implicit criticism of Pericles' assertion regarding what endures. Pericles very deliberately says that the remembrance that will last forever is not dependent on writing. According to Pericles, this memory, set free from writing altogether (*agraphos mneme*), will guarantee eternal glory and praise which never ages. Yet Thucydides recognized that in order to transcend one's own immediate circumstances–to transcend the moment with words–you must use words which will live beyond your own lifetime. Thucydides' audience is able to appreciate that the *preservation* of Pericles' words—and the idea of this unwritten memory—is possible only by means of Thucydides' written history.

On Pericles' memorable expressions, see also Aristophanes *Acharnians* 530–34, Aristotle *Rhetoric* 1365a31–33, and Plutarch *Life of Pericles* 8.9, 28–29.

ORALITY AND ARISTOTLE'S AESTHETICS AND METHODS; TAKE #2

Daniel F. Melia

'Who, in fact, was the first truly bookish individual among the Greeks?' asks William V. Harris in *Ancient Literacy*. 'Hardly Socrates,' he answers himself, 'though he is depicted by Xenaphon reading with his friends the books of "the wise men of long ago." Some might say Euripides;' Harris continues, 'but by the standards of later Greek intelligentsias, the best answer is Aristotle.'[1] This judgment—Aristotle as poster boy for reading and writing—is so widely accepted as to be a commonplace, shared by, among many others, Eric Havelock.[2] And in *Literacy and Paideia in Ancient Greece*, Kevin Robb states flatly that 'Higher education inextricably bound to the study of the content of texts became … a distinguishing feature of the type of education found in Aristotle's Lyceum.'[3] Furthermore, on the face of things, Aristotle himself has left no evidence of personal discomfort with reading and writing. There are no surviving Aristotelian works comparable to Plato's *Phaedrus*, in which the issue of the utility or advisability of writing is discussed, and his own discussions sometimes presuppose an audience imagining a written text. For instance, in his discussion of fallacies arising from division and combination of words (*diairesin kai synthesin*) in chapter 20 of *Sophistical Refutations*, his suggestions for resolving faulty arguments-by-homonym involve recognizing sound differences along with spelling differences,

> 'For what turns on the division of words is not really ambiguous, unless *oros* and *horos*, pronounced according to the breathing constitute a single word with different meanings. (In written language a word is the same when it is written with the same letters and in the same manner, though people now put in additional signs, but the words when spoken are not the same.)' (*Soph. Refut.* 20, 177b1–7)[4]

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[1] W.V. Harris, *Ancient Literacy* (Cambridge, MA 1989), 85.

[2] E.A. Havelock, *The Muse Learns to Write* (New Haven, CT 1986), 109, for example.

[3] K. Robb, *Literacy and Paideia in Ancient Greece* (NY and Oxford, 1994), 221.

[4] Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations*, trans. E.S. Forster (Cambridge, MA, Loeb Library, 1954)

Even if the last bit—the parenthetical explication of the orthographic representation of rough breathing—is an incorporated gloss, which I think it may be, the discussion presupposes an attention to spelling as well as to pronunciation, since disambiguation of these fallacious arguments requires disambiguating the lemmata.

All that being conceded, I would like here to discuss some of the ways in which even an individual fourth century Greek as steeped in literacy as was Aristotle may reveal an underlying mental formation shaped by a general culture in which many assumptions, particularly about language and its uses, are partially determined by the earlier, aliterate, culture. I am viewing Aristotle here as the proving case, the far end of the spectrum, in a mixed culture of writing and both formal and informal orality. I offer two headings for these remarks: memory systems and mental furniture. In an earlier paper on this same subject[5] I attempted to answer the following questions frequently put to me by my students: 1) Why did the Greeks have no name for the art 'that imitates by words alone?' (*Poet.* 1, 1447b) 2) Why does Aristotle say that metaphors are more suitable for prose and similes for verse because 'similes are of the nature of poetry?' (*Rhet.* 3.4, 1406b24) 3) Why does Aristotle lay out six elements for the construction of tragedy, but then say that the mere recitation of the action should engender pity and fear in the audience? (*Poet.* 14, 1453b4–6) and 4) why is there no explicit discussion of memory as one of the parts of rhetoric in the *Art of Rhetoric*?

Very briefly, my argument was that the proper answers to these questions were not independent of one another, but that all could be derived from a kind of 'intellectual hangover' from the aesthetic norms of an oral culture. These particular textual moments reveal in Aristotle's aesthetic notions a congruence with the largely unconscious operations of traditional oral narrative. Aristotle does not apparently feel the need to assign a genre name to unaccompanied prose because it had not developed one in the traditional array of genre terms for literary forms. Similes are 'of the nature of poetry' because even short ones ('he fought as a lion') conform both in their sententiousness and in their grammatical fixity to the notion of the oral-traditional formula in Homeric

[5] 'Orality and Aesthetics in Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetics,' in *New Directions in Oral Theory*, ed. Mark Amodio (Tempe, AZ, MARTS, in press). A shorter version of this earlier essay was presented at the June 2000 Epea and Grammata Conference at the Univ. of Missouri-Columbia.

style. Aristotle's quite remarkable fixation with plot also conforms to the dominance of story-pattern in oral-traditional narrative (and Aristotle here even refers to Homer as a model), and in treating memory in the *Rhetoric* as a matter of retrieval methods equated with invention he gives an explicit description of a set of mental activities which remain implicit, though identical, in practitioners of oral poetry.

The study of Aristotle has, it seems to me, been dominated, perhaps naturally enough, by the textual and philosophical study of his surviving works; and because of the way many of his works have come down to us, as already annotated collocations compiled by people other than Aristotle himself, there has been far less discussion of Aristotle as an author (in the modern sense) than of Plato or Herodotus. None (or virtually none) of his exoteric writings have survived, and the esoteric ones, including the *Rhetoric* and the *Poetics*, are clearly textual compromises of some sort, perhaps, at their best, something like the first quarto of Shakespeare's works, or like Saussure's *Cours de linguistique generale*, which exists only because his students wrote down what he said in lecture.[6] Plato has fared better at the hands of modern literary scholars. The tendency to decode Aristotle essentially as an abstractable corpus of ideas has allowed us, I think, to miss several interesting opportunities to investigate the ways in which he put together his intellectual projects. Aristotle is not a collection of philosophical and scientific texts, but was an actual person, some of whose intellectual formation peeks through the abstractable philosophy.

In my earlier paper I outlined several particular instances of what seemed to me to be evidence for a mindset formed with unconscious reference to the aesthetics of oral rather than written performance. I would like here to concentrate a bit more on what seems to me to hold those individual elements together: Aristotle's explication of the method of invention in rhetoric.

By Aristotle's time, law-writers such as Lysias were clearly the norm for court presentation, though the fiction of speaking extemporaneously on one's own behalf is sometimes explicitly presented in written briefs and seems to have persisted quite late. Rosalind Thomas has pointed out that the first evidence of the use of a written contract in Athens appears only in the first decade of the fourth century and that the earliest evidence of a 'written contract without witnesses' is from the 380s;

[6] Saussure, Ferdinand de, *Cours de linguistique generale* (Paris, 1913), trans. W. Baskin (London, 1974).

the citation of written documents seems to have become common only in the middle of the fourth century.[7] Aristotle's discussion of inartistic (atechnic) proofs (witnesses, laws, contracts, tortured slaves and oaths) in *Rhetoric* 1, 15, shows a similar skepticism about written texts to that put in Socrates' mouth by Plato in the *Phaedrus*. (275a). The testimony of tortured slaves (essentially useless since slaves, by definition "honorless", would have as a motive only the cessation of pain and would thus say anything to please anybody) is a slightly different case from the other items in this category. Though such testimony would have been read out from a written document in court, Aristotle's argument in this case is actually concerned with an issue prior to the introduction of written evidence: because of the nature of slavery, testimony elicited under torture is useless as a persuasive topos from the word go. Laws, contracts, oaths and the testimony of witnesses, however, are, for purposes of rhetorical invention, no better than those who can vouch for them (*Rhet.* 1.15, 1375b). Significantly, Aristotle lumps Homer and Sophocles (amongst many other literary figures) together with living witnesses of alleged facts in running through the ways in which the artistic topoi (enthymemes) can be used to defend either side of an argument based on the same witness statements. You cannot cross-examine a contract, a law, or Homer, as Socrates is made to remark in the *Phaedrus* (275d) and even the most convincing witness statements in writing cannot defend themselves against unexpected attack: if the written law supports one side, the other side is free to quote Antigone's response to Creon that there are higher laws than his. In short, these written 'proofs' are not only 'inartistic' but, as topoi, really no different from other kinds of physical evidence: bloody knives, pilfered silver and the like. Just as Phaedrus thinks that the written copy of Lysias's speech is the best until Socrates makes a fool of him, so anyone who imagines that laws, contracts and witnesses have specially probative status is, in Aristotle's eyes, similarly deluded about the value of writing.

More important, though, than an apparent conscious awareness of the limitations of the popular new technology of writing, which (in view of Plato's frequent discussion of the matter in the dialogues and *Republic*) one can only imagine must have been discussed to death at the Academy, is the real congruence, an unconscious congruence, I think, between Aristotle's system of rhetorical invention and the nature of

[7] R. Thomas, *Oral Tradition and Written Record in Classical Athens* (Cambridge, 1989) 41–44.

oral-traditional compositional techniques. From the fieldwork of Parry, Lord and others we have a pretty good notion of how at least nineteenth and twentieth century Yugoslav guslars learned and practiced their craft.[8] During a period of informal apprenticeship, they privately attempt to imitate good singers, slowly building up a stock of formulas and themes which allow them to try to construct actual stories. But their stock of stories is not limitless. The story-patterns must be drawn only from the existing stock of story types and applied only to the existing stock of heroic figures. Thus, when a singer has learned to speak the dialect of formulas and learned a sufficient stock of themes, he then can hear a 'border song' and recreate it in traditional fashion by recognizing the chain of themes of which it consists. There is thus an 'index' of story-types (designated by Parry and Lord as rescue songs, city-taking songs, return songs etc.) which are realized by the individual singer by calling up, partially unconsciously, a set of themes which are associated in his mind both with each other serially and with their other uses in the tradition 'horizontally,' if you will. The psychological operation of such a system has been explicated at some length by David Rubin in his book *Memory in Oral Traditions*, in which he likens story-patterns to what modern psychologists call 'scripts' (what to say when at the dentist, how to propose marriage, etc.) and the playing out of the particulars of the scripts to a set of associational cues which lead the speaker to a particular expression of that common script.[9] As I often point out to my students, how often do you just launch into a joke without a thought to whether you remember the punch line or not? You just trust to your mind that when the punch line is needed it will be there. With enough practice, the same process can produce *The Wedding of Smailagic Meho*.[10]

In his writerly way, in Book I of the *Rhetoric* Aristotle attempts to describe in detail, to name the operations of, the same process. He derives the three kinds of rhetoric (deliberative, forensic and epideictic) from audience mental activity—whether they are judging future, past or present—and then derives, quite significantly, I think, the master topics for each species of rhetoric (expediency/inexpediency; jus-

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[8] For the seminal studies of oral performance see A.B. Lord, *Singer of Tales*, 2000), A.B. Lord, *The Singer Resumes the Tale* (Ithaca, 1995), *The Making of Homeric Verse, The Collected Papers of Milman Parry*, A. Parry, ed. (NY, Oxford, 1971, repr. 1987), J.M. Foley, *The Theory of Oral Composition: History and Methodology* (Bloomington 1988, repr. 1992).

[9] D.C. Rubin, *Memory in Oral Traditions* (NY, Oxford, 1995), 210–24.

[10] A.B. Lord and D.E. Bynum eds., *The Wedding of Smailagic Meho by Avdo Mededovic* (Cambridge, MA, 1974).

tice/injustice, and praise/blame) by identifying that topic which no speaker in each category will ever concede: 'justice' in forensic argument, for instance. He then shows how to derive other appropriate topoi in each category. Unlike many contemporary and later Classical rhetorical handbooks, Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is concerned not with how to compose a speech in advance—how to write it down—but with how to access material that is already in one's head exactly when needed. In dividing the modes of persuasion into ethical, pathetic and logical in Book 1, ch. 2, he in fact assumes that part of the definition of rhetoric is 'persuasion furnished by the spoken word' (*Rhet.* 1.2, 1356a). Looked at, too, in what I might call an 'oral light' there is additional significance to Aristotle's insistence on rhetoric's methodological unity with dialectic. Dialectic, some idealized use of which we see Socrates pursuing in Plato's dialogues, in fifth and fourth century Athens was apparently very much a matter of discovering the appropriate topoi in one's own mind on the spot as one argued. There is nothing (save for the discussion of written proofs mentioned above) in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* that points to a reliance on writing at any stage of the processes described. The 'naming of parts' is written down and handled in a manner characteristic of written argument, but the process described is at no stage concerned with writing, or even with writing down.

There is a clear parallel between the systems of invention of the Yugoslav guslar and of an Aristotelian rhetor. Each has to choose a script, a story-pattern, say, 'The Rescue of the Children of Alibey', for the guslar, and an enthymeme, a claim of probability with respect to some subject, say, Plato stole Socrates' horse, for the rhetor. Having chosen a story-pattern, the guslar selects (unconsciously) all and only those themes and only in a given order which are the embodiment of that story-pattern; the rhetor selects all and only those topics and only in the ordering of them most likely to persuade. Aristotle offers many examples of how to derive topoi from general principles, and his aim appears to be to illustrate ways in which practice can lead the speaker to the capacity for finding the appropriate topoi when necessary in an entirely subconscious manner. The reports of the oratorical feats of actual practitioners in the classical world down through the second sophistic period would seem to indicate that it was possible to do exactly that.[11] Aristotle has thus developed a system of creating speeches

[11] T.M. Conley, *Rhetoric in the European Tradition* (NY, 1990), 61.

extemporaneously which is not only analogous to, but actually congruent with, the mental activity of the guslar. Unlike the guslar, though, he has given names ('common topics,' 'enthymemes,' 'examples') to his materials for which the guslar has none. There is, to be sure, a significant difference between the rhetorical settings of heroic oral epics and agonistic debate. The guslar is not ordinarily in an immediate ongoing dialogue with an opposing singer. In practical terms, however, the well-trained rhetor, by an iteration of the same process, will treat rejoinders from his adversary as cues for new and more pointedly effective sets of subconsciously discovered topoi; the psychological operations of producing an extemporaneous oral text are not made different by the introduction of another speaker. And, of course, many early literary traditions, including Germanic, have the well-attested genre of the flyting, the formal verbal duel. As Thomas Conley has pointed out, Thersites and Agamemnon give essentially the same speech in Book 2 of the *Iliad*; Thersites is beaten for daring to give his speech to his social superiors, but his speech, ironically, achieves the object that Agamemnon was unable to.[12]

And now for something not quite completely different. If I have been at all successful in reconstructing some of the mental furniture of an Aristotle who devoted much of his professional activity to writing and working with new modes of explication afforded by writing, but was still, in some mental respects a product of a culture in which such an attitude toward writing was both new and peculiar, it is worth speculating, I think, on what the general mentality of such a person might be. Luckily, as with the Yugoslav guslars, we have a modern example, which I now put forward as a possible partial model of what Aristotle's mental furniture might have looked like.

Aristotle and Marcel Jousse

Most knowledge that all of us have is unofficial knowledge. Aristotle is no exception. We find bits of it here and there cropping up even in his formal writings. Part of that unofficial knowledge was his own upbringing and the assumptions (oral) about how one created things verbally. We know little or nothing with certainty about Aristotle's

[12] Conley, *Rhetoric in the European Tradition*, 1–2.

upbringing or childhood training, but from his later connection with the Academy and his entire surviving corpus we can assume that it was much like the upbringing and education of Athenian youth at the time. His knowledge of Homer, of many legends, superstitions, games, jokes and the like must date from his childhood. Although his immediate world must have been more filled with discursive writing than, say, Socrates' had been in childhood, nevertheless, much of what Aristotle had in his head must have come from a surrounding atmosphere of ordinary informal orality. Embodied in this sort of informal knowledge is 'common sense', the sort of things that 'everybody knows' (*doxa*) that young men are impetuous or old men covetous. (*Rhet.* 2.11–12, 1389a2–1390a27).

Now this sort of informal knowledge, often embedded in proverbs or riddles, serves as the raw material for many topoi throughout the *Rhetoric.* Interspersed amongst the many quotations from sources preserved to us in writing (though we cannot know whether or not Aristotle was looking at written texts when he quotes from them) are popular proverbs such as 'breaking the pitcher at the door,' for an unexpectedly fruitless errand (*Rhet.* 1,6; 1363a5) and riddles like the famous 'I marked how a man glued bronze with fire to another man's body,' [a medical cupping procedure (*Rhet.* 3,2; 1405b1)] a riddle which not only indicates an item of informal knowledge shared by Aristotle and his contemporaries but, perhaps, an item from his personal medical family background. What part did this early experience of acquiring knowledge informally play in Aristotle's later written work?

The French linguistic theorist Marcel Jousse (1886–1961) is hardly a household name in American academic circles today, but some of his ideas have certainly been spread in the anglophone world because of his early influence on Milman Parry, who we know, attended some of Jousse's lectures in Paris and cites him more than once.[13] Born in 1886 in the Sarthe and raised by a single mother in a rural community, Jousse grew up in almost entirely illiterate surroundings. In 1924, having become a Jesuit and a linguistics professor in Paris, Jousse published a most unusual book in which he not only laid out his mimetic theories of the origins of speech, but discussed at length the ways in which his reflections on his own childhood experiences in illiterate surroundings led him not only to develop his linguistic theories, but to offer impor-

[13] A. Parry, *The Making of Homeric Verse*, xxii and *passim.*

tant observations on texts, such as the Homeric poems and the Bible, which had emerged from oral surroundings. I have said that his first book was unusual; it is, in fact, virtually unique in modern scholarly literature. Jousse's *Le Style oral rythmique et mnémotechnique chez les verbo-moteurs* is largely a cento; as Jousse himself said, '... my book is made up almost entirely of quotations.'[14]

Le Style oral is an extended argument attempting to demonstrate, among other things, that all language originates in mimicry and that the process of memory is intimately connected with the nature of the acquisition of language. 'It has been noted that it is always relatively easy to start a sentence. It is more difficult to finish it if, in early infancy, one has not been accustomed [by parental singing and rocking] to balance one's sentences.'[15] But, as Jousse himself noted later, the most remarkable feature of the book—and an essential feature of its very argument—was his method of pastiche. In a 1944 lecture at the Ecole d'Anthropologie, Jousse recounted that, having arrived at his arguments ('reality as I had internalised it'), he read some 5,000 works to ascertain 'what other authors had observed on this question.' He continues, 'I retained 500 and I chose, from these 500 volumes, the sentences that seemed to provide the closest tangent to reality.'[16] The result was a book made up 'almost entirely of quotations'[17] interspersed with Jousse's own observations and specialized terminology (such as 'verbo-moteur,' his designation for the illiterate who have a physical sense of mnemonics.)

By itself, this method seems a formidable exercise in data-recording, comparable to the early hand-compiled concordances of the Bible, say. Few of us would take on such a job of recording, copying, and cataloging data. It was easier for Jousse, however, as he explained in a Sorbonne lecture of 1934: 'I never write anything down. I have no notes. You should not have any idea of ordering my notes at some future date. I never take down references. But I remember things with my whole body ... All four walls of my room are covered with books. But on any evening I could locate in any book the exact passage I was looking for. I carry it all inside me.'[18] He is not describing here an eidetic

[14] M. Jousse, *The Oral Style*, trans. E. Sienaert and R. Whitaker (NY, 1990), 15. This quotation is from notes of Jousse's lectures at the Ecole d'Anthropologie.

[15] Jousse, *The Oral Style*, xx.

[16] Jousse, *The Oral Style*, xv.

[17] Jousse, *The Oral Style*, xv.

[18] Jousse, *The Oral Style*, xvii.

memory, the 'photographic memory' beloved of popular crime writers, though. He says himself that 'my memory resides in my fingers,' and describes a method of internal data-recovery which brings to mind simultaneously both Parry's and Lord's description of the methods of epic singers, and ancient descriptions of rhetorical invention. 'The great difficulty,' says Jousse, 'in creating anything lies precisely in the fact that one is overwhelmed by notes. *How, in the process of creation, is one to get these notes ready to come in at just the right moment?* [emphasis mine] Bring them to life in yourself! New, although unexpected, combinations of ideas will become possible because they are alive in you. The combination will then come about of itself. One discovers things not by way of filing-cards, but by way of living gestures.'[19] In short, Jousse composed his book in his head, compiling most of the text from existing printed sources, the location of each of which he held in his memory and was able to locate quickly exactly when he needed it in the course of writing the text down. Such a method is scarcely credible to a later twenty-first century literate audience, but there is no evidence that Jousse was being untruthful nor that anyone who knew him questioned his account. It is also worth pointing out that *Le Style oral* does not read like some florilegium of awkwardly juxtaposed quotations, but as a continuous argument in a single voice into which sentences and paragraphs by other authors are woven with extreme skill. Jousse's method in composing and writing *Le Style oral* was thus a living written example of the argument he was making. The materials of tradition (even the tradition of academic philology) provide the 'word hoard,' and also the structured segments (analogous to Lord/Parry 'themes'), which the individual performer can draw upon with his associative memory to create a new performance, a performance which is both new and entirely consonant with preceding tradition both in form and in content.

One of the great frustrations suffered by Parry and Lord was the difficulty of eliciting methodological meta-description from their illiterate living singers, who lacked not only vocabulary to discuss poetics (how many syllables are required for a line, say) or linguistics, but lacked even a distanced concept of the expressive process of their poetry. Their conscious attention was on only the higher levels of expression (Lord's theme and story-pattern) while the rules that allowed them to 'speak'

[19] Jousse, *The Oral Style*, xvii.

in the special dialect of story poetry had been internalized as unconsciously as had those of their own day-to-day language. The confusion arising between the illiterate artist and the analytic scholar is well illustrated by the following conversation in which the talented singer Đemail Zogic illustrates that he clearly has no concept of what a 'word' means.

N [Nikola Vujnović, Parry's field assistant in the 1930s.] 'Whom do you hold to be the better singer, the man who leaves something out, or the man who adds something?' Đemail: 'I prefer the man who leaves something out ... The man who adds something thinks it up himself and adds it to the song, and it can't be true.'[20] But when Nikola asks Đemail a few minutes later in the same conversation '... if a good singer hears a bad singer who has attempted a good song, but isn't capable of finishing it, of singing it as he should ... can this good singer make a good song, out of it and sing it as it should be sung?' Đemail replies, 'He can make it good by ornamenting and adding to it, and improving it, by God ... for example he adds what the heroes were wearing. He says they were carrying knives, and saddle pistols, and Osmanli saddles. Then he says ...' and at this point Đemail breaks into heroic poetry and sings three traditional formulaic lines describing saddle accoutrements.[21]

For the Serbo-Croatian singer, there is no contradiction here. For him 'word-for-word the same' means 'the same themes in the same order' and 'just as it happened' means not introducing extraneous themes or unnecessarily repetitive themes into a traditional story-pattern. Embellishments within a necessary theme are the active site of his conscious artistry and the way he thinks about this artistry is in a fully embodied form. Đemail characteristically resorts to formulaic singing to make this point as clearly as he can.

Jousse obviates such impasses in understanding. He was a person with many of the crucial skills of an illiterate performer, but with the training of modern linguistic theorist. Furthermore, like the Plato of the *Phaedrus* and the *Ion*, he had given considerable thought to the negative as well as to the positive effects of literacy. In the cases of Plato and Aristotle, we lack the direct access that Jousse and his works afford us, but the case of Jousse allows for a more subtle and confident

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[20] M. Parry, *Serbo-Croatian Heroic Songs*, ed. and trans. A.B. Lord (Cambridge, MA and Belgrade, 1954) 239.

[21] Parry, *Serbo-Croatian Heroic Songs*, 241.

analysis of what we find in Aristotle, particularly those things which may seem at first glance to be puzzling or contradictory. I would argue that Jousse's explanation of his own mental processes may come close to what Aristotle might tell us about his own mental experience were we able to question him directly instead of through the mute medium of writing.

ORAL PERFORMANCE IN THE ATHENIAN ASSEMBLY AND THE DEMOSTHENIC *PROOEMIA**

Ian Worthington

I

In classical Athens, any eligible citizen, regardless of his socio-economic standing or intellectual expertise, was in theory permitted to speak for or against an issue, or to propose other measures or policy, at a meeting of the Assembly. Socrates tells us this in Plato, *Protagoras* 319d:

> But when it is something to do with the government of the country that is to be debated, the man who gets up to advise them may be a builder, or equally well a blacksmith or a shoemaker, merchant, or shipowner, rich or poor, of good family or none. No-one brings it up against any of these, as against those I have just mentioned, that here is a man who without any technical qualifications, unable to point to anybody as his teacher, is yet trying to give advice.

The Assembly, one of the major organs of the democratic constitution, was where matters of domestic and foreign policy were debated and voted on, and meetings were held about four times a month. The meeting started about dawn and lasted until about the mid-afternoon; an agenda prepared by the Boule was carefully worked through, and all the citizens voted for or against by a show of hands.[1] There was no break and the people took their own lunch—wine, three olives, two onions, and a loaf of bread according to Aristophanes (*Eccles.* 306–8).

Politics of course were not localised to just the Assembly; there were also the Boule, and the various magistrates and officials who were also part of the constitution.[2] Or, the law courts.[3] The courts were

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* I am grateful to those scholars at the conference who made comments on this paper as well as the convenor of Orality 5, Dr C.J. Mackie, for all his help.

[1] See in detail M.H. Hansen, *The Athenian Assembly in the Age of Demosthenes* (Oxford, 1987).

[2] The standard work on the Boule is still P.J. Rhodes, *The Athenian Boule* (Oxford, 1972). On the democracy and its workings, see, for example, M.H. Hansen, *The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes*[2] (Norman, 1999).

[3] See, for example, A.L. Boegehold, *The Lawcourts at Athens*, The Athenian Agora

concerned with public and private suits, matters affecting the state as a whole as well as protecting the rights of individuals within that state. We do not have every forensic speech that was ever delivered; however, we have enough to show that the courts could be just as political an arena as the Assembly.[4] Moreover, the same people who attended an Assembly meeting were often jurors. Politics, then, meshed the political organs, especially the Assembly, and the law courts together.

So too did performance, for just as the courts could be a political arena, so the Assembly was a place where performance mattered as in the law courts and theatre.[5] Moreover, Athenian juries seem to have been influenced more by the delivery of a speech than its content, or at least content relevant to the case in hand. Using any number of rhetorical tricks and *topoi*, speakers could arouse the jurors' anger or sympathy or disgust or admiration in ways that would be disallowed in a modern court room. References in speeches attest to this; for example, Dinarchus' client has this to say to the jury at Demosthenes' trial in 323:

> Gentlemen ... [you] are at times prone to make judgment because you are swayed more by mercy than justice (1.55; cf. 57).

Perhaps the apparent ease by which a jury was swayed by performance was a reason why speakers kept reminding jurors of their dicastic oath (Dem. 24.149–51), and to vote in a just and fair manner.

While in theory anyone could stand up and talk in the Assembly, it seems unlikely that in practice just anyone did so. A passage in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (3.7.6) shows Socrates attempting to persuade a citizen to use his right to speak:

> I will attempt to teach you a lesson. Although you are not shy in the presence of the wisest men nor fearful of the strongest, you are ashamed to speak before a gathering of the most stupid and weak people. For how can you be ashamed to speak before fullers, shoemakers, blacksmiths, farmers, merchants, or traders in the market, who think only of buying cheap and selling dear?

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28 (Princeton, 1995) and P. Cartledge, P. Millett, and S. Todd (eds.), *Nomos. Essays in Athenian Law, Politics and Society* (Cambridge, 1990).

[4] The obvious examples here are the speeches of Demosthenes and of Aeschines in the False Embassy trial of 343 (Dem. 19, Aes. 2) and the Crown trial of 330 (Dem. 18, Aes. 3).

[5] See, for example, E. Hall, 'Lawcourt Dramas: the Power of Performance in Greek Forensic Oratory', *BICS* 40 (1995), 39–58 and P.E. Easterling, 'Actors and voices: reading between the lines in Aeschines and Demosthenes', in *Performance Culture and Athenian Democracy*, eds. S. Goldhill and R. Osborne (Cambridge, 1999), 154–65.

In classical Athens, especially in the fourth century, political power rested not on holding political office but on popular support in the Assembly, with speakers influencing the voting mass.[6] As in the courts, success was achieved not always by the content of speeches (and thus the validity of proposals) but by the speakers' performance and oratorical ability. This raises the question how democratic was Athenian democracy when the people *en masse* might be the deciding voice, but that voice was influenced by a narrow group. This is hardly a new line of course, nor is the conclusion novel: that in responding to the 'better' speakers, the people ended up voting, as in the courts, more by emotion than reason. This shows the weakness of the direct democracy, and the Athenians' form of democracy has been criticised for allowing 'non-experts' in the Assembly to make policy, sometimes with disastrous consequences.

Here springs to mind Alcibiades, who was able to convince an Assembly that knew next to nothing about Sicily to vote a huge armada to sail there in 415 (Thuc. 6.15–18). Admittedly, Alcibiades was helped by Nicias' bungling attempt at reverse psychology in his second speech at the Sicilian debate (Thuc. 6.19–23)—if we can accept that speech, since it is so odd for Thucydides to give us three speeches from one debate. However, the point still stands about an inexpert audience making the decisions.

Some time ago, Mogens Hansen divided the Athenian citizens into four groups: (i) the 'passive' citizens, who never attended the Assembly or the law courts, (ii) those who attended the Assembly and served on other political bodies but only voted and never addressed the Assembly, (iii) those who did address the Assembly but only occasionally, and (iv) the full *rhetores*, who were the most politically active, regularly addressing the Assembly, moving proposals, and participating in the law courts.[7] The speakers or orators who spoke the most, then, would be in this last group of citizens, and would be fewer in number. Hansen's work on the numbers of *rhetores* in the Assembly, for example, supports this.[8]

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[6] On this see, for example, R.K. Sinclair, *Democracy and Participation in Athens* (Cambridge, 1988), J. Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens* (Princeton, 1989), and Hansen, *Athenian Assembly in the Age of Demosthenes.*

[7] M.H. Hansen, 'The Athenian "Politicians", 403–322 B.C.', in *The Athenian Ecclesia* 2 (Copenhagen, 1989), 1–24.

[8] For example, M.H. Hansen, '*Rhetores* and *Strategoi* in Fourth-Century Athens', and 'The Number of *Rhetores* in the Athenian Ecclesia', in *The Athenian Ecclesia* 2, 25–72 and

Thus, an individual's policy was often the state's—a good example of this is Pericles, whose war speech, as given to us by Thucydides at 1.140–44, in response to Sparta's ultimatum, reconciled the Athenians to the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides concludes (1.145):

> This was Pericles' speech. The Athenians considered that his advice was best and voted as he had asked them to vote. Their reply to the Spartans was the one that he had suggested, both on the main issue and on the separate points ...

Further, there is the telling statement at Thucydides 2.65.9 that 'Athens, though in name a democracy, gradually became in fact a government ruled by its foremost citizen'. In the fourth century, individuals such as Eubulus, Lycurgus, Demosthenes, and Hyperides influenced policy.

The image we get from all of this is a handful of politically active speakers with a gift of the gab, who were able to say and to do anything, beguiling their audiences into accepting or denying anything thanks to their oratorical ability. Several of the Demosthenic *prooemia*, which I shall shortly move to, support this image; for example, *Prooemion* 45:

> (1) ... But, gentlemen of Athens, you see that there is no correlation between making a good speech and choosing beneficial policies, for one is the task of an orator and the other of a man who is politically savvy. (2) So now you, the majority, and especially the oldest of you, are not expected to be able to speak in the same way as the cleverest orators, for this expertise comes with experience, but you are expected to make a judgement to the same extent and even more so than them, for it is experiences and 'having seen much' that empower us ...

Why, the people are probably drunk, says the First Woman to Praxagora at *Ecclesiazousae* 136–39, to make the sorts of decisions and pass the legislation that they do!

The image is not the reality, for the people who allowed speakers to dominate an Assembly did not give them *carte blanche* to act as they saw fit. Aristophanes tells us that a speaker who used excess noise could be evicted from the Assembly by the Scythian archers, or police force (*Eccles.* 142–43),[9] and at Aeschines 1.35 we have the law about the orderly conduct of public speakers. Now, the laws quoted in Aeschines' speech are generally regarded as forgeries, which were later inserted into the speech. However, there may be genuine provisions in the inserted documents that are lifted from quotations of laws in speeches,

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93–127, respectively.

[9] Cf. Plato, *Protagoras* 319c.

and recent scholars such as Carey and Fisher view the content of this particular law on the orderly conduct of public speakers as plausible.[10]

In this law, we learn that the *proedroi* could impose a fine on a speaker at a meeting of the Assembly or Boule who spoke irrelevantly, or abusively, or disrupted the proceedings in other ways, such as by heckling or by assaulting one of the *proedroi*. The fine was fifty drachmas per incident, but if the speaker had been especially offensive the *proedroi* could fine him and refer his conduct to the next meeting of the Assembly or Boule.

If speakers were not allowed to act as they saw fit, were they allowed to *speak* as they saw fit? Here I turn to the much-neglected Demosthenic *prooemia*, which tell us a lot about the relationship of the public speaker to his audience. From them, we see that the audience had considerable influence on speakers—that the people expected speakers to follow certain 'rules' and practices, and that this affected their oral performance, on which so much of their potential for political success was grounded.

2

While the *prooemia* are mentioned *en passant* in works dealing with Demosthenes and Greek oratory, they have never been the subject of a dedicated study in English, and in fact quite neglected. Swoboda's seminal work on them in 1887 was followed by a long article by Rupprecht in *Philologus* in 1927. The DeWitts' Loeb edition of Demosthenes' last works was published in 1949, but this has no more than a handful of explanatory notes. Then in 1974, Clavaud's Budé text was published, which has an excellent introduction and notes.[11]

The common term for these works is the Latin *exordia* ('openings'), but this does not do them full justice, hence, like Quintilian (4.1.1), I prefer the Greek term *prooemia* ('preludes'). There are 56 *prooemia*

[10] C. Carey, *Aeschines* (Austin, 2000), 36 n. 41, N. Fisher, *Aeschines*, *Against Timarchos* (Oxford, 2001), 164.

[11] R. Swoboda, *De Demosthenis quae feruntur prooemiis* (Vienna, 1887), A. Rupprecht, 'Die Demosthenische Prooemiensammlung', *Philologus* 82 (1927), 365–432, N.W. and N.J. DeWitt, *Demosthenes* 7, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1949; repr. 1986), R. Clavaud, *Démosthène*, *Prologues*, Budé Text (Paris, 1974). A translation of Demosthenes' last works with critical notes by the present author will be published in the University of Texas Oratory of Classical Greece series (general editor M. Gagarin).

attributed to Demosthenes, and they can be found before the *Letters* at the end of his corpus, for it was common practice by ancient compilers to place such works at the end of a corpus. In reality, only 55 of the 56 are *prooemia* proper since *Prooemion* 54 is an account of state sacrifices performed in honor of various gods including Athens' patron goddess Athena in order to protect the city's stability, well being, and safety. It seems to have been included in the *prooemia* by mistake.

The function of a *prooemion* in a speech was of primary importance. A speech was generally divided into four sections: introduction (*prooemion*), narration (*diegesis*), proof (*pistis*), and conclusion (*epilogos*). This division or arrangement (*taxis*), one of the five parts of rhetoric, and one treated at length by Aristotle in his *Rhetoric*,[12] was very important, hence each section of a speech played its own distinct role. Of the *prooemion*, Aristotle tells us that it was like 'the prologue in poetry and the prelude in flute-playing; for all these are beginnings, and as it were a paving the way for what follows' (*Rhetoric* 3.14.1). The *prooemion* foreshadowed what was to come, and it had that all-important rhetorical function of gaining the goodwill of the audience (*captatio benevolentiae*). It was also meant to state the topic of the speech in as simple terminology as possible, outline the speaker's rhetorical ability, and exhort the audience to be heedful of what was spoken. All of this was vital for any speaker in the emotionally charged atmosphere of the courts or Assembly, and the importance of the *prooemion* is shown by the time devoted to its use in all types of speeches by Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 3.14, Anaximenes, *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* 29, and Quintilian 4.1.

Rhetorically, the Demosthenic *prooemia* are clever pieces of work. Often in no more than a few lines multiple themes are lucidly outlined, the role of the speakers who address the Assembly and the shortcomings of the people are criticised, and the Athenians are warned what to do and how to react to speakers.[13] However, one question that needs to be addressed here is whether we can accept them as legitimate openings of speeches as opposed to musings about how a

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[12] These were invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery: see G. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton, 1963), 10–12, for discussion, and *passim* for their uses in the works of the ancient rhetoricians and orators. The two major classical Greek rhetorical works are Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (which treats invention, arrangement, and style): see Kennedy, *Art of Persuasion*, 82–114, and the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* of Anaximenes of Lampsacus: see Kennedy, *Art of Persuasion*, 114–24.

[13] Some are longer than others depending on how important the matter is at hand: see 21, 24, 32, 35, 50, 53, 54, 55, and 56.

speech ideally ought to begin, and then later attributed to Demosthenes. Callimachus, who collected them for the Library at Alexandria, believed that Demosthenes composed them, as also did Pollux and Stobaeus. Modern scholars are divided: for example, Swoboda rejected their authenticity, while Blass,[14] Dobson,[15] and Rupprecht[16] believed they were genuine. Kennedy[17] is non-committal, and the DeWitts in the Loeb say nothing on the matter. That they are real preludes to speeches is beyond doubt since some correspond closely to the openings of Demosthenes' speeches. For example, *Prooemion* 1 is very close to *Philippic* 1 and *Prooemion* 3 to *Olynthiac* 1. *Prooemion* 7 is almost exactly the opening of *On the Symmories*, as is *Prooemion* 8 to *For the People of Megalopolis* and *Prooemion* 27 to *For the Liberty of the Rhodians*.

We also have many *prooemia* that bear no relation to Demosthenes' speeches that we have, though this is not a case for their spuriousness, not least because we do not have all of Demosthenes' speeches. It is beyond plausibility that the handful of deliberative speeches that exist today represent all that he delivered in over thirty years of high-profile public life. We do not have any deliberative speeches from the period when Alexander was king (336–23), but we know that he made some. Just two examples: there was an Athenian debate in 331 over whether or not to support the war of Agis III of Sparta, and it was Demosthenes who persuaded the Athenians against this. Then in 324/3 Demosthenes spoke—successfully—in at least two Assembly meetings in connection with the Harpalus affair.[18] There is no question that Demosthenes had the technical skills to write such *prooemia*, perhaps towards the end of his career, since they all seem too polished for a beginner's exercises. However, their authenticity does not affect my arguments in this paper; we can accept that they are valid, and hence can be exploited as legitimate source material.

The theme that runs through all of the *prooemia* is that democracy is the best form of government; the criticisms contained in them are to stress the responsibilities of the people.[19] In many of the *prooemia*, the

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14 F. Blass, *Die attische Beredsamkeit*², 3.1 (Leipzig, 1898), 281–87.

15 J.F. Dobson, *The Greek Orators* (London, 1919), 267.

16 'Demosthenische Prooemiensammlung', 365–432.

17 *Art of Persuasion*, 53.

18 See Ian Worthington, 'Demosthenes' (In)activity during the reign of Alexander the Great', in *Demosthenes: Statesman and Orator*, ed. Ian Worthington (London and New York, 2000), 90–113.

19 Cf. the summation of them by the DeWitts in the Loeb edition (pp. 84–85).

people are warned about venal speakers who operate at the expense of the common good (2, 6, 12, 17, 24, 26, 31, 32, 40, 42, 53, 55), and there are many pleas that the people must listen carefully and silently in order to vote properly (3, 4, 5, 47). As well as giving us insights into the Athenians' attitude to their democracy, the *prooemia* show us the reactions and even expectations of the people at a meeting of the Assembly, and how these affected speakers, and thus their performance. Hence, we return to the subject of this paper.

The Assembly seems to have conducted its business speedily, if we can believe a comment made by the Corinthians at a meeting of the Spartan Assembly in 432: 'An Athenian is always an innovator, quick to form a resolution and quick at carrying it out' (Thuc. 1.70.1). Nothing much has changed by the fourth century, for references in the *prooemia* indicate that there was little time taken to consider important proposals in much detail. Hence, hasty decisions were made, which were obviously not in the best interests of the city. For example, *Prooemion* 21.3:

> Gentlemen of Athens, just as someone would rightly deploy a military force, so are you accustomed to make your deliberations—with speed. What you must do is deliberate leisurely but execute what you decide to do with zeal …

Court procedure also was rushed; for example, at *Apology* 37a Plato argues that if the jurors at Socrates' trial had had time to consider the case properly, then he would never have been condemned. Plato needs to be taken with a pinch of salt here as his agenda is to show that Socrates was wrongly condemned, but in support of the rushed nature of court procedure *AP* 67.1 tells us that four private trials were heard a day, and public trials usually took one day.[20]

In a court case, we know that the jurors did not have long to deliberate—they could talk among themselves as speakers delivered their cases, though this had to mean they would lose track of what was being said because their attention was diverted. Presumably they could discuss the strengths and weaknesses of both sides as they lined up to cast their vote in the urns. However, they were not sequestered

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[20] See further, P.J. Rhodes, *A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia* (Oxford, 1981), 719–17 and Ian Worthington, 'The Duration of an Athenian Political Trial', *JHS* 109 (1989), 204–7 (replied to by D.M. MacDowell, 'The Length of Trials for Public Offences in Athens', in *Polis and Politics Studies in Ancient Greek History Presented to Mogens Herman Hansen on his Sixtieth Birthday*, eds. P. Flensted-Jensen, T.H. Nielsen, and L. Rubinstein [Copenhagen, 2000], 563–68); but see now my 'The length of an Athenian Public Trial: A Reply to Professor Mac Dowell', *Hermes* 131 (2003), 364–71.

away for however long it took as with a jury today. In the case of an Assembly, did the Athenians deliberate too quickly because of long-winded speakers who took forever to make their cases and so left too little time for discussion? The answer is negative, for from the *prooemia* we see the restlessness of the people, and the lengths to which they resorted to keep speakers on track. They heckled speakers who talked for too long or with whom they disagreed; for example, *Prooemion* 4:

> Gentlemen of Athens, it is right to hear everything that is said since it is in your hands to choose whatever you wish. For it often happens that the same man speaks incorrectly about one thing but not about another; thus, by shouting him down when you are in a bad temper you may lose many beneficial ideas, but by listening in good order and quietly, you will do everything that is proper, and if you think someone is speaking stupidly you will ignore him ...

Prooemion 5:

> Gentlemen of Athens, I see that it is clear in every way what speeches you listen to with pleasure and those to which you have an aversion. Nevertheless, I consider that the mark of those wanting to plot against you is to say what someone thinks will gratify you, whereas I judge that the mark of a well-disposed and loyal citizen is to withstand your jeers and whatever else you wish, and to put forward what he himself feels is for the best interests of the city ...

Prooemion 26.1:

> Gentlemen of Athens, when you meet in the Assembly to discuss the current situation and all others, if only it were true that the same things that seem best for you actually are in reality! However, when deliberating on weighty and common matters you must listen to all your advisers, so it seems to me, considering that it is disgraceful, gentlemen of Athens, to raise uproar now when certain men wish to propose something ...

And *Prooemion* 56.3:[21]

> This is the first thing I say. Second, and perhaps this will be surprising as far as reducing the length of speeches goes, is that you listen in silence. As for whether this or that is beneficial, and which the city might choose more rightly, there are not many arguments except from those wanting to waffle in vain, nor would someone have a need to voice them again. As for the view that it is only right to listen to the reaction of the crowd [*thorubos*] and answer, and to deliver speech after speech, there is no one

[21] Cf. *Prooemion* 46.

> who is unable to do that. You do not get rid of speeches with heckling, for then you are compelled to listen to speeches having nothing to do with the matter in hand ...

There seems to have been a law, discussed above, to control the rowdiness of *rhetores* at Assemblies, and references to their behaviour are found in various speeches; for example, Aeschines 1.33, 3.4, and [Demosthenes] 59.43. However, the people too were loud, and even shouted down speakers, as we have seen in the *prooemia*, and as is seen elsewhere, for example Aeschines 1.33:

> For there is no use attempting, gentlemen of Athens, to drive such men from the platform by shouting at them, for they have no sense of shame.

The *prooemia*, so seldom cited in such matters (and certainly deserving far more attention), show the extent to which good speakers had to take verbal audience response into account. Moreover, the people wanted short speeches and grew bored (cf. 29.3, 34.2), plus they were quick to censure speakers who went off at tangents, as *Prooemion* 56 indicates:

> (1) Gentlemen of Athens ... I think that, if you are willing to be persuaded by me today, you will be more able to choose the best policy and make the speeches of those who climb up shorter. What, then, do I advise? (2) First, gentlemen of Athens, order the man who steps forward to speak about only those things which you are considering. For someone may include many other matters in his speech and say many funny retorts, especially if they are clever speakers as some are ...

Speakers responded accordingly to audience demands—for example, some complimented themselves for being terse and addressing only the issue at hand, as *Prooemion* 4 shows:

> I am not accustomed to making long speeches, and ... I will tell you in as few words as I am able, what I consider is in your best interests ...

The same is true of *Prooemion* 17:

> Gentlemen of Athens, it falls on the man wanting to propose a measure to you to try to speak in such a way so you are able to stay focused on him, or if not this, to do away with all the other topics and advise on those things which you are considering, and this in the fewest words possible. For it seems to me that it is not from any dearth of speeches that you now see all your affairs in disorder, but from the fact that some are speaking and taking part in political life for their own gain, and others who have not yet shown evidence of this, prefer rather to be considered to speak cleverly than that some beneficial act will come about from what they say. And in order that I do not do the opposite of what I myself say is right, and say more about other questions than what I stood up to

> discuss, I will ignore all other topics and will attempt to tell you what I advise right now.

And *Prooemion* 36.2:

> You seem to me wise for cutting back the time for being cheated to the barest minimum. If I wanted to say something of the same type as the others, I should not have thought I needed to disturb you by speaking. But now I think I have something to say that will be in your best interests to hear, and completely different from what is anticipated by the majority. It will take only a short time. Upon hearing, consider it, and, if it pleases you, adopt it.

Now, the extent to which a jury in a law court became bored or even hostile is unknown, but jurors did not force speakers to keep on track because they wanted to go home, and when the jurors raised their own voices they were usually exhorted to do so by speakers in support of their cases.[22] A different attitude prevailed at the Assembly, which, after all, was not as entertaining an arena as the courts. I suggest that speeches in an Assembly with half a dozen of so ordinary items on the agenda were probably short. At an Assembly meeting to discuss an item of national importance, such as war, the agenda might be taken up with just that item, but it does not follow that speakers would have taken advantage of this to talk forever. The reverse, in fact, to judge from the *prooemia*.

The symbouleutic speeches that we do have vary in length, some like Demosthenes' *Olynthiacs* are quite short. However, since we do not know the relationship of the oral speech to the revised one, we cannot use the length of the Assembly speeches we have as a basis for estimating time. We can see from some of Demosthenes' symbouleutic speeches that he was conscious of the time factor;[23] so too was Isocrates, whose works were not orally delivered but meant to be read.[24] My point, then, is that in an effort to appeal to the masses, and thus enjoy political support, speakers had to be well prepared, as we would expect, and moreover keep their speeches terse and to the point. This is what the people wanted, as the *prooemia* indicate, and was something that had to have affected their whole oral performance.

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[22] See V. Bers, 'Dicastic Thorubos', in *Crux. Essays in Greek History Presented to G.E.M. de Ste. Croix on his 75th Birthday*, eds. P.A. Cartledge and F.D. Harvey (London, 1985), 1–15.

[23] 6.37, 10.75–76, 14.41.

[24] 6.24, 40, 8.145, 14. 63.

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The *prooemia* also tell us about the level of decorum expected in an Assembly, both of audience and of speakers. As we know from Aristophanes' *Wasps*, Athenian jurors enjoyed seeing defendants in court squirm and hearing them denigrated. However, abuse of opponents was frowned upon in the Assembly, and proper behaviour was expected at all times, even though many of the same people who sat as jurors attended the Assembly. Aristophanes tells us that a speaker who used excess noise, or bluster, could be evicted from the Assembly (*Eccles.* 142–43), while Thucydides and the author of the *Athenian Constitution* criticise Cleon for his conduct. He was, according to *AP* 28.3, prone to 'impetuous outbursts' and 'was the first person to use bawling and abuse on the *bema*, and to gird up his cloak before making a public speech, all other persons speaking in orderly fashion'. Cleon did not have *enkrates* on the *bema* it seems, although given the bias of our sources towards him, we need to take what they say with a pinch of salt.[25]

Popular attitudes were something that the *prooemia* clearly addressed. There should be no personal abuse against other speakers: only past events which were detrimental to the state should be enlarged upon so as to show that the people erred in following the advice of certain speakers and to urge that they do not do so again. For example, *Prooemion* 20:

> (1) Gentlemen of Athens, I believe it is both right and expedient for you to set aside the charges and recriminations when we are to deliberate, and for each man to say whatever he thinks best concerning the present situation. For we all know that our affairs are badly affected because of the actions of certain men, and how they can be made better is the job of those wanting to advise you ... (3) Therefore, I consider that all other matters are needless, and I will try to tell you those things which I think are expedient about what you are now discussing, requesting only this: if I should happen to mention something that has happened, do not consider that I am speaking for the sake of accusation, but in order that having shown in what areas you made mistakes, I may now prevent you suffering the same again.

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[25] Cf., for example, A.G. Woodhead, 'Thucydides' Portrait of Cleon', *Mnemosyne*[4] 13 (1960), 289–317 and A.W. Gomme, 'Thucydides and Cleon', in *More Essays in Greek History and Literature* (Oxford, 1962), 112–21.

Prooemion 31:

> (1) Gentlemen of Athens, there is nothing more heinous than public speakers who condemn but use the same practices. For no one is so stupid as to say that quarrelling among themselves and accusing each other when no one is on trial would not harm our interests. I myself think that these men would be better off if, when speaking in public, they turn their must-win attitude over each other to the enemies of the city …

And *Prooemion* 35:

> (1) … Since some men who then kept quiet are now being critical, I want to say a few things to them. (2) I am alarmed at the way these men conduct politics, and I think it foul. For if they are able to advise you when you are deliberating, yet they decide to condemn what has been decided, they do the job of sycophants not, so they say, of well-meaning men …

Of course, abuse and ridicule still happened,[26] but abuse of one's opponents was considered a disservice to oneself and the people as a whole, and those who resorted to such practices were criticised. A good example of this is the conversation between Praxagora and the First Woman about the insults, and how to deal with them, of Cephalus, a potter and a demagogue, in *Ecclesiazousae* 248–54. Note also *Prooemion* 6:

> Gentlemen of Athens, although many speeches have been delivered by all your advisers, I do not see that you happen to be any closer now to discovering what must be done than before you came up to the Assembly. I believe the reason for this is the same as that for our general wretched plight: because the speakers do not offer advice to you about the present situation but accuse and ridicule each other, making you used to hearing all the damage they do, without proper legal evaluation, so I judge, in order that if they are brought to trial sometime, you will not think you are hearing new stuff but only what has often made you angry …

And *Prooemion* 53:

> (1) Gentlemen of Athens, the abuse and upset that are accustomed to damaging the city all the time have come from the same men now as always. But it is not right to criticise these men so (for perhaps they do this out of anger and envy and, the most important reason of all, it is profitable for them to do it) as yourselves, gentlemen of Athens, if, when you have come together concerning common and important affairs, you sit and listen to the private abuses and are not able to realise this by yourselves, that the slanders of all the speakers against one other, without there being a trial, make you legally liable for what they prove against

[26] Cf. *Prooemia* 6, 11, 20, 31, 52, and 53.

> one another. (2) Except for a few men, perhaps (so that I do not have to say everyone), not one of them slanders another so that any of your affairs may improve—far from it—but in order that he might allege what a most dreadful thing his opponent has done, so that he himself may do the same thing more covertly …

We also find the vague Greek phrase ὁ δεῖνα, often translated as 'such-and-such', or 'a certain speaker', or even 'my opponent', used so as not to name names, although the audience would know who was meant. For example, *Prooemion* 34.1:[27]

> Gentlemen of Athens, it is clear that only recently when you chose not to listen to those wanting to speak against what such-and-such said …

It has been suggested[28] that the *prooemia* were written out in advance, perhaps as models, and so the phrase ὁ δεῖνα was a 'blank' into which a relevant name could be inserted. However, this would seem to be counter to the general practice of not naming names. Another explanation, which grew out of discussion at the conference, was that a speaker, especially a good extemporaneous one, could insert a reference to a previous speech in the 'blank'. For example, in a debate with multiple speeches on both sides a speaker might refer to the content of a previous speech (and/or other speakers) to show continuity in the case he was putting forward. At the same time, his speaking ability, and hence oral performance, would be further highlighted.

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In conclusion, I argue that the *prooemia* show us a dynamic between the advisers who spoke and the mass of citizens who listened and voted. From these sources, so often regularly and wrongly neglected, we see that speakers realised that their proposals made them vulnerable to the will of the people, since we have numerous references to how their speeches might cause them personal harm or lead to a later indictment (6, 25.3, 29, 37.2). At the heart of the *prooemia* was not just an attempt to gain the goodwill of the audience, for they show us the steps taken by speakers to ensure success and thus political support, steps which affected their oral performance in the Assembly, including also the

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[27] Cf. *Prooemion* 45.1.

[28] By the DeWitts in the Loeb edition, *ad Prooemion* 34.1.

length of speaking times, apparent impromptu speeches, and the extent to which a speech was rehearsed.

The audience interrupted and heckled speakers in the Assembly. Based on the Demosthenic *prooemia*, I suggest that the reasons for this behaviour, something that has not been the focus of much scholarly attention, could be linked to speakers whose performance as opposed to what they were saying was found wanting. Speakers were as much actors as actors in a play, and just as the latter responded to audience reaction and expectations, so too did public speakers, only the stakes were higher and the stage was different.

DEMOSTHENES ACTOR ON THE POLITICAL AND FORENSIC STAGE

Craig Cooper

Recent scholarship suggests continuity between the courtroom and the theatre, between the orator's performance in court and that of the actor on stage and between the audience who attended the tragic and comic performances and sat as jurors or attended the assembly.[1] Trials and drama thus shared a common context and to succeed in this very public, open and noisy stage the orator,[2] who performed orally before his audience, needed to draw on the actor's craft. Aeschines, who had worked as a tragic actor, relied on his well-trained voice to good effect, and the scorn that Demosthenes heaps on him for this suggests that he was successful. Demosthenes frequently refers to Aeschines' fine voice.[3] He describes him as *euphônos*[4] and *lamprophônotatos*.[5] According to Demosthenes, he is loud-sounding, allowing him to express clearly and emphatically whatever he wants with his voice.[6] Aeschines is compared to a gust of wind, who can string together words clearly 'without taking a breath' (*apneusti*). Apparently this was something Demosthenes initially could not do, speak *apneusti*[7] and so, we are told, worked on his voice and breathing (Plut. *Dem.* 11.1). On more than one occasion Demosthenes connects Aeschines' fine voice with his training in the

[1] J. Ober and B.S. Strauss, 'Drama, political rhetoric and the discourse of Athenian Democracy', in *Nothing to do with Dionysos? Athenian drama in its social context*, eds. J.J. Winkler and F.I Zeitlin (Princeton, 1990), 237–70; E. Hall, "Lawcourt Dramas: the Power of Performance in Greek Forensic Oratory," *BICS* 40 (1995) 39–52.

[2] V. Bers, 'Dikastic Thorubos', in *Crux*, ed. P.A. Cartledge and F.D. Harvey (1985) 1–15; A.M. Lanni, 'Spectator sport or serious politics? *hoi periestekotes* and the Athenian lawcourts', *JHS* 117 (1997) 183–89.

[3] A. Schaefer, *Demosthenes und seine Zeit* I (Leipzig, 1885) 240 n. 2 has collected all the references; for a discussion of Demosthenes' criticism of Aeschines, see J. F. Kindstrand, *The Stylistic Evaluation of Aeschines in Antiquity* (*Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis* 18) (Uppsala, 1982), 17–23.

[4] Dem. 18. 285; 19. 126, 338.

[5] Dem. 18. 313; 19. 199.

[6] Dem. 19.206; cf. 18.260, 19.216, 338.

[7] Zosimus 299.64; [Plut.] *Mor.* 844f.

theatre,[8] and notes how he exercises his voice and practices.[9] This is precisely what the later tradition says of Demosthenes; after he had failed at speaking in the assembly, he turned to an actor for help,[10] and began diligently to practice his orations, train his voice and put great store on its tone (Plut. *Dem.* 11.3). Whatever we make of these anecdotes, they do confirm this continuity between acting and oratorical performance, and suggest a recognition on Demosthenes' part of the importance in a political and forensic contest of histrionic skill.

In such oral performances, particularly in the context of the assembly, the ability to extemporize enabled the orator to handle and react to *thorubos* of the crowd. Another of Demosthenes' political adversaries, Demades, was adept at it, whereas Demosthenes apparently was not (Plut. *Dem.* 8.2, 10.1) and was initially easily cowed by the noisy reactions of the crowd (Plut. *Dem.* 6.3, 8.7). To compete against such gifted orators as Demades and Aeschines, Demosthenes needed to develop his own histrionic repertoire. Ancient critics suggest two areas, theatrical delivery and striking use of figures. In this paper I seek to explore the ways Demosthenes exploited such histrionic devices and suggest that as Demosthenes became a more accomplished actor the written style of his speeches changed to accommodate and enhance his delivery.

The Impact of Writing on Oratory

By the second half of the fifth century a noticeable shift had been made in oratory. Writing had been introduced into the equation. Up until this time all oratory was oral, both in terms of composition and performance.[11] 'Composition was synonymous with performance'.[12] But this changed with the sophists, who introduced the study of language and rhetoric and composed works on these subjects that could be read and studied. Both Protagoras and Gorgias, it seems, wrote *technai*, rhetorical

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[8] Dem. 18.127, 287, 313; 19.189, 246–47.

[9] Dem. 18. 280, 308, 309; 19. 255, 336.

[10] Plut.*Dem.* 7.1; [Plut.] *Mor.* 845b; Phot. *Bib.* 493 a41.

[11] M. Gagarin, "The Orality of Greek Oratory", in *Signs of Orality: The Oral Tradition and its Influence in the Greek and Roman World*, ed. E. A. Mackay (Leiden, 1999), 164.

[12] C.G. Thomas and E.K. Webb, 'From Orality to Rhetoric: an Intellectual Transformation', in *Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action*, ed. I. Worthington (London and New York, 1994), 11.

handbooks; in the case of the former, he published a work on *orthopeia*, correct diction (Plat. *Phaedr.* 267c), and sets of arguments (*antilogiai*), which learned would allow one to argue effectively in court and in the assembly (*peri nomôn kai politikôn*: Plat. *Soph.* 232de).[13] Gorgias' *technai* may have consisted of rhetorical pieces or model speeches (*rhêtorikoi logoi*) to be learned by heart (Arist. *Soph. Refut.* 183 b36),[14] and both sophists seem also to have composed commonplaces (Cicero [*Brut.* 46] on the authority of Aristotle);[15] in particular Gorgias' commonplaces consisted of *laudes* and *vituperationes*. In these kinds of activities the sophists were anticipated by the inventors of rhetoric, Corax and Tisias, who composed precepts to help in litigation in the new democracy in Syracuse. (Cic. *Brut.* 46). Like Gorgias, they may have included in their rhetorical handbooks examples of praise and blame (Plato *Phaedr.* 267a)[16] and certainly arguments of probability.[17] According to T. Cole, it is unlikely that such *technai*, as Aristotle suggests for Corax, were confined exclusively to *eikos*, but possibly consisted of 'model speeches based on *eikos*', along the pattern of the prosecution and defence attributed to Tisias in the *Phaedrus* (273b–c), where a weak brave man is said to have assaulted a strong coward and argued the improbability of a weak man attacking the stronger who, in turn, argued the weak man had been assisted in the assault on him.[18]

In the late rhetorical *Prolegomena* (Rabe 67: 6–7; cf. 189: 16–17) we find information that may go back to Timaeus that indicates that Corax had developed parts of speeches, in particular, the *prooimion*, *diêgêsis*, *agôn* and *epilogos*.[19] Certainly Plato's summary of the content of rhetorical

[13] On Protagoras' rhetorical works see W.K.C. Guthrie, *The Sophists* (Cambridge, 1971), 44 n.4, 205 n.2; Thomas & Webb, "From Orality to Rhetoric", 13.

[14] Guthrie, *The Sophists*, 270.

[15] Or at least, what later came to be known, in the case of Protagoras, as commonplaces; Cicero refers to Protagoras' commonplaces as *disputationes rerum illustrium*, which may remind us of the *antilogiai*.

[16] A.E. Douglas, *M. Tulli Ciceronis Brutus* (Oxford, 1966), 37.

[17] Corax: Arist. *Rhet.* 1402 a18; Tisias: Plat. *Phaedr.* 273 a6. For a general discussion of Corax and Tisias, see G. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (London, 1963), 58–61: T. Cole, *The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece* (Baltimore and London, 1991), 82–83.

[18] On the use of probability in early Greek rhetoric, see M. Gagarin, "Probability and Persuasion: Plato and Early Greek Rhetoric," in *Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action*, ed. I. Worthington (London and New York, 1994), 46–68, who suggests (51) that the great innovation of Corax and Tisias was not probability arguments which had long been known and used but the development of a new form of argument, the 'reverse probability'.

[19] See Kennedy, *Persuasion*, 59; cf. Cole, *Origins of Rhetoric*, 82–83.

handbooks of the late fifth century found in the *Phaedrus* (266d–267d) indicate that such *technai* included descriptions of the component parts of a judicial speech (*prooimion, diêgêsis, tekmêria)* and probability arguments (*eikota*). Some of these, we are told, included praise and blame and provided techniques to aid memory, such as setting the censure to verse.[20] This last point indicates that the various set pieces, parts of speeches and commonplaces included in these handbooks were meant to be learnt by heart and would thus be ready on command for the litigant to repeat in court, as the need arose. As Kennedy notes, the actual composition still remained largely extempore with the speaker drawing on material in his memory.[21] We get some sense of how this was done from Plato's *Menexenus* (236 b1–5), when Socrates describes how Aspasia rehearsed her funeral oration to him, extemporizing parts of it (*ta men ek tou parachrêma*) and reciting parts she had prepared beforehand (*ta de proteron eskemmenê*).[22] It is also clear that the rhetorical handbooks were not concerned with forensic oratory alone, though that may have been a chief concern, but contained material to assist the speaker in other public contexts like the assembly. Preserved among the corpus of Demosthenes is a collection of *prooimia* for deliberative speeches. Antiphon is known to have published his own *prooimia*, though his introductions may have been tailored for the forensic stage.

At first, the impact of such speech preparation, though felt in the presence of rhetorical *topoi* and reasoned arguments of probability, may not have been as significant, since the performance in court remained largely extempore, as it would with the appearance of the logographer in the last quarter of the fifth century. With Antiphon, logographers began to compose speeches for others to memorize and deliver in the courtroom and this new dimension no doubt had a considerable impact on the performance, both in terms of preparation and the delivery on the forensic stage.[23] As Schloemann and others have

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[20] Hippias apparently developed effective memory techniques: Plato *Hipp. min.* 368d; *Hipp. Mai.* 285e. On the importance of memorization, see J. Schloemann, 'Entertainment and Democratic Distrust: the Audience's Attitudes towards Oral and Written Oratory in Classical Athens', in *Epea and Grammata: Oral and Written Communication in Ancient Greece,* ed. I. Worthington (Leiden and Boston, 2002), 135–36.

[21] Kennedy, *Persuasion*, 53.

[22] On the possibility that Plato's *Menexenus* is a deliberate parody of extemporaneous speeches, see N. O'Sullivan, *Alcidamas, Aristophanes and the Beginnings of Greek Stylistic Theory* (*Hermes Einzelschriften*: 60) (Stuttgart, 1992), 41 n. 95.

[23] For a general discussion of that impact, see Schloemann, 'Entertainment', 137–39. On logography in general, see M. Lavency, *Aspects de la logographie judiciaire* attique

noted,[24] memorization became even more essential; already the sophists had stressed the importance of memory work and published model texts to memorize. But now whole speeches needed to be memorized and failure to do so could prove disastrous. One need only recall Demosthenes' disastrous showing before Philip in 346; according to Aeschines (2.35–36), Demosthenes had barely gotten through his *prooimion*, when he fell silent and stood there helpless, in a state of *aporia*. Philip tried to encourage him not to think he had met with some kind disaster as if he were on the stage (*hôsper en tois theatrois*), but little by little to recall his speech and speak it out as he had prepared it. Demosthenes could not; he had in a sense gotten stage fright. According to Aeschines, once he had become disoriented and had forgotten what he had written, he could not recover. In Demosthenes' case, his absolute dependency on a prepared text proved his undoing and similar instances, we can well imagine, could easily happen to less well-trained speakers. Alcidamas (*De Sophistis* 18) emphasizes the difficulty of memorizing a whole written text, which, he says 'is necessary to commit to memory and learn precisely both the arguments and the words and the syllables'.[25] He notes the embarrassment of forgetting parts during the delivery and instead recommends extemporization. The difficulty in preparing for the courtroom drama is parodied in Aristophanes' *Knights* (347–49): in order to win his trivial little case against an alien, the sausage-seller must stay up all night going over and over his speech, repeating it on the streets, drinking only water and rehearsing it to an audience of exasperated friends.[26]

Not only was it now essential, if one wanted to compete in the court successfully against an opponent who would also avail himself of the services of a logographer, to be prepared fully by memorizing

(Louvain, 1964). On the client/logographer relationship, see S.Usher, 'Lysias and his Clients', *GRBS* 17 (1976), 31–40, who argues that there was little or no collaboration between the two in the composition of the speech; after the initial consultation the logographer composed the speech on his own 'in his own words and with the exact degree and emotional appeal that he considered necessary' (36).

[24] Schloemann, 'Entertainment', 135–36; Hall, 'Lawcourt Dramas', 47.

[25] Translation of Alcidamas taken from J. Muir, *Alcidamas: The Works and Fragments* (London, 2001).

[26] See also Plutarch *Mor. 504c* of a client who complains to Lysias of his difficulty in memorizing a speech not in his own words. Cf. Usher, 'Lysias', 34. N. O'Sullivan, 'Written and Spoken in the First Sophistic', in *Voice Into Text: Orality and Literary in Ancient Greece*, ed. I. Worthington (Leiden, 1996), 126, sees an implicit contrast in Cleon's abuse of the sausage-seller between the written style and the extemporaneous style of speech.

the speech thoroughly but in that preparation to craft a speech that included phrases that gave the impression of spontaneity, which was still demanded by the Athenian audience. All orators including Demosthenes did this.[27] Alcidamas (13) recommends that 'those who write speeches for the courts avoid precision and mimic the style of extempore speakers', because it adds plausibility to what they say. Scholars have noted the necessity in the Athenian setting of maintaining the illusion of spontaneity,[28] and certainly Athenians were quick to point out those who failed to maintain the illusion. Pytheas is said to have accused Demosthenes' speeches of smelling of the lamp wick (Plut. *Dem.* 8. 3–4). The context of this anecdote in Plutarch, who is likely drawing on Peripatetic sources,[29] is a discussion of Demosthenes' inability to extemporize and his consistent refusal to come forward, when called upon in the assembly, unless he was prepared (*pareskeuasmenos*).[30] Apparently too much preparation went into Demosthenes' speeches and there was little evidence of extemporization in the delivery. Demosthenes' sharp rebuke of Pytheas indicates that he was sensitive to the charge, not because he had to rely on writing out his speech but because such preparation could arouse suspicion and distrust among the *dêmos* about the sincerity of his words or motives (cf. Alcid. *De Soph.* 12). On more than one occasion Aeschines himself had tried to insinuate and warn the jurors that Demosthenes was a *technitês logôn* who teaches the young the *technai logôn.*[31] As the author of the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* advises (36:1444a19–30), when confronting such slanders of speaking written speeches (*gegrammenous logous legomen*) or practising the speech (*legein meletômen*), Demosthenes does not deny Pytheas' charge but turns it on end. Their lamps did not pursue the same ends; his speeches were neither written or fully unwritten; practice of speaking (*ton legein meletônta*) was the mark of a man of the people, preparation (*paraskeuên*) service to the demos, whereas disregard of what the many may think

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[27] On the kinds of phrases that gave the impression of spontaneity see Hall, 'Lawcourt Dramas', 47.

[28] Schloemann, 'Entertainment', 136–37; Hall, 'Lawcourt Dramas', 47.

[29] C. Cooper, 'Philosophers, Politics, Academics: Demosthenes' Rhetorical Reputation in Antiquity', in *Demosthenes: Statesman and Orator*, ed. I. Worthington (London and New York 2000), 229.

[30] As scholars have noted, *paraskeue* has negative connotations. See Schloemann, 'Entertainment', 140; M. Christ, *The Litigious Athenian* (Baltimore and London, 1998), 38–39; S. Halliwell, 'Between Public and Private: Tragedy and Athenian Experience of Rhetoric', in *Greek Tragedy and History*, ed. C. Pelling (Oxford, 1997), 124.

[31] Aes. 1. 117, 170; 2.156; 3. 200; 1.117; cf. 2.1, 3.35, 37, 193.

of the speech the mark of an oligarch. It is clear that Demosthenes, perhaps more than any other orator, embraced the new realities of oratory, where written documentary evidence was the norm in court and written preparation was deemed essential if not mandatory.[32] It was only the rare individual, like Demades, who had a knack at extemporizing, that avoided such a dependency on written preparation.[33] But such careful preparation would allow Demosthenes, as he became a more accomplished speaker, to craft speeches that contained passages of remarkable *tour de force*,[34] which were themselves only possible as he became a more accomplished actor, in terms of breathing, intonation, and gesturing. I think there is an intimate connection between Demosthenes' later style of oratory, which was highly praised by ancient critics, and his skill at declamation. And here I move to the real topic of this paper declamation, but before I do so, I must discuss the impact that speech preparation and declamation had on style.

Declamation and Style

Those in the fourth century who wrote on rhetoric were acutely aware of the impact that written composition was having on oratory. Alcidamas (*De Soph.* 13) advises that 'those who write speeches for the court avoid precision (*akribeia*) and mimic the style of extempore speakers, and they seem to being doing their best writing when they produce speeches which least resemble scripts.' Aristotle notes the same distinction. 'The written style', according to Aristotle (*Rhet.* 3.12.2), 'is most precise; the agonistic most histrionic or suited to delivery.' Nowhere is it suggested by Alcidamas or Aristotle that writing was not involved in the process of oral presentation but rather the type of precision, that is the polish and complexity of writing and sentence structure, determined the style of the oratory, whether it more resembled writing or

[32] See D. Mirhady, 'Demosthenes as advocate: the private speeches' in ed. I. Worthington (London and New York 2000), 181–204, who argues convincingly that Demosthenes exploited more fully than any of the other later orators (after the shift to written evidence) the use of documentary evidence.

[33] That an orator like Demades was skilled at extemporization was inferred from the fact that no speeches of his survived but only aphorisms, whereas few such aphorisms could be attributed to Demosthenes. Cf. Cic. *Brut.* 36; *Or.* 90. On the sayings of Demades, see 'Demetrius' *On Style* 282–86.

[34] L. Pearson, 'The Virtuoso Passages in Demosthenes' Speeches', *Phoenix* 29 (1975), 214–30.

oral presentation.[35] Michael Gagarin has shown in the case of Gorgias and Antiphon, that stylistic differences 'stem from the different mode of communication envisioned for each speech.'[36] Whereas Gorgias' *Helen*, which was intended for an oral performance, seeks clarity and simplicity, by using signposts, parallelism and simplified sentence structure, Antiphon's *Second Tetraology*, which was intended for circulation, avoids such features and uses much more complex syntax. Gagarin's arguments are strengthened by the fact that Antiphon's courtroom speeches do not have the same degree of complexity as the *Tetraologies*; they use more signposts, tend to be more paratactic in style and have shorter sentences.[37] In short they avoid the precision, noted by Alcidamas and Aristotle as characteristic of the written style and imitate the agonistic style of extemporaneous speakers.[38]

The same kinds of observations have been noted in the case of Demosthenes' deliberative speeches, but unlike some of Antiphon's speeches, all of Demosthenes' speeches seemed to have been intended for an oral performance, delivery in the assembly.[39] Thus the written style, which was primarily intended for reading or lecturing, did appear in real oral performances but not with the same degree of success, and it is no surprise that Demosthenes' earliest appearances in the assembly, when his style was most like writing, were the least successful. There may be some truth to the tradition that an unappreciative crowd heckled Demosthenes off the *bêma* when he first addressed the assembly. According to Plutarch (*Dem.* 6.3), his speech was confused by long periods and excessively tortured arguments. Not only that, he also failed in the area of declamation; according to Plutarch, he had a

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[35] See O'Sullivan, *Alcidamas*, 39–42, who argues that Alcidamas' *On Sophists* is a written speech that exhibits the features of extemporaneous speech.

[36] M. Gagarin, "The Orality of Greek Oratory", *Signs of Orality: The Oral Tradition and its Influence in the Greek and Roman World*, ed. E. A. Mackay (Leiden, 1999), 167.

[37] Gagarin, 'Orality of Greek Oratory', 174

[38] On the two styles, see O'Sullivan, *Alcidamas*, 32–62. Simplicity of composition and unpolished use of language of emotive affect characterize the extemporaneous style.

[39] Here I follow R.D. Milns, 'The Public Speeches of Demosthenes,' in *Demosthenes: Statesman and Orator*, ed. I. Worthington (London and New York, 2001), 207, who argues that though Demosthenes' deliberative speeches were not spoken in the Assembly exactly as we have them, 'each of our speeches does represent a speech delivered to the People but edited or revised afterward for circulation.' On the question of revision, see J. Trevett, 'Did Demosthenes Publish his Deliberative Speeches', *Hermes* 124 (1996), 425–41; I. Worthington, 'Greek Oratory, Revision of Speeches and the Problem of Historical Reliability', *C&M* 92 (1991), 55–74; M.H. Hansen, 'Two Notes on Demosthenes' Symbouleutic Speeches', *C&M* 34 (1984), 55–70.

certain weakness of voice, (*phônês astheneia*) indistinctness of tongue (*glôttês asapheia*) and shortness of breath that disturbed the sense of his words by ripping apart his periods. He was not yet trained as an actor.

Pearson and others have noted a development in Demosthenes' deliberative speeches from his early ones (14, 15, 16) that lack force and clarity to later ones, which are marked by *deinotês*, that rhetorical force for which Demosthenes' speeches were famous in antiquity. Demosthenes' early speeches, like *On the Symmories* (14), are Thucydidean in style with complex arguments that require close and careful reading.[40] Traces of an Isocratean influence can also be found in these early political speeches,[41] and it was Isocrates' speeches that ancient critics argued were not suited for an oral performance. Hieronymus, the third century Peripatetic, noted that Isocrates' speeches could be read effectively but to declaim them publicly (*dêmêgorêsai*) with the proper voice and tone and appropriate delivery was impossible (Dion.Hal. *Isoc.* 13). Demetrius of Phalerum, stated much the same when he commented that Isocrates' long periods were bad for delivery (fr. 134 Fortenbaugh).

By contrast, Demetrius criticized Demosthenes' delivery for being intricate (*poikilon*), over-done (*peritton*), not simple (*haploun*) and refined (*oude kata ton gennaion tropon*) but inclined to what is weak and ignoble (fr. 134; cf. fr. 137). Here I believe he was thinking of the performances of Demosthenes' maturity. The more mature speeches (*Philippics, Chersonese, Olynthiacs*) in contrast to his early deliberative speeches prefer arguments that are direct and language that flows with greater speed.[42] We find the effective use of asyndeton and anaphora, striking metaphors and similes[43] and a deliberate use of hiatus, which Isocrates so carefully avoided.[44] The periodic style perfected by Isocrates is abandoned and the simple clause becomes 'the most common expressive structure',[45] delivering a force and clarity not evident in Demosthenes' earlier speeches;[46] there is a combination of fullness and brevity, rapidity

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[40] L. Pearson, 'The Development of Demosthenes as a Political Orator', *Phoenix* 18 (1964), 97; Milns, 'The Public Speeches', 210; cf. C.W. Wooten, 'Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Hermogenes on the Style of Demosthenes', *AJP* 110 (1989), 577.

[41] L. Pearson, *The Art of Demosthenes* (Meisenheim am Glan, 1976), 24–25.

[42] Pearson, 'The Development of Demosthenes', 96; contrast Wooten, 'Dionysius of Halicarnassus', 577–78.

[43] Milns, 'The Public Speeches', 214–15.

[44] Milns, 'The Public Speeches', 215; cf. Wooten, 'Dionysius of Halicarnassus', 577.

[45] G. Rowe, 'Demosthenes' Use of Language', in *Demosthenes On the Crown*, ed. J.J. Murphy (New York, 1967), 186; cf. Wooten, 'Dionysius of Halicarnassus', 578.

[46] Pearson ('The Development of Demosthenes', 96) notes that 'in the later speeches

and abundance, in Hermogenes' words (*On Types of Style* 69), where a single idea is expanded and repeated, restated and reworked in a series of short clauses.[47] But intimately connected with this change in style is Demosthenes' development as a rhetorical actor; later in his career, when asked what were the three most important things in rhetoric, Demosthenes replied 'delivery, delivery, delivery.'[48] Declamation was now intimately bound up in his oratory. The point is that features, such as asyndeton, which are a mark of Demosthenes' mature style, were purposely chosen to accommodate delivery that was of increasing importance to the success of his oratory.

This point was not lost on later rhetoricians either. Commenting on what relevance Demosthenes' interest in delivery had to a discussion of his style, Dionyisus of Halicarnassus (*Dem.* 53–54) notes that the style of his deliberative speeches, which was full of pathos and character (*mestê pollôn ousa êthôn kai pathôn*), is designed to accommodate it and dictates the form of delivery needed. After quoting from the *Third Philippic* (3. 26) he adds 'Here the style itself dictates what kind of delivery is needed.' What kind is needed: a delivery overwhelming in anger and grief, with intonations, facial expressions and gestures of anger and grief. Earlier in the same discussion (*Dem.* 53), Dionysius notes that delivery, which adorns Demosthenes' style, is an essential virtue of political speeches and also needed in agonistic speeches, if they are to be convincing and animated. His particular observations about Demosthenes' style echo Aristotle's own general observations in the *Rhetoric* (3.12.2): the agonistic style, which lacks precision but is most histrionic, exhibits character and pathos (*ê men gar êthikê ê de pathêtikê*). Of the two agonistic styles, the forensic is more precise than the deliberate (3.12.5), which is like a rough sketch. In this style delivery is most effective, precision least present (*hopou malista huporiseôs, entautha hêkista akribeia eni*) and a loud voice most needed (*touto de hopou phônês kai malista opou megalês*). All this to say that declamatory performance dictates the style of the orator's speech and this seems particularly true of Demosthenes' mature style.

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each paragraph is limited in its application; there is no effort to make more than one point at a time'.

[47] See Wooten, 'Dionysius of Halicarnassus', 582–85, on this assessment of Demosthenes' style and for an example from the *Third Phillipic* that illustrates this combination of rapidity and abundance.

[48] [Plut.] *Vit. X* 845a; Phot. *Bibl.* 493 a41; Quint. 11.3.6; Cic. *Orat.* 17.56, *Brut.* 38.142; *De. Orat.* 3.213; Lib. 295.66; Val. Max. 8.10 ext.

A distinguishing feature of this mature style was that quality which ancient critics called *deinotês*, a style of oratory that shares many of the features of the agonistic or extemporaneous style of speech described by Aristotle and Alcidamas.[49] Our clearest understanding of this style comes from 'Demetrius', the author of *On Style.* The work was written sometime between the third BCE and first century BCE[50] and shows clear Peripatetic influence.[51] 'Demetrius' identified four types of style, the plain, the elevated, the elegant, and the forceful. He is the only critic to introduce *deinotês* as a separate style, which he notes is now all the rage (245), and cites Demosthenes more than any other author for examples of the forceful style, and rarely, if ever, in connection with any of the other styles.[52]

But what created that characteristic force was Demosthenes' delivery. There were two things in particular which rhetoricians identified with *deinotês*, a dramatic delivery and intricate use of figures of speech.[53] And in the case of figures they were indispensable for an effective delivery. At section 269 of *On Style* 'Demetrius' notes that 'above all disjunction or asyndeton (*dialusis*)[54] produces forcefulness' (cf. 301) and he proceeds to cite an example from Demosthenes 19.314 (*On the False Embassy*). At 270 he notes how 'climax' creates force and then cites by way of example Demosthenes 18.179 (*On the Crown*). At 271 'Demetrius' sums

[49] O'Sullivan, *Alcidamas*, 11–14.

[50] So G.M.A. Grube, *A Greek Critic: Demetrius on Style* (Toronto, 1961), 39–56, followed by Kennedy, *Persuasion,* 286, but Kennedy in A *New History of Classical Rhetoric* (Princeton, 1994), 88, suggests the 1st century BCE. R. Roberts, *Demetrius on Style*, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass., 1922), 271, places the composition of the work in the 1st century AD and tentatively identifies the author with Demetrius of Taras, Plutarch's friend.

[51] He refers to Theophrastus, Demetrius of Phalerum and Praxiphanes. See Grube, *A Greek Critic,* 32–39

[52] Already by the middle of the 3rd century, and certainly by the 2nd century, Demosthenes was beginning to be characterized solely for his *deinotês,* and as Rhys Roberts suggests (Loeb Introduction 267), in creating this separate category, [Demetrius] was trying to find an independent place for Demosthenes' style of oratory, which was now becoming fashionable.

[53] See especially Quint. 6.2.24 and also Cic. *Brut.* 141, where *Antonius* is compared to Demosthenes who surpassed all other orators in his use of figures and delivery.

[54] By this term Demetrius clearly means asyndeton, the lack of connectives between clauses and phrases in a sentence, and indeed elsewhere (192) he connects the two terms: 'Asyndeton and disjunction (*dialelumenon*) makes everything completely obscure, because the beginning of each clause is obscured by the looseness (*lusis*)'. But as Grube (*A Greek Critic*, 105 n. 192) points out, the terms *dialusis* or *lusis* also have a more general meaning of loose, non-periodic structure.

up his point, making this time a direct connection between debate, delivery and forcefulness. 'In general', he says, 'figures of speech help a speaker in histrionic delivery and in debate, that is for forcefulness, and this is especially true of the disjointed style (*to dialelumenon*)'. In an earlier passage the connection had already been made between asyndeton and delivery. At 193 'Demetrius' tells us that 'the disjointed style (*dialelumenê lexis*) lends itself better to debate, and this style is called histrionic, since looseness (*lusis)* stimulates an actor's delivery. A written style, on the other hand, is best read.' In all these passages *deinotês*, a characteristic feature of Demosthenes' oratory, is closely associated with debate, delivery and the disjointed style, that is the orator who wants to debate will use the forceful style, which is achieved through the use of figures such as asyndeton, which in their turn produce an effective delivery, and it was Demosthenes, whom 'Demetrius' noted for his effective use of asyndeton.

There is something very Aristotelian about what 'Demetrius' says; he makes the same distinction, as Aristotle, between the written and agonistic styles (cf. 224–26) and the explicit connection with delivery. In Aristotle's assessment the agonistic style lacks not only precision, but also incorporates histrionic features; the two go hand in hand. In the same passage (3.12.2), which we quoted above, Aristotle continues by remarking that 'speeches by writers appear meagre in debate; those by orators, however well read, look amateurish. The reason is that they are only suited to debate; for this reason the histrionic features, when delivery is absent, do not fulfill their function'. Two features of the agonistic style that he identifies are asyndeton and repetition. The two figures, he notes, are disapproved of in the written style but are used by orators in the agonistic style because they lend themselves to delivery (*hupokritika).* But, he advises, one must vary expression when repeating the same things for this opens the way to delivery. That is to say the effectiveness of the agonistic style very much depends on the presence of certain stylistic features that lend themselves to declamation and delivery, and, I would argue, that the effectiveness and success of Demosthenes' mature style depended to a large degree on his success at declamation.

Declamation and Delivery

There is some evidence that Demosthenes' speeches were well received by the Athenians. According to Plutarch (*Dem.* 11.3), Demosthenes 'considered the tone and delivery of those speaking so important for persuasion. Accordingly his delivery was wondrously pleasing to the many, but men of refinement, like Demetrius of Phalerum (fr. 137), considered his affectation mean, ignoble and weak.' For Demosthenes what mattered most was how his speech affected the crowd to which he played; oratory for oratory's sake alone was not important, but a positive reception by the *dêmos*, and this, it seems, was achieved as much through the delivery of the speech as through those many remarkably written passages of *tour de force*, which in any case could only carried off by an orator who had learned to control his breathing as Demosthenes had,[55] and this was the skill of an actor, who also knew how to vary his expression and add the appropriate gesture.

That Demosthenes' declamation left an impression with his audience is evident from the criticism he received from his contemporaries. Aeschines (3. 167) describes how Demosthenes whirled around on the *bêma* to emphasize how he stirred up revolt against Philip in various places, and the two short clauses quoted by Aeschines abound in repetition, a figure that aided in delivery. Demosthenes responds (18.232) to the invective by complaining that Aeschines had mimicked his words and gestures, as if what happened to Greece depended on him using a certain word, or making this gesture or that. Despite Demosthenes' attempt to deflect the criticism, what comes across is a clear indication of the careful consideration that went into Demosthenes' choice of words and corresponding gestures. In another context (2.4) Aeschines warns of Demosthenes' beguiling antitheses, which were deliberately conceived to do him harm. And such antitheses were regularly parodied by the comic poets,[56] who also mention a metrical oath that he once swore in the assembly ([Plut.] *Vit. X* 845 b). Both Demetrius of Phalerum (fr.135A) and Eratosthenes of Cyrene (Plut. *Dem.* 9.4) picked up on the comic poets. Demetrius noted how Demosthenes swore

[55] Pearson, 'The Virtuoso Passages', 214–30; cf. Hall, 'Lawcourt Dramas', 47–48.

[56] Timocles fr. 12 KA; Antiphanes fr. 167 KA; Alexis fr. 212 KA; Anaxilas Fr. 8 KA. Cf. Aes. 3.83; the particular antithesis parodied by the comic poets centred on Philip's offer to return Halonnesus, which Demosthenes argued against accepting, 'if he gave but not returned it.'

the oath as one possessed (*hôsper enthousiônta*); Eratosthenes added that often in his speeches he became frenzied or theatrical (*parabakchon*). Apparently Demosthenes could at times become overly theatrical in his rhetorical performances on the political stage and we can well image the kinds of gesturing that accompanied the invective against Asechines' mother, who was nicknamed Empousa because she did it all and submitted to it all.

The Peripatetics had taken particular note of Demosthenes in their discussions about delivery (*hupokrisis).* The subject was divided into two broad areas of discussion, intonation and gesture. Aristotle himself had dealt with the subject only summarily (3.1 & 12) and defined delivery primarily as a matter of voice, how to use it to express each emotion, with what level of volume, with what pitch and with what rhythm (3.1: 1403 b26). Thus when he discussed asyndeton and repetition, histrionic feature suited for delivery, he spoke only in terms of variation of expression and tone (3.12: 1413 b22). The question of gesticulation was largely ignored, though elsewhere he hints at its importance.[57] This was left to his students, Theophrastus and Demetrius of Phalerum to elaborate more fully. And what we find in sources that draw on these Peripatetics is a sense that Demosthenes took a keen interest in developing these two areas of his delivery, for he clearly recognized their importance in rhetorical performances.

In his *prolegomena* to Hermogenes' work *On Issues* (176:12–177.8 Rabe) Athanasius introduces a summary of Theophrastus' views by first commenting that 'delivery exists to conform the gesture, the gaze and the voice to well spoken words, as would the best tragic actor; gesticulation appropriate for rhetoric is not to be overdone in one gesture or another' (*mê dia tou perittou pros ti schêma ekpesein*). Athanasius goes on to note that Andronicus the actor was the first to introduce delivery but Demosthenes failed in declamation but testified to its importance in rhetoric, by replying, when he had been asked what rhetoric might be, with the simple answer delivery, something that the actor Polus taught him. Athanasius continues: 'In like manner (to Demosthenes) Theophrastus (fr. 712 Fortenbaugh) the philosopher says that delivery is the greatest help in persuasion for an orator, referring (when he said this) to

[57] At *Rhet.* 2. 8 (1386 a33) Aristotle notes that pity can be aroused by gestures (*schêmasi*), voice (*phônais*), dress (*esthêti*) and delivery in general (*hypokrisei*). At 3. 7 (1408 b7) he warns against excessive correspondence between style and delivery; if the words are harsh, the voice and facial expression should not be.

the principles and emotions of the soul and the knowledge of these so that the movement of the body and the intonation of the voice are brought in harmony with the whole science'. Apparently Theophrastus had divided the subject of delivery into gesturing and intonation and discussed these in terms of psychology, particularly the emotions, as Aristotle had suggested for the voice.[58]

What is important for our discussion is the connection drawn between Theophrastus' view of delivery's importance in rhetoric and that of Demosthenes, who is also singled out by Demetrius of Phalerum for the importance he attached to delivery. In chapter 53 of his essay, *On the Style of Demosthenes,* Dionysius of Halicarnassus notes that delivery is a necessary virtue of agonistic speeches if they are to be convincing and animated; Demosthenes showed much care in this area as in others. 'Seeing that delivery was twofold in nature, he studied both aspects thoroughly, working hard on the intonation of his voice and the movements of his body for the best possible effect, though by nature he was not well suited for such exertions, as Demetrius (fr. 136) and other writers note.' In this context Demetrius (fr. 137: Plut. *Dem.* 11.1) reported, apparently on the authority of Demosthenes himself, a number of exercises used by orator to correct an indistinctness in his speech and to improve his delivery: reciting speeches with a mouth of full of pebbles, exercising his voice as he ran or climbed a hill, reciting speeches or verses in a single breath and practising his declamation before a mirror. The result in Demetrius' estimation (fr. 134: Phld. 1. 197 Sudh.) was that Demosthenes 'became an actor (*hupokritên*) whose delivery was intricate and overdone, not simple and of noble fashion but inclined to what is rather soft and mean.' To men of refinement like Demetrius, Demosthenes' delivery seemed over-the-top, designed to please the masses, the mean, ignoble and corrupt elements of society. There is an obvious hint of moral censure here that echoes Aristotle.[59]

But in many ways Demosthenes was following the trend of his time. Aristotle himself had noted a direct correlation between recent developments in drama and in contemporary rhetoric. According to Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 3.1.3), 'delivery had only lately appeared in tragedy and rhapsody, since poets first used to act themselves.' And the same phenomenon, he notes, is also happening in rhetoric. According to Aristotle, those who master all aspects of delivery (volume, pitch and rhythm)

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[58] Arist. *Rh.* 3.1 (1403 b 28); cf. 3.12 (1413 b9).

[59] On this point, see Cooper, 'Philosophers, Politics, Academics', 231–32.

win all the prizes at the dramatic contests, and 'just as the actors now have greater influence than the poets, so it is in political contests because of the corruption of the forms government.' Although Aristotle himself felt (3.1.5) that the whole subject of delivery was in itself vulgar, it was necessary, since the business of rhetoric was all about persuading public opinion. And delivery, he notes (3.1.5), has this power to persuade because of the corruption of the listener. Demosthenes, who evidently could please the corrupt crowd, knew what the business of rhetoric was all about; it was about persuading public opinion and the style of his oratory with its emphasis on histrionic performance was aimed at just that.

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STAGING LITERACY IN PLAUTUS

NIALL W. SLATER

Literacy and its technologies are an accepted and indeed widespread part of the world of Plautine comedy. Unlike the plays of Old Comedy,[1] the comedies of Plautus often rely on the written word as a fundamental part of their plot mechanisms. At the same time, some of the jokes are very elementary indeed, appealing to the minimally literate rather than the most sophisticated part of the Roman audience. In part this varied picture of literacy reflects the dual origins of Roman comedy from both borrowed scripts of Greek New Comedy and the native Italic improvisational forms, but the surviving references do not neatly divide into two categories, Greek and Roman. The public performance of these plays implies a Roman audience for whom literacy and its uses were very familiar but still often suspect. Plautus's staging of literacy in his plays taps that suspicion as part of his broad Saturnalian inversion of the ordinary strictures of Roman life.

The most elementary jokes about literacy are almost certainly Plautus's own creations. Jokes which turn on Latin spelling must be Roman additions. In the *Mercator*, the old man Demipho announces that he has begun school that day and already learned some letters:

> DEM. Hodie ire in ludum occepi litterarium,
> Lysimache. ternas scio iam. LYS. Quid ternas? DEM. Amo.
> (*Merc.* 303–4)
>
> Dem. Today I started going to school to learn my letters,
> Lysimachus. I already know three. Lys. What three? Dem. A. M. O.

The joke invokes a typical Saturnalian inversion, the senex as student,[2] using one of the simplest spellings possible.

Schools themselves were a relative novelty at Rome. A certain Spurius Carvilius, freedman of the consul of 234 B.C. of the same name, opened the first *ludus litterarius* at Rome (Plut., *Moralia* 278e). Gregor Vogt-Spira suggests that two passages in the *Asinaria* (693–94 and 865–

[1] For the picture of literacy there, see N.W. Slater, "Literacy and Old Comedy," in *Voice Into Text: Orality and Literacy in Ancient Greece*, ed. Ian Worthington (Leiden, 1996), 99–112.

[2] P.J. Enk, *Plauti Mercator*. 2 vols. (Leiden, 1932) *ad loc.*

66) with catalogues of names in alphabetical order parody the syllabaries and other learning techniques of such schools.[3] In one the clever slave Libanus demands that his young master's mistress address him with endearments:

> dic igitur med aneticulam, columbam vel catellum,
> hirundinem, monerulam, passerculum putillum ... (*Asin.* 693–94)
>
> So call me your little ducky, dove or puppy,
> swallow, jackdaw, your teeny weeny sparrow ...

In the later passage, the matrona recites an alphabetical list of friends her husband claims to have been visiting (*Asin.* 865–66). Where the old man in *Mercator* became a schoolboy, here women and slaves assume the role of dictating schoolmaster. The Saturnalian inversion empowers the jokes, even for those of the audience who do not hear the echo of the school room.

A comic exchange in the *Aulularia* involves another three letter spelling as a set-up to an untranslatable pun, although there seems to be even more going on. The slave Strobilus is bringing two wrangling cooks home:

> STR. sed uter vostrorum est celerior? memora mihi.
> ANT. ego, ut multo melior. STR. coquom ego, non furem rogo.
> ANT. coquom ergo dico. STR. quid tu ais? CON. sic sum ut vides.
> ANT. coquos ille nundinale'st, in nonum diem
> solet ire coctum. CON. tun, trium litterarum homo,
> me vituperas? fur. ANT. etiam fur, trifurcifer. (*Aul.* 321–26)
>
> Str. But which of you is faster? Tell me.
> Ant. I am, and much better. Str. I mean as a cook, not a thief.
> Ant. I say, as a cook. Str. What do you say? Con. I am as you see.
> Ant. As a cook he's a nine-day wonder; he usually goes cooking every
> ninth day. Con. Hey, you three-letter man,
> are you insulting me? You're the F. U. R. Ant. You're a thief too, you
> condemned triple threat thief.

Plautus caters for all tastes and skill levels here.[4] Even an illiterate will hear the sound play which turns *fur* into *trifurcifer*, which taps into the rich tradition of punishment jokes in Roman comedy. An audience member with at least rudimentary spelling skills might guess that a

[3] G. Vogt-Spira, "Plauto fra teatro greco e superamento della farsa italica. Proposta di un modello triadico," *QUCC* 58 (1998), 111–35; 127 n. 47.

[4] For a good appreciation of the comedy of the scene and its Romanness, see E. Lefèvre, *Plautus' Aulularia* (Tübingen, 2001), 108.

"three-letter man" was a thief. Finally, there may be an even more complex level, using numbers and letters, to the conundrum joke set up by Anthrax calling Congrio a *coquos ... nundinale.* Plautus loves this form of joke. Anthrax calls his rival a *nundinale*, then explains what that means. If, however, a *fur* is a three-letter man, a *trifur*-[5] is a thrice three-letter or nine-letter man, echoing the nine root in *nundiale.*

Let me suggest a visual aspect to the game being played here with the alphabetic form of Roman numerals. A Roman three is three vertical strokes. A Roman nine is the same three strokes with two of them crossed. The *furca* was a Y-shaped piece of wood that could be used either as a mobile instrument of torture and punishment or, when fixed, as an instrument of execution.[6] The cross as instrument of execution did not always look like the standard Christian cross but could also resemble an X, also called traditionally a St. Andrews cross. Might a human figure affixed to either an X-shaped cross or a Y-shaped *furca* look something like all three strokes superimposed? See the figure below for one essay in this visual game of what a *trifurcifer* or "triple cross man" might look like:



fig. 1

Yet basic alphabetic literacy is not treated as a very complex skill in Plautus. Sophoclidisca, a maidservant to the courtesan in the *Persa* protests that she has learned a lot about following orders in her years with her mistress and clinches the point by saying:

> nam equidem te iam sector quintum hunc annum, quom interea, credo,
> ovis si in ludum iret, potuisset iam fieri ut probe litteras sciret ...
>
> (*Persa* 172–73)

> I've served you for five years now; in that time, I think,
> if a sheep went to school, it could learn its letters quite well.

[5] Euclio later calls Strobilus a *trifur* (633). The audience probably therefore hears at 326 "*etiam fur, trifur*" before the latter word turns into *trifurcifer*. While W. Wagner, *T. Macci Plauti Aulularia* (Cambridge and London, 1876; repr. New York 1979) *ad* 324 notes they are not the same word, Plautus certainly plays on the sound connection.

[6] *OLD* s.v. 2c, 3.

One should keep in mind the fiction of Greek setting here. Whether female slaves in general in Rome were as sophisticated about reading and writing as Sophoclidisca is here might still be an open question, but she is presented to the Roman audience as an imaginable version of a slave girl.

Another letter joke from the *Aulularia* relies on visual form in a way which implies recognition of different kinds of writing. The old woman servant in Euclio's house is so worried about her young mistress's fate that she contemplates suicide thus:

> neque quicquam meliu'st mihi,
> ut opinor, quam ex me ut unam faciam litteram
> longam, meum laqueo collum quando opstrinxero. (*Aul.* 76–78)

> I think there's nothing better for me
> than to make one long letter out of myself
> when I hang my neck in a noose.

Most translators assume with Paul Nixon in the Loeb that the letter in question is "I."[7] This seems not necessarily clear to me,[8] but the specific letter is less important than its associations. Note the expression "long letter," which seems to parallel an expression the slave Gripus uses in the *Rudens*:

> cubitum hercle longis litteris signabo iam usquequaque,
> si quis perdiderit vidulum cum auro atque argento multo,
> ad Gripum ut veniat. (*Rud.* 1294–96)

> I'll advertise everywhere, by heaven, in long letters a cubit high,
> if anyone's lost a chest with a lot of gold and silver,
> he should come to Gripus.

Long letters then are the letter forms of wall inscriptions, such as we see in the painted notices at Pompeii,[9] the opposite of private

[7] Compare, for example, Palmer Bovie in D.R. Slavitt and P. Bovie, *Plautus: The Comedies*, vol. II (Baltimore, Md., 1995), 99. E. Segal, *Plautus: Four Comedies*. Oxford, 1996), 239 finds the joke "indecipherable" and omits it from his translation, but his note makes the same assumption. The discussion goes back to Lipsius's remarks in Gronovius's edition of 1664: these are cited with full discussion at Lefèvre, *Plautus' Auluaria*, 124 and n. 502. Cf. Wagner, *Auluaria*, *ad loc.*

[8] Lipsius argues that "I" is truly long because it sticks up above even the other capital letters—but that implies monumental capitals of a later period.

[9] "Long letters" also occur at *Poenulus* 836–37, where a slave speaks of wine jars with names painted on: *ibi tu videas litteratas fictilis epistulas, / pice signatas, nomina insunt cubitum longis litteris.* I take these to be painted ownership inscriptions, and therefore also public rather than private writing, but the passage is difficult.

handwriting in tablets or on papyrus. The next figure shows a notice from Pompeii:[10]

fig. 2

While these letter forms are two and a half centuries later than Plautus, they may still suggest the public face of writing in his time. Returning to the situation of the old woman in *Aulularia*, we see that to make a long letter of herself would be to demonstrate publicly her own honor as well as that of her young mistress, writing with and on the body.[11] It is of course not surprising that a Roman audience would be familiar with the specific form of lettering used for such notices. Gripus's joke in *Rudens* about advertising does not rely closely on the form of the letters he would use, and so might well stem from the Greek original, but the old woman's reference in *Aulularia* does rely specifically on the "long letter" form and so looks like a Plautine innovation for his Roman audience.

Perhaps more interesting is the familiarity with the letter forms of private writing implied by some of the opening jokes in the *Pseudolus*. The young master Callidorus gives Pseudolus a letter to read:

CAL. cape has tabellas, tute hinc narrato tibi
quae me miseria et cura contabefacit.
PSE. mos tibi geretur. sed quid hoc, quaeso? CAL. quid est?
PSE. ut opinor, quaerunt litterae hae sibi liberos:
alia aliam scandit. CAL. ludis iam ludo tuo?
PSE. has quidem pol credo nisi Sibulla legerit,
interpretari alium potesse neminem.
CAL. qur inclementer dicis lepidis litteris
lepidis tabellis lepida conscriptis manu?

[10] After H. H. Tanzer, *The Common People of Pompeii: A Study of the Graffiti* (Baltimore, 1939), fig. 46. One "I" is indeed lengthened below the line, but so is the first stroke of one "R."

[11] Female suicide makes public that which is normally private. While the form of the humor here is Roman, it may well tap into Greek tradition, reaching back to Euripides' portrayal of Phaedra and her suicide in Euripides' *Hippolytus*. For Phaedra's identification with the hidden writing inside her tablet (*deltos*) and the whole theme of inside and outside, see F. Zeitlin, "The Power of Aphrodite," in *Playing the Other* (Chicago 1996), esp. 243–47.

PSE. an, opsecro hercle, habent quas gallinae manus?
nam has quidem gallina scripsit. CAL. odiosus mihi es.
lege vel tabellas redde. PSE. immo enim pellegam. (*Ps.* 20–31)
Cal. Takes these tablets; hence inform yourself
what misery and care wither me.
Ps. This favor will be granted you. But what's this? Cal. What?
Ps. I think these letters seek to beget children:
one climbs on top of the other. Cal. Playing your own joke, now?
Ps. By heaven, I don't think anyone but the Sibyl could read this;
no one else can penetrate it.
Cal. Why do you make fun of lovely letters written in
lovely tablets by a lovely hand?
Ps. Say, do chickens have hands?
A chicken scratched this, for sure. Cal. You're being hateful.
Read, or give back the tablets. Ps. I'll read them, I'll read them.

Again, the form of comic by-play here suggests a Roman context and Plautine innovation.[12] Even the worst Greek hands seem relatively disciplined when compared to Roman handwriting, especially in the latter's tendency to use strokes which do not connect to form single letters nonetheless, as John R. Clark has suggested in a recent article on this passage.[13] I show as the next figure an alphabet of what Bernhard Bischoff calls the "wax tablet script" as a means of imagining the form of the letter Pseudolus is reading:[14]



fig. 3

Let us move on to the functions of literacy within the plots of Roman comedy. C.W. Marshall has suggested, in an excellent paper given to the Classical Association of Canada in 2002 which he generously

[12] G. Jachmann, "Zum Pseudolus des Plautus," *Philologus* 88 (1933) 443–56; 451: "die ganze Häufung der Witzmotive über die schlechte Schrift unattisch ist." Cf. Vogt-Spira, "Plauto ... un modello triadico," 125 and n. 37, 128 n. 48. For the staging of the letter here, see G. Monaco, "L'epistola nel teatro antico," *Dioniso* 39 (1965), 334–51; 334–40.

[13] J.R. Clark, "Early Latin Handwriting and Plautus' *Pseudolus*," *CJ* 97 (2001–02) 183–89.

[14] B. Bischoff, *Latin Palaeography: Antiquity and the Middle Ages*, trans. D. Cróinin and D. Ganz (Cambridge 1990), 56. Figure after Clark, "Early Latin Handwriting," 185.

shared with me,[15] that one function of literacy in the plays is to allow an actor to stage the presence of an absent character. As Patricia Rosenmeyer has shown, this use of letters is one of the innovations of Euripidean tragedy.[16] Indeed the letter is often identified with the distressed heroine herself and exploited for pathos, as in the *Iphigenaia in Tauris*, where Pylades' delivery of the letter to Orestes onstage reunites brother and sister and prefigures her ultimate deliverance. Pathos in Euripides becomes farce in Plautus, as the metaphor of woman as letter is literalized. At the same time, as Vogt-Spira notes, the written text is reclaimed for improvisation.[17] Just before Pseudolus finally reads the letter he says:

> PSE. tuam amicam video, Calidore. CAL. ubi ea est, opsecro?
> PSE. eccam in tabellis porrectam: in cera cubat. (*Ps.* 35–36)

> Ps. I see your girlfriend, Calidorus. Cal. Where?
> Ps. Right there, stretched out on the tablets; she's lying in wax.

As Rosenmeyer observes of letters on stage (but it is also true of written documents in general) they are in themselves almost anti-dramatic: they must be staged in particular ways to give voice to their contents available and enable them to act kinetically upon the plot. The jokes about literacy we have looked at so far present it as humorously familiar. Literacy in action, however, is another matter. I will argue that the written word in Plautus's plays regularly functions subversively in two ways: first, in its capacity to transgress boundaries, and second (and more Platonically) in its capacity for misinterpretation or misappropriation.

The normal social staging of literacy at Rome was for the master or patron to dictate to a writing dependent (or listen to one reading), and Plautus gives us examples of this scenario. Pyrgopolynices in the *Miles* seems to be dictating his memoirs on and off to his parasite Artotrogus:

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[15] "Plautus, Literacy, Shtick," CAC, May 2002.

[16] P.A. Rosenmeyer, *Ancient Epistolary Fictions: The Letter in Greek Literature* (Cambridge, 2001), esp. chapter 4. She notes of Euripides (94): "The letter itself may be understood as a miniature script within the larger context of the memorized lines of the whole tragedy; when brought on stage, it is as if the actor were coming forth with a newly written scene from the author, a fresh angle on a familiar story." Letters in tragedy then represent innovation and even improvisation within established myth. In comedy they can be a competing script; so N.W. Slater, *Plautus in Performance: The Theatre of the Mind* (Princeton, 1985), 132; 2nd ed., rev. (Amsterdam, 2000), 108: "We have seen the typical New Comedy dilemma handed to Pseudolus as a script in the form of a letter."

[17] Vogt-Spira, "Plauto ... un modello triadico," 126.

Pyrg. habes–Art. tabellas vis rogare? habeo, et stilum.
Pyrg. facete advortis tuom animum ad animum meum.
Art. novisse mores tuos me meditate decet
curamque adhibere, ut praeolat mihi quod tu velis.
Pyrg. ecquid **meministi**? Art. **memini**: centum in Cilicia
et quinquaginta, centum in Scytholatronia,
triginta Sardos, sexaginta Macedones
† sunt homines† quos tu occidisti uno die.
Pyrg. quanta istaec hominum summast? Art. septem milia.
Pyrg. tantum esse oportet. recte rationem tenes.
Art. at nullos habeo scriptos: sic **memini** tamen. (*Miles* 38–48)

Pyrg. Do you have ...? Art. Tablets, you mean? I do, and a stylus.
Pyrg. You cleverly give your attention to my intention ... .

The parasite goes on to list the body counts in the soldier's conquests, a hundred here, a hundred fifty there. When the soldier asks (line 46), "What's the total of men?" even the minimally numerate in the audience know that "seven thousand" is not the right answer. We cannot be sure precisely how Artotrogus delivered line 48 ("I've written none of it down, but I still remember it"), but it is an interesting question nonetheless. The first part of the line might well be an aside to the audience, to assure them he has written down no such nonsense as he has just been reciting. It could also be delivered to the soldier as a gross flattery: his deeds are so great they can be remembered without being written down. But the subversive potential of the scene is there in either case, to greater or lesser degree. Since Artotrogus has not in fact written any of these empty boasts down, the memoirs are not being written. The soldier himself might even be illiterate, unable to discover what in fact the parasite writes down. This moment is potentially a satire of the difference between oral and written *kleos*, for the language insists that the parasite remembers all these deeds (note the highlighted verb forms)—but none of it ends up committed to writing.

The dictation scene in the *Asinaria* brings us to the issue of boundaries and their subversion. The soldier Diabolus, rival of the young hero for the affections of the courtesan Philaenium, has composed a contract for her services which he has his parasite read out and correct on stage. Diabolus sees literacy as a threat to his control of the woman, as the contract provisions show:

aut quod illa dicat peregre allatam epistulam,
ne epistula quidem ulla sit in aedibus
nec cerata adeo tabula; et si qua inutilis
pictura sit, eam vendat: ni in quadriduo

abalienarit, quo aps te argentum acceperit,
tuos arbitratus sit, comburas, si velis,
ne illi sit cera ubi facere possit litteras. (*Asin.* 761–67)

Since she may say she's gotten a letter from abroad,
she's not to have *any* letter in the house,
not even a wax tablet, and if she has any
unsuitable picture, let her sell it. If she doesn't sell it
in four days, after she takes your cash,
you have the right to burn it, if you want,
so she has no wax to write letters with.

Obviously, the soldier wants to keep her from receiving letters from other lovers, and his jealous paranoia taps deeply into the comedy of obsession, but the details here are even more interesting. He fears she will say a letter is "from abroad," *peregre*. He could simply forbid all letters—and does—but why give this reason? Possibly he imagines a "letter from abroad" could be the proffered explanation for one written in a different language or some kind of code. And what is the "unsuitable picture" (*inutilis pictura*) that he forbids? Probably something erotic,[18] and since he will want her to be aroused only by himself, this seems sufficient explanation—until the contract gives the reason *why* the soldier might wish to burn such a painting: so she will not have wax to write letters with. There seems to be no textual problem here nor anything missing. Small portable paintings were often in encaustic technique, the colored pigments fixed in wax. Does the soldier imagine her scratching a message into the surface of the painting and sending it off to another lover, or scraping wax off the surface to make her own letter tablet?[19] Either is sufficiently ludicrous, but both show the soldier's fear that the written word could more easily subvert his control of the girl than oral communication. And there is one more irony: the means of control he proposes. The contract begins with the obvious provision

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[18] And movable, since it can be sold and removed from the house. This might be an erotic panel painting with small doors to cover it, such as we see represented in the background of an erotic scene on a bronze mirror cover found on the Palatine, illustrated on the cover of A. Richlin, ed., *Pornography and Representation in Greece & Rome* (New York, 1992) and in J.R. Clarke, *Looking at Lovemaking* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1998) fig. 60 (discussion 166–69). Cf. also Molly Myerowitz, "The Domestication of Desire: Ovid's *Parva Tabella* and the Theater of Love," in Richlin, *Pornography and Representation*, 131–57; 145–47.

[19] J.H. Gray, *T. Macci Plauti Asinaria* (Cambridge, 1894) *ad* 763 says simply "The idea is that she might use the wax of the picture as a writing-tablet."

that she is not to entertain any other men, no matter who she claims them to be. How is she to do this?

> in foribus scribat occupatam esse se. (*Asin.* 760)
>
> Let her post a notice on her door that she's busy.

The written word is required then to defend the household's integrity against the dangers posed by literacy.

Since soldiers are often rivals in Plautus, it may be no more than coincidence that the written word often figures in deceiving them, but there might also have been a particular satisfaction in showing that writing was much harder to control than persons themselves who could be intimidated by physical force. In the *Miles Gloriosus* the title character carries off a courtesan from Athens while her young lover is away. His faithful slave Palaestrio sets sail to carry this news to his master in person but is captured at sea and then given as a slave to his same *miles*. What he could not manage in person, he then does by letter:

> ego quoniam inspexi mulieris sententiam,
> cepi tabellas, consignavi, clanculum
> dedi mercatori cuidam, qui ad illum deferat (*Mil.* 129–31)
>
> As soon as I saw how the woman felt,
> I took tablets, sealed them, gave them secretly
> to a certain merchant who carried them to him [that is, his Athenian master]

The letter escaping the soldier's control prefigures the movements of the heroine who is already at the play's beginning visiting her newly arrived Athenian lover through an opening dug between two houses and who will be completely freed from the soldier by the action of the plot.

Finally, the clever slave can write and re-write the plots of the plays themselves. Pseudolus in his play and Chrysalus in the *Bacchides* are outstanding examples. The opening of the *Pseudolus* shows how central control of reading and writing is in that play. Here is the opening of the letter he finally reads:

> PSE. "Phoenicium Calidoro amatori suo
> per ceram et lignum litterasque interpretes
> salutem impertit et salutem abs te expetit
> lacrumans titubanti animo, corde et pectore."
> CAL. perii! salutem nusquam invenio, Pseudole,
> quam illi remittam. PSE. quam salutem? CAL. argenteam.

PSE. pro ligneam salute vis argenteam
remittere illi? vide sis quam tu rem geras. (*Ps.* 41–48)

Ps. "To her lover Calidorus Phoenicium sends
via wax and wood and messenger letters
salutation and seeks salutation from you,
weeping with trembling spirit, heart, and bosom."
Cal. I'm done for! Pseudolus, I'll never find that salutation
to send her. Ps. What salutation? Cal. A silver one.
Ps. You want to return her wooden salutation
in silver? Watch out how you're handling things, please!

It seems relatively certain that nothing like line 42 appeared in any Greek original: this is Plautus, setting up the joke about "silver salutation," the money needed to buy her freedom, but also highlighting the constructedness of this situation. Out of wax, wood, and letters Pseudolus the poet proceeds to construct his plot. In his great soliloquy he frames himself as such, and apparently as a literate rather than primarily oral poet:[20]

sed quasi poeta, tabulas quom cepit sibi,
quaerit quod nusquam gentium'st, reperit tamen,
facit illud veri simile quod mendacium est,
nunc ego poeta fiam: viginti minas,
quae nunc nusquam sunt gentium, inveniam tamen. (*Ps.* 401–5)

But just like a poet, when he takes up his tablets,
seeking what exists nowhere on earth, yet finding it,
makes a lie seem very truth,
now I'll become a poet. Those twenty minae
which now are nowhere on earth, I'll find all the same.

His plot in fact proves to be an improvisational one. A chance encounter with Harpax, the messenger from the soldier, and a little quick role-playing put him in possession of both money and the letter from the soldier, authorizing the delivery of Phoenicium to the bearer of the letter. Pseudolus recruits Simia to play the messenger, and thereby acquires Phoenicium for his master, Callidorus. Given that the plot succeeds through improvisation and misappropriation of a written text, we might wonder at the imagery for writing here. In the end, Pseudolus writes nothing. Yet the image may still be appropriate, even finely calibrated to the kind of writing. In a previous publication I rather

[20] Vogt-Spira, "Plauto ... un modello triadico," 131 suggests the passage expresses Plautus's own pride in being a literate, rather than purely improvisatory, creator of comedy.

mistranslated the end of line 401 as "when he takes pen in hand."[21] The tablets are in fact key here: they are the correct medium for writing which is not yet fixed, for writing and rewriting. Letters in the Greek and Roman world were written on both papyrus and wax tablets,[22] but only the latter were subject to easy rewriting.

Chrysalus in the *Bacchides* shows us this kind of improvisational literacy. I will not attempt to summarize the tangled and controversial skein of deceptions and multiple letters which constitute this play's plot, but call attention only to some of the imagery and power of literacy here. Again, literacy has the power to subvert boundaries, real and metaphorical. The rich military and especially Trojan imagery of this play has been studied by Jocelyn, among others.[23] In the hands of Chrysalus, a letter becomes the essential weapon of assault:

> nam ego has tabellas opsignatas, consignatas quas fero
> non sunt tabellae, sed equos quem misere Achivi ligneum.
> ...
> tum quae hic sunt scriptae litterae, hoc in equo insunt milites
> armati atque animati probe. (*Bacch.* 935–36, 941–42)

> For these signed and sealed tablets I'm carrying
> are not tablets, but the wooden horse the Achaeans sent ...
> Then the letters written in here are the soldiers in the horse,
> armed and ready for action.

In the absence of the parallel passage from Menander's *Dis Exapaton*, we cannot be sure, but again I suspect Plautine innovation here, not just from the characteristic assonance of *armati atque animati*, but the whole bold conception of the tablet as wooden horse, stuffed with animate letters ready to leap into the fray. It is also just possible that this image is a deliberate transformation of one used by the Greek comic poet Antiphanes, who wrote a play entitled *Sappho*. His Sappho seems to have been the figure of the later biographical tradition, who killed herself after an unhappy love affair. In fragment 194 K-A. Sappho propounds a riddle about a feminine being who keeps under her bosom her voiceless offspring who nonetheless cry out. Her interlocutor guesses that it is a city (*polis*), whose leaders speak out but are unheeded by the populace. Sappho says such leaders are never really

21 Slater, *Plautus in Performance*, 126 (2nd ed., 103–4).

22 We should note that the plays of Plautus give evidence only for letters on tablets.

23 H.D. Jocelyn, "Chrysalus and the Fall of Troy," *HSCP* 73 (1969), 135–52; M.S. Jensen, "The Fall of Troy in Plautus' *Bacchides*," *C&M* 48 (1997) 315–23, is more sympathetic to Plautus's artistry here.

voiceless; her answer to the riddle is a letter (*epistole*), as a mother, and the alphabetic letters (*grammata*) which it contains as her babies.[24] The Antiphanes passage thus contrasts the city and the written word. Has Plautus, or perhaps an unknown intermediate Greek poet, transformed that image of the pregnant letter into the Trojan horse, pregnant with the deadly male soldiers who will overwhelm the citadel of the city here?

The old master Nicobulus believes that words can be kept in bounds and controlled. He accepts a letter from his son that Chrysalus hands him and trusts it because it is properly sealed:

> numquam edepol quicquam temere credam Chrysalo;
> verum lubet etiam mi has pellegere denuo:
> aequom'st tabellis consignatis credere. (*Bacch.* 922–24)

> By heaven I'll never rashly trust Chrysalus at all again;
> still, I want to read this through once more;
> you ought to trust sealed tablets.

The problem, however, is not whether the letter has indeed been written by his son—it has been—but whether he can trust what his son says. Some letters are in fact lies, but the key letter in this play in fact tells nothing but the truth—but not the whole truth. Chrysalus has already once deceived old Nicobulus and been exposed as a trickster when he must undertake the task again. Chrysalus does so by dictating a letter for his young master Mnesilochus to write to the old man. As Marshall and Jensen note, this lively scene also enacts a reversal of the usual hierarchy of power of dictating master and writing subordinate (as with Diabolus and his parasite in the *Asinaria*).[25] What gives this scene and this letter its peculiar power, however, is that everything Chrysalus has Mnesilochus write is in fact the truth—but far from the whole truth:

> CHR. scribe. MNE. quid scribam? CHR. salutem tuo patri verbis tuis.
> PIS. quid si potius morbum, mortem scribat? id erit rectius.
> CHR. ne interturba. MNE. iam imperatum in cera inest. CHR. dic quem ad modum.
> MNE. "Mnesilochus salutem dicit suo patri." CHR. adscribe hoc cito:
> "Chrysalus mihi usque quaque loquitur nec recte, pater,
> quia tibi aurum reddidi et quia non te defrudaverim ...
> ... "nunc, pater mi, proin tu ab eo ut caveas tibi:
> sycophantias componit, aurum ut aps ted auferat;

[24] See J. Svenbro, *Phrasikleia: An Anthropology of Reading in Ancient Greece*, trans. J. Lloyd (Ithaca 1993), 158–59, and Rosenmeyer, *Ancient Epistolary Fictions*, 96 on this passage.

[25] Marshall, "Plautus, Literacy, Shtick;" Jensen, "The Fall of Troy," 323.

et profecto se ablaturum dixit." plane adscribito.
MNE. dic modo. CHR. "atque id pollicetur se daturum aurum mihi
quod dem scortis quodque in lustris comedim, congraecem, pater.
sed, pater, vide ne tibi hodie verba det: quaeso cave.

(*Bacch.* 731–36; 739–44)

Chr. Write. Mn. What shall I write? Chr. Well wishes to your father in your own words.
Pis. How about if he writes disease and death? That'll be better.
Chr. Don't interrupt. Mn. Your commands are in wax. Chr. Repeat it back.
Mn. "Mnesilochus wishes his father well." Chr. Write this down fast:
"Chrysalus keeps talking at me everywhere, Dad, and not nicely,
because I gave you your money back and didn't cheat you ...
... So now, Dad, protect yourself against him;
he's plotting some scheme to get the gold from you." Write that plainly.
Mn. Go on. Chr. "And he promises he'll give me the cash
to spend on hookers and live it up, Greek-style, Dad.
But Dad, see you don't let him trick you today. Watch out, please."

As far as it goes, this is an absolutely accurate report of what Chrysalus has said and plans to do. Chrysalus's scheme works because he manages to stage a scene in which the old man spies on his son carrying on with a courtesan and comes to believe this letter is a lie, concocted by his son. He thus discounts the truth of the written letter, accepts the false evidence of his own eyes, and ends up trusting again the word of the slave who has already tricked him once in this play, Chrysalus.

Plautus inherited from Euripides and Greek New Comedy a repertoire of plot techniques exploiting literacy and especially personal letters. Already in Euripides we encounter letters containing both true and false information, and even in the *Palamedes* a forged letter. Nothing known to me in the Greek tradition, however, matches Plautus's tour de force here: a true letter designed to be disbelieved.

Literacy and its techniques are subordinate then to the improvisatory powers of the Plautine comic hero. He can steal others' texts and write them into his own plots or compose his own texts, true and false. The source of the texts ultimately does not matter, for Plautus's tricksters know it does not matter who writes the texts, so long as they interpret them.

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ORAL AND WRITTEN FORMS OF CLOSURE IN THE ANCIENT NOVEL

Stephen A. Nimis

The subject of this paper is closure in the ancient novels, but I will begin with an observation about the book divisions in Homer. Although the Homeric book divisions have long been thought to be Hellenistic in origin, the debate has been reopened lately, reexamining whether the divisions are artfully deployed or not and whether they reflect artistic intentions of the poet or not.[1] In his Martin Lectures on the performance of Greek and Latin poetry, Edwards takes an unusual approach to this traditional problem by an application of the insights of discourse analysis. By examining carefully not only the book divisions, but also other places where modern editors and translators mark paragraph indents, Edwards emphasizes the continuity and smoothness of Homeric diction at points where scene changes and other kinds of narrative articulation occur. What he shows is that the diction found at the book divisions do not represent pauses or stopping points in the narrative at all, but rather language designed to carefully make a smooth transition, if there is one, from one scene to another or one episode to another; rather than being natural boundaries that are designed, for example. to coincide with the end of a partial performance of the *Iliad* or *Odyssey*, the book endings share phraseology used throughout the epics to make the text a seamless and continuous whole. The conclusion of Edwards goes far beyond the position that the book divisions postdate the oral composition of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*:

> It is now clear that in actuality there are no narrative breaks within the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. Each is a seamless whole. When the poet is obliged to change his focus from one character to another, or move the action from one location to another, a link is provided, or the completed action

[1] Arguing for the artful deployment of book divisions by Homer is K. Stanley, *The Shield of Achilles* (Princeton, 1993); for their lateness and arbitrariness, O. Taplin, *Homeric Soundings* (Oxford University Press, 1992), 285–93. A reevaluation of the issue from numerous points of view can be found in M. S. Jensen, 'Dividing Homer: When and How were the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* divided into Songs?' *Symbolae Osloenses* 74 (1999), 5–91. A full bibliography can be found in B. Heiden, 'The Placement of "Book Divisions" in the *Iliad*,' *JHS* 118 (1998), 68 n. 2.

> is summarized and mildly contrasted with the action to come (*men ... de*). Often the change of focus happens in the middle of a verse, which obviously prevented any interruption in the discourse, The sequence of time, as has been long understood, proceeds continuously, one episode following after another.[2]

This conclusion confounds our intuitive ideas about the performance of these epics. For while no one believes that they were recited continuously *in toto* by a bard or even a group of bards, Edwards' conclusion seems to suggest that our texts as we have them do not acknowledge any kind of narrative break at all. Edwards cites examples in Serbo-Croatian poetry that have been put forward by Lord and Foley, where specific performative gestures and devices could bring a narrative or a portion of narrative to a halt, either as a temporary pause or as a conclusion, verbalized as something like: 'That isn't the end. I'll rest a little.'[3] Such pauses, however, would be a conclusion for the *performance*, not a *narrative* conclusion inscribed in out text of the[4] epics.

The point I want to take from this discussion is the distinction it implies between *performative* and *narrative* closure; for to the observation that Homer's book endings do not represent boundaries or stopping points in the narrative, we can add that neither do the endings of the poems. The final line of the *Iliad*, for example,

> 'Such was their funeral of Hector, breaker of horses,'

contains diction with parallels throughout the story at places of continuation and transition; and in fact some manuscripts have an additional line introducing the arrival of Penthesilea, the next episode in the cycle of the Trojan saga. My point is not that the funeral of Hector is such a bad place to stop–there have been ingenious defenses of it–but that neither of the two epics of Homer gives much attention to narrative closure at all; and I think we must deduce from this that closure was a performative event, something delegated to the physical presence of the performer, not to the verbal portion of the performance that we have preserved in our written down versions of those performances.[5] More-

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[2] M. Edwards, *Sound, Sense, and Rhythm: Listening to Greek and Latin Poetry* (Princeton, 2001), 58

[3] Edwards, *Sound*, 152.

[4] Heiden, 'Placement,' suggests a subtle narrative rationale for the book divisions in the *Iliad*, indicating moments of 'diversion' but not a strong sense of closure, the subject of this paper. He gives a different rationale for the *Odyssey*'s divisions, B. Heiden, 'The Placement of "Book Divisions" in the *Odyssey*,' *CPh* 95 (2000), 247–59.

[5] Irene de Jong notes that the final book of the *Odyssey* contains a number of closural

over, just as performance traditions must have developed a repertoire of non-verbal ways to bring a performance to a proper conclusion, so also narrative traditions that are not organized around a performer, such as the novel, will have to evolve more strictly narrative forms of closure that become part of the verbal portion of the story.

This dovetails with Bakhtin's characterization of the epic as a 'perennial middle' from a narrative standpoint, in contrast to the novel. Because of the epic's fixation on an 'absolute past' in which everything has always already happened, Bakhtin argues that the epic shows a certain indifference to beginnings and endings; whereas the novel, because it deals with the open-endedness of the future, lacks the epic's internal conclusiveness, thereby creating 'a sharp increase in demands of an external and formal completedness and exhaustiveness, especially in regard to the plot-line.'[6] Bakhtin was interested in this contrast with respect to certain thematic issues, particularly representations of time, and I will return to his distinctions below. What interests me about this contrast is its implication for the handling of closure that accompanies a transition from a discourse organized around the body and activity of a performer, to a discourse oriented more around the interpretive activity of a reader–and hence my title: written and oral forms of closure. What I want to talk about is the emergence of closural devices in narrative that is meant to be read rather than performed, as part of a larger transformation from performance to reading, what in other contexts I have called the trajectory from verse to prose.[7] The ancient novels are an important transitional moment in that trajectory: still beholden for the most part to the protocols of performance, but with an emerging sense of a discourse no longer centered around the activity of a performer, one that transfers more of the burden of interpretation onto a reader, who is still an emerging figure at this point in the history of discourse.

The question of how these novels actually circulated in antiquity is a matter about which we have no conclusive evidence, but it is possible to make a more modest claim that, unlike epic and drama, for example, novels don't imply or make provision for any context

motifs and devices, *A Narratological Commentary on the* Odyssey (Cambridge, 2001), 565–66. Nevertheless, the final scene itself seems awkward and abrupt.

[6] M. Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination*, ed. Michael Holquist (Austin, Texas, 1981), 32.

[7] S. Nimis, 'The Prosaics of the Ancient Novel' *Arethusa* 27 (1994). 387–411. Cf. W. Godzich and J. Kittay, *The Emergence of Prose: An Essay in Prosaics* (Minneapolis, 1987).

for their consumption. That is, there is no special place or time for reading novels, no special social circumstance, no festival at which they are read. The novels seem to be the closest one gets in antiquity to our own modern protocol for reading, which is private, silent reading. Whether or not that ever happened in antiquity, and it seems unlikely that it did on any significant scale, I want to look at the way the novels make provision for private reading in a way that epic and drama do not.[8] Texts of epic and drama are examples of what can be called written-down verse, which is meant to be enacted in performance, like a musical score. This is not true in quite the same way of the novels.

Performance traditions have a very specific advantage over the novel when it comes to closure. Epics and dramas can easily rely on some sort of performative gesture to signal the end, which doesn't necessarily coincide with the 'conclusion' of the narrative itself. A perfectly good way to end a comedy, for example, is to have one character chase another off stage; the fact that the narrative hasn't actually been exhausted is no problem. But the fact that the novel doesn't have a non-verbal resource to deploy creates a greater pressure for the narrative itself to end properly, in particular as Bakhtin says, for greater 'exhaustiveness with regard to the plot-line.' As opposed to a performed conclusion, which could include rituals or processions, like the choral exodus in Attic drama, examples of more strictly narrative conclusions would include an anagnorisis, or the solution to a mystery, somebody's death, a reunion, etc.[9]

There is, of course, a sense in which narrative never ends: Even if all the characters are dead, their actions can still have an afterlife, since subsequent events can change the meaning of prior events. In the Greek novels, for example, there is a happy ending that usually alludes to many more events, so the ending of the novel must somehow make us feel that nothing more noteworthy remains to be narrated about the characters. Fusillo has surveyed closural devices that address this problem in the ancient novels, following the model of Torgovnik, who catalogues various ways that modern novelists have produced sat-

[8] Although A. K. Gavrilov, 'Reading Techniques in Classical Antiquity,' *CQ* 47 (1997) 56–73, and M. Burnyeat, 'Postscript on Silent Reading,' *CQ* 47 (1997) 74–76, provide powerful counter arguments, I still find P. Saenger, *Space Between Words: The Origins of Silent Reading* (Stanford, 1997) more persuasive that silent reading was rare in antiquity.

[9] For closural devices in Euripides, see F. Dunn, *Tragedy's End—Closure and Innovation in Euripidean Drama* (Oxford, 1996).

isfactory conclusions.[10] These critics, however, give the impression that authors end their novels by selecting from a number of options that are always readily available to them. But I would argue that the ancient novelists faced some specific problems that had to do with their historical moment between the different protocols of reading and performing, and that the way they address the problem of closure shows that they are involved in a much more experimental and heuristic enterprise than they are usually given credit for. I will thus use the tentative distinction between narrative and performative closure outlined above to look at the way two very different ancient novelists, Xenophon of Ephesus and Heliodorus, seek to bring their stories to a satisfactory ending. To anticipate my conclusion, these ancient novelists tend to fall back on protocols of performance when it comes to ending, as one might expect, by alluding to some kind of performance; but at the same time, we can see emerging forms of narrative closure, particularly in the use of secondary thematic material to lend greater coherence and closure to the main story, even if that involves lapses in plausibility. And in fact what drew me to this topic in the first place was the parallelism between two characters, both reformed brigands, in each of the two novels I will be talking about. The peculiar handing of these two characters suggests to me an authorial strategy to address the demand for *narrative* closure that the novel entails.

In discussing the Greek novels Bakhtin characterizes them as displaying 'adventure-time,' a particular representation of time and space that produces a certain plot type. Between the flair-up of love between the main characters at the beginning of the story and their bliss at the end, everything that makes up the novel proper is a digression that leaves no trace on the characters themselves or their situation. The bulk of the story is a series of random episodes that make up an 'extra temporal hiatus between these two moments of biographical time.'[11] This plot type is well-exemplified by Xenophon's *Ephesian Tale*. In it the young lovers, Habrocomes and Anthia, fall in love, are married and then begin a disastrous voyage, during which numerous events and agents conspire to separate the two young lovers and test their fidelity to each

[10] M. Fusillo, 'How Novels End: Some Patterns of Closure in Hellenistic Narrative,' in *Classical Closure: Reading the End in Greek and Latin Literature*, eds. D. Roberts, F. Dunn, and D. Fowler (Princeton, 1997), 209–227. M. Torgovnik, *Closure in the Novel* (Princeton, 1981).

[11] Bakhtin, *Dialogic Imagination*, 62.

other. The heroine is buried alive on a couple occasions, she is poisoned, she is besieged by pirates and villains of various kinds, and sold into a brothel; the hero Habrocomes is falsely accused and punished, sold into slavery, joins a band of robbers, works in a quarry, and is crucified. Their happy reunion is recounted in the penultimate paragraph of the novel, which emphasizes that the characters have not been transformed or changed in any way by their harrowing experiences (Xen. Eph. *Ephesiaca* 5,15):[12]

> 'I have found you again, after all my wanderings over land and sea, escaping robbers' threats and pirates' plots and pimps' insults, chains, trenches, fetters, poisons and tombs. But I have reached you, Habrocomes, the same as when I first left you ...'
>
> 'And you [Anthia] have found your Habrocomes as pure as you left him.'

Although this is a textbook adventure-time ending, it seems the author felt compelled to tack on another paragraph which deals more directly with the issue of closure. For the reunion concluding the sequence of the adventure-time novel does not produce a new state of affairs, but precisely reproduces the state of affairs of the beginning. One wonders how this point in the story is different from the ending of any other episode. What is going to prevent the fatal beauty of Anthia from casting its spell on yet other men? Why won't more pimps and pirates be testing the fidelity of the two lovers?

The last paragraph of *An Ephesian Tale* seems to address these questions by combining more strictly narrative forms of closure with references to various kinds of performative closures, trying to include both kinds. From a narrative standpoint, we can note the way the reunion of Habrocomes and Anthia is woven into the two other sets of characters: the now freed slaves, Leucon and Rhode, and Hippothoos and Cleisthenes. Leucon and Rhode, who were shipwrecked with the heroes at the beginning, were sold into slavery and then freed by their new masters before returning home. Unlike the hero and heroine, however, Leucon and Rhode arrive transformed by their experiences in the novel and after having achieved a completely new status. By making a parallel between the stories of the two slaves and the two heroes, the author is able to intimate a parallel transformation in the main characters. Even more important is Hippothoos, a key secondary character in the

[12] Similar sentiments are expressed at the ends of Chariton and Achilles Tatius, which both end with a reunion after a long separation.

novel who interacts alternately with the hero and heroine, and is explicitly compared and contrasted with the hero Habrocomes on several occasions.[13] At one point the two even team up briefly as partners in crime, despite the implausibility of this scenario, in order to make the parallel more explicit.

Hippothoos' own story begins as a tragic gay sub-plot, which had brought him from respectability to the life of a robber. In the course of the story he becomes married to a widow, who dies leaving him rich; he then has another gay relationship with a young noble, Cleisthenes, whom he finally adopts as his son here at the end as part of his return to a life of respectability. His story provides a strong contrast to the resolute steadfastness of the hero and heroine, and is more like another 'chronotope' discussed by Bakhtin, the 'adventure novel of everyday life', best exemplified in antiquity by Apuleius, a narrative that contains the idea of development in the 'mythological sheath of metamorphosis.'[14] This development takes the form of a sequence: guilt, punishment, purification, blessedness, where the punishment takes the form of a 'descent' into everyday life, as an outcast or a thief, or as in the case of Apuleius, by becoming an animal. While Habrocomes and Anthia are impervious to any kind of alteration by their experiences, Xenophon seems to go out of his way to represent Hippothoos as a different kind of character. As Scaracella notes, 'Hippothoos descends into caves as though into the realm of the most dreadful abjection and death, finally emerging from this moral and social degradation to reenter society and legality and to take up a new living standard.'[15] The decision to include at the close of the novel the polymorphous Hippothoos' final ascendance to respectability as a contrast and comparison to the resolute heterosexual relationship of the heroes lends to their story a stronger sense of closure, implying that the course of the narrative has actually produced an outcome that will not simply be another episode. Although all three main characters, Hippothoos, Habrocomes and Anthia, descend below the earth and experience what seem to be symbolic deaths and resurrection, Habrocomes and Anthia are only transformed by association, so to speak.

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[13] See D. Konstan, *Sexual Symmetry.* (Princeton, 1994); A. Scaracella, 'The Social and Economic Structures of the Ancient Novels,' in G. Schmeling, *The Novel in the Ancient World*, (Leiden, 1996). 221–76.; A. Billaut, 'Characterization in the Ancient Novel,' in *The Novel in the Ancient World*, ed. G. Schmeling (Leiden, 1996), 115–29.

[14] Bakhtin, *Dialogic Imagination*, 113.

[15] Scaracella, 'The Social and Economic Structures,' 238.

However, in addition to this strictly *narrative* form of closure, we can also note the profusion of references to various kinds of performances. For example, we are told that Habrocomes and Anthia make their way to the temple of Artemis and offer prayers and make sacrifices, which are privileged examples of performative gestures that mark a formal close to something.[16] At the same time, they build tombs for their dead parents, again a performance that is precisely meant to produce closure. In a parallel gesture Hippothoos builds a tomb for his erstwhile lover, Hyperanthes, and transforms the status of Cleisthenes from boyfriend to son. At the same time, the statement that the heroes' lived the rest of their lives together like one long festival (*heorte*) asserts in a different way the aspiration to transcend time. A festival, which is by its nature not unending, is a negative image, in the photographic sense, of the temporal scheme of the novel. A festival is also an extra-temporal hiatus in the flow of time, in a sense something that stands outside the flow of biographical time, but this time it is turned inside out, so to speak. To have a life that is like a festival is to have a life in which time has stood still, which is precisely the aspiration of our novelist for his heroes. Indeed, a similar expression describes the heroes' blissful life together immediately after their wedding night (1.10: *heorte hapas ho bios*), a bliss that is quickly shattered by their ensuing voyage. Elsewhere in the story festivals are regularly the setting for a change of affairs,[17] so that the assertion of a kind of permanence in the form of a festival runs counter to the dynamics of the story as a whole.

The final noteworthy thing is the mention of a tablet dedicated to the goddess in her temple that recounts their sufferings and adventures. This is to become a classic novel device, to refer to a discursive event that provides the ground and the origin for the discourse we just finished reading. In its most famous 19th Century manifestations, the conclusion of the novel will bring about a transformation in the hero such that he will now be able to begin writing the novel we have just read. Here in Xenophon, where no such transformation has taken place, this tablet dedicated in the temple is something different, suggesting obliquely a performative context for the *reading* of the novel, instead of a basis for the *writing* of the novel: That is, the implication is that one can go to the temple of Artemis and read it like one reads other *anath-*

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[16] The final words of Chariton's novel are also a prayer offered by the heroine to the goddess Aphrodite.

[17] Xen. Eph. *Ephesiaca.* 1,2; 3,2; 5,7; 5,11.

emata. In this way the reading of the novel is put on a par with reading tomb inscriptions or temple dedications, or perhaps even aretologies, which were inscribed narratives that recounted divine miracles related to personal conversions.[18]

At the same time, this evocation at the end of a proper way to read the story indicates the degree to which this is a text that is organized around the interpretive activity of a reader; that is, there is a somewhat primitive attempt here to script the activity of a private reader: 'This is how you should read this.' Now it is possible to look at this as an example of explicit self-referentiality, which is of course a highly valued feature of contemporary fiction, so these novelists at times seem to anticipate our postmodern preoccupations; and it seems exciting to find it in these ancient novels. But I think a more historical explanation of this phenomenon is to see it as a symptom of the anxiety that ancient authors felt about how their work, cut off from the protocols of performance, would be properly understood when they circulated in writing. The very density of closural gestures in this final paragraph is symptomatic of a certain anxiety about how to evoke properly the sense of an ending in this kind of a text.

It is worth noting that the division of *An Ephesian Tale* into five books, if indeed that division is original, does not mark places that exhibit strong narrative closure, so that in this regard Xenophon is more parallel to Homer than to modern novels. The sixth chapter of the last book contains a series of summative statements that seem to be a prelude to the conclusion of the novel, but it does not coincide with a book division. Other ancient novelists show greater attention to provisional closure at some book endings, but not all. Chariton, for example, uses summative statements *in propria persona* at the beginnings of books 5 and 8, but the other book endings are very lightly marked transitions.[19] Of the eight books of Achilles Tatius' *Leucippe and Clitophon*, strong transitions are marked at the ends of books 2 and 4.[20] Longus' *Daphnis*

[18] A dedication is made by Daphnis and Chloe at the end of Longus' novel with a hint that these are the paintings which inspired the author to tell the story at the beginning. See A. Wouters, 'Longus, *Daphnis et Chloe*: le prooemium et les histoires enchâssées, à la lumière de la critique récente,' *Les études classiques* 62 (1994): 131–67.

[19] See S. Nimis, 'The Sense of Open-endedness in the Ancient Novel.' *Arethusa* 32.2 (1999), 215–38.

[20] See. S. Nimis, 'Memory and Description in the Ancient Novel.' *Arethusa* 31.1 (1998), 99–122; D. Sedelmeier, 'Studien zu Achilleus Tatios.' *Wiener Studien* 72 (1959), 113–43.

and Chloe, whose structure and symmetry have been much studied, has stronger narrative closure marked at each of its four books.[21] Finally, Heliodorus' *An Ethiopian Tale* has ten books, of which three (1, 5 and 6) coincide with a narrative caesura marking provisional closure. Other books occur at points that are only a slight transition, no more marked than transitions elsewhere in the novel. With the possible exception of Longus, the divisions of the ancient novels into books do not seem designed to establish units of narrative any more than the book divisions of Homer.[22] The elaborate attention to closure at the end of each of the novels is thus all the more noteworthy.

I want to turn to a different novel, Heliodorus' *Ethiopian Tale*, and make some parallel observations about narrative and performative closure in that novel in order to account for some of its peculiarities. Although Heliodorus' novel has the same central preoccupation as Xenophon's story with a pair of idealized lovers whose mutual fidelity and commitment are put to the test and proven in the course of the novel, Heliodorus has introduced a whole array of complications to enhance his narrative, including the use of stories within stories told by various internal narrators to various internal audiences, including a lengthy flashback that is clearly modeled on the *Odyssey*. Of particular interest is Heliodorus' tendency to engage the reader in a dialogue in which we are lead to believe certain things that turn out later to require revision, together with a number of famous instances that were analyzed carefully by Jack Winkler, where alternative explanations are offered without any final judgment. Again Winkler and others interpret Heliodorus' technique as indicative of a sort of ancient post-modern consciousness of heightened self-reflexivity.[23] But I would prefer to see the peculiarities of this text as symptomatic of the emerging importance of the reader as the organizational focus of the discourse. In particular, they are indicative of the fact that the ancient novelist must

[21] See S. Nimis, 'Cycles and Sequences in Longus,' *Speaking Volumes: Orality and Literacy in the Greek and Roman World*, ed. Janet Watson (Brill, 2001), 187–200.

[22] On the provisional closure that occurs in the middle of Longus and Chariton, see S. Nimis, 'In mediis rebus: Beginning Again in the Middle of the Ancient Novel,' in *The Ancient Novel and Beyond*, ed. S. Panayoakis, M. Zimmerman, and W. Keulen (Brill, 2003).

[23] J. Winkler, 'The Mendacity of Kalasiris and the Narrative Strategy of Heliodorus' *Aithiopika*.' *YCIS* 27 (1982), 93–158. In a similar vein, S. Bartsch, *Decoding the Ancient Novel* (Princeton, 1989).

address an absent 'audience,' an audience that can only be imagined, and whose interpretive activity must be prompted and guided by the text itself.

While the ending of Xenophon's story has been seen as indicative of the simple-minded audience for whom it was designed, the complicated ending of Heliodorus' novel has been viewed as an exceptional piece of self-conscious wizardry that betrays either a serious or highly playful purpose.[24] There is plenty of thematic support for these positions, but I think they fail to take into account the degree to which thematic material here is being deployed to make up for the loss of non-verbal resources for producing closure. Heliodorus' ending is a remarkable accumulation of performative and narrative closures, including a chastity test, physical trials, tokens of recognition, an oracle, and a procession, among other things. Of particular interest is the paragraph when everyone suddenly recognizes the truth all at once, despite the obstacles to such an epiphany (Heliodorus, *Aethiopica* 10,38,3):

> The populace cheered and danced for joy (*exechoreue*) where they stood, and there was no discordant voice as young and old, rich and poor, united in jubilation, for although they understood very little of what was said, they were able to surmise the facts of the matter from what had already transpired concerning Charikleia.

This assertion of a sudden universal illumination flies in the face of everything that we have been lead to expect in the novel, namely that there is no universal and permanent perspective on things, something that is even alluded to by the presentation of this epiphany with a typical Heliodoran ambiguity. For the sentence continues (10,38,3–4):

> ... or else perhaps they had been brought to a realization of the truth by the same divine force who had staged (*eskenographesen*) all this and that now produced a perfect harmony of opposites: joy and sorrow combined; tears mingled with laughter, the most hideous horror transformed to celebration (*heorten*); the laughter of those who wept, the rejoicing of those who grieved, the discovery of those whom they had not sought, the loss of those whom they thought to have found; and finally the transformation (*metaballomenon*) of the expected blood-offering into a sacrifice free from stain.

[24] Winkler, 'Mendacity,' argues that the ending makes a serious philosophical statement about the character of divine wisdom; J. Morgan, 'A Sense of the Ending: The Conclusion of Heliodoros' *Aithiopika*.' *TAPA* 119 (1989), 299–320, argues that the ending is playful. For a reconsideration of the issue, see K. Dowden, 'Heliodorus: Serious Intentions,' *CQ* 46 (1996) 267–85.

The reference to the stage in the word *eskenographesen* together with the word 'festival' (*heorten*: the same word that occurred at the end of Xenophon), the evocation of a 'chorus' of singers and dancers (*exechoreue*), along with the transformation of a traditional sacrifice in a way that recalls the *aetia* that close a number of Euripides' plays, makes this scene reminiscent of a *deus ex machina* conclusion in Attic tragedy. This despite the fact that references to drama throughout the novel regularly portray the stage as the site of deception, not illumination. These allusions to the context of tragedy seem to be part of a larger strategy, similar to that of Xenophon, to pile up as many kinds of closural devices as humanly possible, simply because no one of them is felt to be sufficient for the job. Although the cessation of human sacrifice may seem like a good candidate for a thematic element in a religious interpretation of the novel, it is instead a good example of the way thematic material becomes redeployed in the novels to assume functions that had been assigned to the nonverbal activity of a performer.

Another example of this use of thematic material by Heliodorus, and one that is paralleled in Xenophon's story, is the reformed brigand of Heliodorus' novel, whose name is Thyamis. He is not the most important secondary character, but he is the only one that spans the entire narrative, appearing at the opening of the story and being mentioned for the last time in its conclusion. Like the reformed brigand of Xenophon's story, he alternates between being a foe and a friend of the heroes, and like Hippothoos follows a trajectory from respectability to brigandage and back to respectability. Once again the author seems to link this story of personal transformation with that of the heroes precisely to lend greater coherence and closure to their story. I would like to conclude with a brief consideration of this figure and his role in contributing to the closure of Heliodorus' novel.

In the opening scenes of the novel the hero and heroine, Theagenes and Charikleia, are captured by Thyamis, who is portrayed negatively with *sententiae* describing his brigand heart and harsh nature. However, we also find out that he was cheated of his priesthood in Memphis by his evil brother, Petosiris, and has turned to a life of crime out of necessity. After falling in love with the beautiful heroine, his band suddenly comes under attack and his reaction to his desperate situation is to kill Charikleia so no one else can have her. The author observes in reference to Thyamis that 'when a barbarian loses all hope of his own preservation, he will usually kill everything he loves before he dies' (*Aethiopica* 1,30,6), as Thyamis kills in cold blood a young woman he

thinks to be the heroine, Charikleia. Despite the fact that his victim turns out to be another Greek woman, Thyamis is clearly portrayed as someone capable of brutally killing the beautiful heroine out of envy. At the end of the first book Thyamis is captured alive by the enemy, who, we are now told, are in the service of the very brother who cheated Thyamis of his priesthood. They capture him alive in order to return him to Memphis and his brother. All this attention to Thyamis' fate inkles to us that he will have further involvement in the story somehow, so when we find out in the next book that he and his brother are in fact the estranged sons of another secondary character, Kalisiris, who now narrates a lengthy flashback, we expect that the novel will also somehow produce a reunion of father and son. And indeed this development turns out to be a parallel to the story of the main characters, similar to the story of Hippothoos in Xenophon.

It is not till the beginning of Book 6, halfway through the novel, that we hear more news of Thyamis; and here there is a substantial unexplained change from how things ended in Book 1. For there Thyamis was captured by local villagers in the pay of his devious brother. Now in Book 6 Thyamis is reported to be the newly elected leader of this same band of villagers; and moreover Thyamis and this band have rescued the hero Theagenes from the Persians. Thyamis and Theagenes now become partners, leading these rebellious villagers to Memphis in order to restore Thyamis to his rightful place as priest. This implausible scenario is reminiscent of the partnership of Hippothoos and Habrocomes, brigand and hero, in Xenophon. This implausibility is even addressed obliquely in a peculiar passage in Book 6 (*Aethiopica* 6, 9, 5–7), where Kalisiris, the estranged father of Thyamis, and the heroine Charikleia discuss the character of Thyamis. Kalisiris assures Charikleia that her lover Theagenes will be safe with Thyamis, and reminds her that Thyamis is his own son 'as you already know from what you have heard'; Charikleia now reveals to Kalisiris her harrowing encounter with Thyamis back in Book 1. Although Kalisiris expresses confidence in his son's character, he urges Charikleia to take steps to modify her appearance just in case. This exchange does not really resolve the contradictory portrayal of Thyamis, but in a typical Heliodoran way leaves open either possibility. But why address it all? In a footnote to his translation, John Morgan notes that 'we must presume that Kalisiris has on some unnarrated occasion mentioned to Charikleia that he has a son named Thyamis,' for this connection is nowhere else acknowledged to Charikleia. But it is striking that these minor lapses–so minor that only

a careful reader would notice them–occur in relationship to Thyamis, for his character is the only one who both reappears throughout the story and who also undergoes important changes. And that is because his story is regularly deployed to give coherence to the heroes' story, rather than to have any coherence of his own; and it is this function which dictates his reappearance in the rest of the narrative.

In Book 7 of the novel, there is a climactic anagnorisis in which Thyamis and his brother are reunited with their father and each other, while the two lovers are simultaneously restored to each other, and Thyamis becomes their best friend and advocate. Like Xenophon's reformed brigand, Thyamis is redeemed, allowed to reenter society and legality and to take up a new living standard, while his father Kalisiris dies peacefully that same night. As the stories of these secondary characters seem to come to an end, the author is simultaneously cooking up a new set of adventures for Theagenes and Charikleia, for we are still several books from the end of the narrative. All readers of Heliodorus have noticed that the last half of the novel is narratologically quite different from the first half, that it is linear, with no flashbacks nor any internal narrators or narratees. It is as though the story starts over again here in the second half in a more traditional adventure-time format. The narrative meanders into all kinds of subjects and takes some very strange turns, but in Book 8, Thyamis reappears twice: first to protest the treatment of the two young lovers by Arsake, the satrap's lusty wife, who now victimizes them, and then later stirring up the people against Arsake for the same reason. In neither case does Thyamis seem to affect the plot, but his presence serves in part to knit together the two halves of the story, not only because he is the only other surviving character from the first half of the novel, but also because he too was a victim of Arsake's passion in his previous life (7.2). In order to provide a link among all the characters, Thyamis' character is revised and expanded to fit the demands of the story, particularly to bestow coherence on the story at the very moments where it seems most haphazardly constructed.

The name of Thyamis is reinvoked in the conclusion of the story, together with that of his father, Kalisiris. Just prior to the anagnorisis which I cited above, the adoptive father of Charikleia, Charikles, about whom we have heard nothing for more than 6 books, arrives in a stunning coincidence, looking for his adopted daughter. Now we find out he had been pursuing Kalisiris and the young lovers, and in his own words, 'surmising that the goal of their flight was Memphis, Kalisiris'

hometown, I made my way there, only to find Kalisiris already dead, as he so richly deserved. However, his son Thyamis told me everything there was to tell about my daughter' (10,36, 4). Now we can only speculate what Thyamis actually told Charikles about his daughter—we wonder for example if he mentioned his attempt to kill her back in Book 1—but the invocation of the names of Kalisiris and Thyamis seem designed once again to lend a stronger sense of closure to the novel because of the redemptive trajectory of their stories, despite the lapse in plausibility produced by this invocation.

To those of us for whom the novel and its protocols of private reading and interpretation are second nature, it is tempting to look back at these older examples and impose our own ideas about reading on them. In fact that is inescapable to a certain degree; but it is particularly easy to overlook the kinds of problems these authors faced in assessing and predicting the reception of their work. They are thus at the other end of the spectrum from genres of mass-produced fiction, like mysteries or Harlequin romances. Their thematization of issues of interpretation and reading do not indicate that they take these issues for granted and go beyond them, but rather that they belong to a highly experimental and innovative twilight between performance and reading.

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ORALITY, GREEK LITERACY, AND EARLY PTOLEMAIC PAPYRI*

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In the age of electronic mail many people have at some stage had the experience of accidentally deleting a message and being obliged to ask a correspondent to resend. Inattention over key strokes was not an issue in Antiquity, but the same result could be produced by mice. This is illustrated by Item 1 below, a letter written on papyrus by a young man named Epharmostos to his elder brother.[1] There is no date on the document, but it is thought to belong to the period 257–248 BC. It comes from Egypt. We do not know the exact provenance, but circumstantial evidence suggests Epharmostos was living in Alexandria at the time. His brother was based in the Fayum.

(1) *P.Lond.* 7.2033, recto:

Ἐφάρμοστος τἀδελφῶι χαίρειν. | ἣν ἐγράψατε ἐπιστολὴν | Μένωνι περὶ τοῦ 'Καλλικῶντος' κερματίου | οἱ μῦες κατεβεβρώκεισαν. | καλῶς οὖν πο[ιή]σεις | γράψας τὸ τάχ̣[ος] ὅπως ἂν | μὴ κατέχηται ὁ Καλλικῶν. | ἔρρωσο.

('Epharmostos to his brother, greetings. Mice had eaten[2] the letter which you wrote to Menon about Kallikon's money. So please write quickly in order that Kallikon may not be held up. Farewell.')

* A version of this paper was delivered on 5 July 2002 at the Fifth Biennial Conference on Orality and Literacy in Ancient Greece: Oral Performance and Its Context, University of Melbourne. It is a pleasure to thank the audience on that occasion for helpful responses. Dr Jim Adams, Dr Ed Carawan, Dr Malcolm Choat, Professor Willy Clarysse, Dr Tamara Neal, and Dr Andrew Wright provided valuable advice during preparation of the publication version. I am also grateful to Dr Grant Tapsell for bibliographical assistance.

The paper is dedicated to the memory of my friend the psychologist Roderick Power, whose battle with cancer ended on 6 July 2002.

[1] For mice eating papyrus letters see also *P.Panop.Beatty* 1, 389–91 (AD 298), and cf. W. Clarysse and K. Vandorpe, *Zenon, un homme d'affaires grec à l'ombre des pyramides* (Leuven, 1995), 97.

[2] Note incidentally that the pluperfect κατεβεβρώκεισαν has 'epistolary' function, standing in place of a perfect tense form. Such pluperfects provide further evidence in support of the argument put in T.V. Evans, 'Another Ghost: The Greek Epistolary Perfect', *Glotta*, 75 (1999), 194–221. The Greek perfect can hardly have an epistolary function and yet possess its own epistolary substitute.

It is not the mice we need to focus on, but the issue of handwriting. The original letter is written 'in a small, practised cursive'. This is Theodore Skeat's description. He observes that we 'probably' have here a specimen of Epharmostos' autograph and adds that the valediction ἔρρωσο 'is in smaller lettering, but perhaps in the same hand as the body of the letter; it has the appearance of having been added as an afterthought.'[3] Skeat's opinion deserves the highest respect in such matters, but it has to be recognized that this particular interpretation can only be speculative. It is at least equally possible that the position of the valediction on the papyrus, somewhat below the main text, and the different size and appearance of its lettering *do* reflect a difference of hand. Documents written by scribes and then 'signed' in this way by their named authors are a common phenomenon in the non-literary papyri of later periods (Van Minnen even claims to have identified the hand of Cleopatra VII in such a case).[4] Examples from the third century BC are much rarer, but are by no means unknown. We shall notice a definite case below.[5] So I agree that this papyrus almost certainly gives us an example of Epharmostos' autograph, but it can only be identified with any degree of confidence in the word ἔρρωσο.[6]

Who actually wrote the letter and how Epharmostos' message found its way onto the papyrus are questions of considerable importance for a research project I am undertaking at Macquarie University in Sydney. This is a study of the linguistic habits of individuals and social groups in the Zenon Archive of the mid-third century BC. They also have much broader implications for the study of ancient Greek orality and literacy. Ptolemaic non-literary papyri have attracted a considerable amount of attention within discussion of these topics.[7] By comparison with ear-

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[3] *P.Lond.* 7.2033, introd., and line 8 and n.

[4] P. van Minnen, 'An Official Act of Cleopatra (with a Subscription in Her Own Hand)', *Ancient Society*, 30 (2000), 29–34.

[5] And for another see *P.Cairo Zen.* 5.59808, introd.

[6] My comments are based on examination (made possible through the kindness of Dr Brian Muhs and Dr Nico Kruit) of a photograph of *P.Lond.* 7.2033 at the Leiden Papyrological Institute.

[7] See e.g. W.V. Harris, *Ancient Literacy* (Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1989), 116–46; M.R. Falivene, 'Government, Management, Literacy: Aspects of Ptolemaic Administration in the Early Hellenistic Period', *Ancient Society*, 22 (1991), 203–27; D.J. Thompson, 'Language and Literacy in Early Hellenistic Egypt', in *Ethnicity in Hellenistic Egypt*, ed. P. Bilde, T. Engberg-Pedersen, L. Hannestad, and J. Zahle (Aarhus, 1992), 39–52; ead., 'Literacy and the Administration in Early Ptolemaic Egypt', in *Life in a Multi-Cultural Society: Egypt from Cambyses to Constantine and Beyond*, ed. J.H. Johnson (Chicago, 1992), 323–26; ead., 'Literacy in Early Ptolemaic Egypt', in *Proceedings of the XIXth Inter-*

lier periods and other regions the Egyptian context provides a marked increase in recorded documentation of everyday interactions from the third century onwards. It accordingly offers much promising evidence concerning degrees of orality and literacy. Unfortunately, the papyri also present essentially insoluble difficulties. The basic and frustrating fact is that in most cases it is impossible to establish conclusively who penned any particular document. It could be the named author or just as easily an anonymous scribe. The services of scribes were readily available to people from all spheres of society, a convenience for the busy, and a necessity for illiterate persons. The purpose of this paper is to reassess the problems of distinguishing named author and scribe in relation to my study of the Zenon Archive. What inferences can be drawn from a closely integrated analysis of the language of this large, well-defined corpus? I want to consider its implications for literacy levels, the role of the scribe, and the oral element in written communications. This presentation is a preliminary study, and addresses what for me is a preliminary question. My essential aim is to seek out the voices of individuals within the Archive. To achieve that I need to establish as clearly as possible the means by which their words reach the written page.

The brother to whom Epharmostos writes in Item 1 is the eponymous Zenon who kept the archive in question. This remarkable body of texts amounts to some 2,000 items, constituting approximately two thirds of all extant papyri from the third century. It was discovered in the 1910s in obscure circumstances on the site of the ancient Egyptian village of Philadelphia in the Fayum, was split up and sold piecemeal, and is now held in a number of separate collections in different

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national Congress of Papyrology, vol. ii, ed. A. H. S. El-Mosalamy (Cairo, 1992), 77–90; ead., 'Conquest and Literacy: The Case of Ptolemaic Egypt', in *Literacy: Interdisciplinary Conversations*, ed. D. Keller-Cohen (Creskill, N.J., 1994), 71–89; ead., 'Literacy and Power in Ptolemaic Egypt', in *Literacy and Power in the Ancient World*, ed. A.K. Bowman and G. Woolf (Cambridge, 1994), 67–83. Focused more on the Graeco-Roman period are H. C. Youtie, ' ἈΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΟΣ: An Aspect of Greek Society in Egypt', *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, 75 (1971), 161–76; id., 'βραδέως γράφων: Between Literacy and Illiteracy', *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies*, 12 (1971), 239–61; id., 'ὑπογραφεύς: The Social Impact of Illiteracy in Graeco-Roman Egypt', *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik*, 17 (1975), 201–21; E. Wipszycka, *Études sur le christianisme dans l'Égypte de l'antiquité tardive* (Rome, 1996), 107–35; P. van Minnen, 'Boorish or Bookish? Literature in Egyptian Villages in the Fayum in the Graeco-Roman Period', *Journal of Juristic Papyrology*, 28 (1998), 99–184; T.J. Kraus, '(Il)literacy in Non-Literary Papyri from Graeco-Roman Egypt: Further Aspects of the Educational Ideal in Ancient Literary Sources and Modern Times', *Mnemosyne*, 4th ser., 53 (2000), 322–42.

parts of the world. Zenon was a Carian from the unhealthy town of Kaunos (Strabo, 14.2.3). He joined the flood of Greek immigrants to the newly Hellenic kingdom of Egypt and prospered, working as an agent of Apollonios, the finance minister of Ptolemy II Philadelphos, and most famously managing Apollonios' large estate in the Fayum for some years. He was also very active in business on his own account and became an independently wealthy man. Over the period from about 261 to 229 Zenon and others accumulated a mass of papers. They are mostly business documents, detailing the everyday concerns of the great Apollonios, of Zenon, and of their circle, and providing a link of extraordinary immediacy with ancient life. The authors—from government officials, landholders, and other persons of influence to native tradesmen and labourers—represent a wide range in socio-economic status, ethnicity, and educational background.

These people regularly communicated with one another via letters, memoranda, and petitions, receipts, accounts, and other lists of various sorts. But how many of them could actually write these documents themselves? How many could read them? As an approach to these questions of orality and literacy, and to my own sociolinguistic viewing lense, let us consider Item 2.

(2) *PSI* 4.379:

(Inner text) L λζ, Χοίαχ κβ. ὁμολο|γεῖ Ἡρα̣κλείδης ἔχειν | πα̣ρὰ Πετοσίριος τοῦ | Πετενούριος [[ἔχειν]] | εἰς τὸν φόρον τοῦ λζ L | δέλφακας δεκαέξ.

(Outer text) ἔτους ἑβδόμου | καὶ τριακοστοῦ, | Χοίαχ δευτέραι | καὶ ἰκάδι. ὁμολογεῖ | Ἡρακλείδης ὁ πα|ρὰ Ζήνωνος ἔχειν | παρὰ Πετοσίριος | τοῦ Πετενού|ριος τοῦ ἐν τῆι | Δικαίου νήσωι | ὑοφορβοῦ εἰς τὸν | φόρον τοῦ ἑβδόμου | καὶ τριακοστοῦ | ἔτους, ὧν ἔχ[ει] | τοκάδων δέκα, | δέλφακας δεκα|επτά.

(Inner text: 'Year 37, 22nd of Choiach. Herakleides acknowledges that he has from Petosiris son of Petenouris for the 37th Year's rent sixteen young pigs.' Outer text: 'In the Year Thirty-Seven, twenty-second of Choiach. Herakleides, who represents Zenon, acknowledges that he has from Petosiris son of Petenouris, the swineherd at Dikaiou Nesos, for the 37th Year's rent, on the ten sows which he has, seventeen young pigs.')

This is a duplicate receipt from Zenon's agent Herakleides for a payment of rent in young pigs by the swineherd Petosiris. It is briefly discussed by Harris in *Ancient Literacy*, but the treatment there fails to address all the relevant data and needs to be nuanced. Out of the series of specific problems it raises I shall focus on the two most basic

questions. Was Petosiris literate, either in Greek or in Egyptian? 'Probably in neither' is Harris's response. And did Herakleides write the receipt himself? 'Probably, but there is no certainty at all'; that is Harris again.[8]

We need more of the available information than Harris considers in order to interpret the text effectively. First of all, the nature and physical characteristics of such duplicate documents are worth attention. There is a large number of them in the Zenon Archive and they are well explained by Pestman in the introduction to his edition of the bilingual receipts.[9] To summarize, the point of the duplication is as follows. The inner and original text was folded over and sealed separately to the rest of the document, and was therefore secure against tampering. The outer text was a copy which was readily available for consultation. The inner text would only be opened if controversy arose, for example if it were alleged that the outer copy had been altered in some way. In the case of Item 2, which was found with the inner text still sealed,[10] one cannot help noticing that there is a significant change from original to copy. An extra pig has been added to the rent. It would be charitable, and possibly correct, to interpret this as a simple mistake. As we shall see, however, Herakleides was a controversial figure, and if there was a chance to confuse the issue and acquire a porcine profit out of the transaction he may well have seized on it.[11]

The person one would expect to have custody of the receipt is Petosiris. Harris assumes that Herakleides gave it to him.[12] But this does not seem likely. For some reason the document remained in Herakleides' hands (or returned to them) and ended up being filed with Zenon. Most of the receipts preserved in the Archive were filed by the payer, namely Zenon, or earlier Panakestor, or one of their representatives. Pestman has noted only three examples (including our Item 2) which

[8] Harris, *Ancient Literacy*, 116–17.

[9] *P.L.Bat.* 20, 9–10. I am grateful to Willy Clarysse for advice regarding these duplicate documents.

[10] *PSI* 4.379, introd.

[11] For similar discrepancies between inner and outer texts see *P.Lond.* 7.1963, line 26 and n.; *P.Cairo Zen.* 5.59825, introd., and lines 33–34 and n.; also F. Bilabel, 'Zur Doppelausfertigung ägyptischer Urkunden', *Aegyptus*, 5 (1924), 166–67. For a clear case of altering an amount by one for personal profit (in a context of oral communication) cf. the deceit attempted by Pais the brewer, which is recorded in *P.Cairo Zen.* 2.59199 and *P.Mich.Zen.* 36.

[12] Harris, *Ancient Literacy*, 116.

were filed by the payee in *A Guide to the Zenon Archive* (*P.L.Bat.* 21).[13] Two of those three come from Herakleides and concern pig rents for Year 37.

This is leading us inexorably into the tough and sometimes nasty activity that was pig-keeping in the Fayum in 248 BC. Herakleides was then farming the pig-tax and looking after Zenon's considerable interests in the business.[14] And tempers were fraying. Herakleides was suspected by the swineherds of running a racket of some sort in collecting the rents they owed to Zenon or whoever else owned the pigs. Item 3 is one of two letters of complaint (*P.Cairo Zen.* 3.59330 and 59331) from the swineherd Pemnas to Zenon, both dated the 30th of June, 248.

(3) *P.Cairo Zen.* 3.59330:

Πεμνᾶς Ζήνωνι χαίρειν. περὶ τῶν ὀφειλομένων ἐν τοῖς | ὑοφορβοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἐπάνω χρόνων σὺν τῶι φόρωι τοῦ λζ L, συνφω|νήσας Ἡρακλείδης μετὰ Θοτέως αὐτοὶ ἄνευ ἡμῶν διελογί|σαντο καὶ οὐ δυνάμεθα παρακολουθῆσαι τί πεποιήκασιν ἕως | τοῦ νῦν, οὐδὲ αἰτούμενοι τὸν λόγον ἐτόλμησαν ἡμῖν δοῦναι. | καὶ περὶ τούτων οὖν πλεονάκις ἐπεμαρτυρόμην Ἰάσονι ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς | ποιοῦσιν συμπεφωνηκότες. ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὰς συνγραφὰς τὰς πρὸς τοὺς | ὑοφορβοὺς πάσας Ἡρακλείδης. γέγραφα οὖν σοι περὶ τούτων ἵνα εἰδῆις. | ἔρρωσο. L λη, Παχὼνς ι.

('Pemnas to Zenon, greetings. Concerning the debts among the swineherds from the previous periods together with the rent for the 37th Year, Herakleides acted in collusion with Thoteus and they themselves calculated the accounts without our consent and we are not able to follow closely what they have done up until now, and although they were asked for the account they did not have the courage to give it to us. And so concerning these things I appealed to Iason several times to the effect that being in collusion they were not acting in an upright manner. And Herakleides also holds all the contracts made with the swineherds. Therefore, I have written to you in order that you should know. Farewell. Year 38, Pachons 10.')

Clearly, Pemnas' concern is that Herakleides, who will not allow him to check the accounts, has entered against his name a larger debt than he really owes. And he does not seem to be alone in his suspicions.[15]

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[13] *P.L.Bat.* 21, 192–93.

[14] Cf. *PSI* 4.384 and C. Orrieux, *Zénon de Caunos,* parépidémos, *et le destin grec* (Paris, 1985), 207–8. Young Epharmostos, incidentally, was beginning to play a prominent role in pig-farming at this time too. Already in a letter of 15 September 250 Paramonos asks Zenon for a pig ἄξιον σοῦ καὶ | Ἐφαρμιούσ[το]υ, 'worthy of yourself and Epharmostos' (*P.Cairo Zen.* 3.59305, lines 4–5). *P.Cairo Zen.* 3.59346 shows that he was very active by 245.

[15] In this letter the forms ἡμῶν, δυνάμεθα, and ἡμῖν probably have a genuine plural

Herakleides also holds all the contracts made with the swineherds in his own hands, which may just be telling us something about his custody of Petosiris' receipt. That was written on the 12th of February. Meanwhile, the swineherd Thoteus is said to be acting in collusion with Herakleides. A tantalizingly ill-preserved letter from Thoteus to Zenon (*P.Cairo Zen.* 5.59830), dated the 11th of June, so 19 days earlier then Pemnas' letters, appears to give his side of the same story. The dispute over the contested account was then escalating and the other swineherds had apparently assaulted him (lines 16–18:]ọị ὑοφορβοὶ προσπηδή|σαντές με τῆι ιθ ὀψ[ὲ τ]ῆς ὥρας τὰς χέρας με προσ|ήνεγκαν, '… the swineherds leapt on me late at night on the 19th and put their hands on me …').[16] We also have an undated memorandum from Herakleides to Zenon—this is Item 4—in which he asks for someone to be sent with him to collect pigs owed by this Thoteus before he can sell them. Herakleides wants company because he is being harrassed by the swineherds in Thoteus' vicinity.

(4) *P.Cairo Zen.* 3.59439, recto:

ὑπόμνημα Ζήνωνι παρὰ Ἡρακλείδου. περὶ τοῦ | προσαγγέλματος οὗ δέδωκά σοι περὶ τῶν Θοτέως | ἱερήων· καλῶς ἂν οὖν ποιήσαις συναποστείλας | τινὰ μετ' ἐμοῦ, ἵνα καταγάγω αὐτὰ πρὸ τοῦ αὐ|τὸν πωλῆσαι. καταδιώκομαι γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐνταῦ|θα ὑοφορβῶν.

('Memorandum to Zenon from Herakleides. Concerning the report which I have sent you concerning the pigs of Thoteus, would you please send someone with me, in order that I might bring them[17] down before he [i.e. Thoteus] sells them. For I am being harrassed by the swineherds there.')

The lack of a date renders it impossible to establish how this piece relates to the period in which Herakleides and Thoteus were work-

reference back to the τοῖς ὑοφορβοῖς in lines 1–2 (contrast the singular forms ἐπεμαρτυρόμην and γέγραφα) rather than manifesting the rhetorical figure of plural for singular which is usually assumed to occur within the Archive (cf. *P.Lond.* 7.1979, introd.—I have argued for caution regarding this assumption in a yet to be published paper delivered on 6 February 2003 at the ASCS XXIV Conference, Macquarie University, Sydney). Pemnas appears to be representing a group of disgruntled swineherds.

[16] The edition has προσπηδή|σαντός, a perplexing genitive form which is provisionally corrected here following a suggestion of Willy Clarysse (I have not seen the papyrus).

[17] Willy Clarysse notes that καταγάγω αὐτῶ in line 4 of the edition must be a mistake for καταγάγω αὐτά, as Campbell Edgar himself suspected (*P.Cairo Zen.* 3.59439, line 4 and n.). The *iota* adscript is always written in this period, so αὐτῶ cannot represent αὐτῶι.

ing together. The chronology might have told us whether Herakleides decided to shop his co-conspirator, or at least to pretend to, in order to remove the suspicion of collusion. It is a plausible guess that the memorandum postdates their controversial partnership, especially given the fact that it was written at a time when Herakleides was feeling threatened by swineherds. But perhaps he was always unpopular. The pressure we see him applying to Thoteus might equally have *led to* their collaboration. Whatever the real story was, we have by now a fair picture of the trouble in the industry at the time.[18]

More to the present purpose, we can now readdress Harris's questions. His answers remain perfectly reasonable guesses. Petosiris may well have been illiterate in both Greek and Demotic Egyptian. We can in fact be more certain with regard to Egyptian than Greek. Egypt had a very old tradition of literacy, but it was a highly restricted tradition practised by a small royal and priestly élite and by a scribal sub-élite.[19] This class adapted quickly to the new Greek administration. For a long period both official and private documents in the hinterland continued to be written in Demotic.[20] But a person like Petosiris is most unlikely to have been anywhere near one of the temple schools in order to be trained to read and write Demotic. Would he have been earning his living by herding pigs if he had?

As for Greek literacy, all we can say about Petosiris specifically is that Herakleides does not seem to have given him a chance to do much reading of his receipt. But even if it had been put into his hands, the authority of the seal may have met his requirements for using the document at future need.[21] Be that as it may, we do have letters here from two of his colleagues, Pemnas and Thoteus. These surely represent the type of document on which we should focus our

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[18] If Herakleides really was cheating the swineherds, what was the trick? We can never expect to know the precise answer, but the case of the seventeenth young pig added to Petosiris' rent in the outer text of *PSI* 4.379 (Item 2 above) may provide a clue (whatever the reason, if it were deliberate, for writing the correct (?) 'sixteen' in the inner text). Perhaps he and Thoteus were adding a pig to the rent owed by various other swineherds as well, deducting the resulting number from Thoteus' rent, and making some sort of division of the extra pigs between themselves. I thank Andrew Wright for assistance in constructing this speculative model of deceit.

[19] Thompson, 'Literacy and Power', 68–69.

[20] Thompson, 'Language and Literacy', 45–47; ead., 'Literacy and the Administration', 323–24; ead., 'Literacy and Power', 70, 72–75; cf. Falivene, 'Government, Management, Literacy', 223–24.

[21] Cf. R. Thomas, *Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece* (Cambridge, 1992), 11.

attention in considering literacy levels among the swineherds—they are not isolated examples of documents generated by this group either (cf. *P.Cairo Zen.* 3.59379, 59443, 59495; 5.59819)—and it is worth taking another look at Item 3. Pemnas may be employing a professional scribe to write for him. Even where he asserts that he and his colleagues have been unable 'to follow closely' (παρακολουθῆσαι) what Herakleides and Thoteus have done and complains that they will not hand over the account for it to be checked, there is nothing in the actual words used which proves he had the skills to read the document himself. What is clear, however, is that Pemnas stands at least on the edge of the literate process, illustrating the close interaction between orality and literacy. He has a keen alertness to the importance of the relevant documents and may be able to deal directly with a technical piece like an account, if not with more demanding texts. In addition, it seems now to be generally accepted that more people were able to read than write in the ancient world, as in many subsequent periods,[22] and this could well be a case in point. Meanwhile, an interesting body of evidence indicates the spread and encouragement of Greek education under Ptolemy II Philadelphos and Ptolemy III Euergetes, including tax-exemptions for Greek teachers. Thompson interprets this concentration on schooling in the *chora* to affect all sections of the population.[23] So it is perhaps not so unlikely as one might think that a Fayum swineherd in 248 BC should possess a basic level of literacy. The quality of Pemnas' Greek still makes me incline to the view that a professional scribe has written his letter,[24] but I do not feel we can lightly dismiss the idea of limited Greek literacy among the swineherds.

Turning to Herakleides (whose Greek name may, incidentally, disguise Egyptian ethnicity),[25] it is true both that he probably wrote Petosi-

[22] Thomas, *Literacy and Orality*, 10.

[23] Thompson, 'Language and Literacy', 47–51; cf. ead., 'Literacy and the Administration', 324–26. For a less positive assessment cf. Harris, *Ancient Literacy*, 132, 134–35.

[24] If Clarysse is correct in identifying this Pemnas with the Pemenasis who sent *P.Cairo Zen.* 3.59493 (as well as persons named Pemenas and Pemenes; see *P.L.Bat.* 21, 397 s.v. Πεμενᾶς 1), the likelihood of scribal involvement becomes greater. But there can be no proof. Pemnas may have been as prone to variation as anyone else in turning his name into Greek form.

[25] *Pace* Harris, *Ancient Literacy*, 116. *PSI* 4.384 is a petition from the soldier Euphamidas to Zenon against Herakleides, written around the summer of 248. It contains the detail that Herakleides, when arranging for Euphamidas to act as guarantor for one Paapis, a mender (ἠπητής), said that the latter was his ἀδελφός. Euphamidas apparently accepted the identification. If ἀδελφός has the sense of 'brother' or 'kinsman' (probable

ris' receipt himself, and that we can never be absolutely certain. But here again there is more that can be said, and also scope for genuine progress. The Archive contains a total of five documents which appear to originate from our Herakleides.[26] There are the two rent receipts (*PSI* 4.379 [my Item 2], 381), an account of sows owned by Zenon and leased to various persons (*P.Cairo Zen.* 3.59334), an incomplete and poorly preserved memorandum to Zenon proposing measures to house pigs and other animals against the onset of the flood (*P.Mich.Zen.* 84, which, incidentally, contains an interesting diagram), and the memorandum about Thoteus and the swineherds (*P.Cairo Zen.* 3.59439 [my Item 4]). This is a limited, but potentially useful sample of Herakleides' Greek. Where we have sufficient materials from a single named source, examination of language and handwriting offers an opportunity to sharpen significantly the identification of authors and to gain new insights regarding literacy. Unambiguous proofs are hardly to be expected, but we are at least in a position to work with strong probabilities.

This is where my own study of personal styles becomes relevant. My already stated aim is to describe the language of individuals within the Archive. Before I can begin analysing the characterizing components of personal styles, I need to be able to isolate those separate styles themselves. The sort of information I am seeking to extract to this end inevitably casts light on questions of orality and literacy. The following examples are instructive.

The soldier Claudius Terentianus sent five Latin letters (along with another five in Greek) to his father over a period of some years in the first quarter of the second century AD. Adams's analysis of the language of these important specimens of Egyptian Latin is an encouraging model of what can be achieved on the linguistic front. The handwriting of the letters varies, showing that Terentianus employed professional scribes, but Adams is able to demonstrate a level of linguistic

in the context), it would seem more plausible that Herakleides was an Egyptian adopting a Greek name in his role as an agent of Zenon than that Paapis was a Greek adopting an Egyptian name for some reason (cf. the discussion based on second and early first century evidence from the public domain in W. Clarysse, 'Greeks and Egyptians in the Ptolemaic Army and Administration', *Aegyptus*, 65 (1985), 57–66; also Falivene, 'Government, Management, Literacy', 203–4, 218–19). But there are other possibilities, on which one can only speculate. Perhaps Herakleides and Paapis were the products of an early 'mixed marriage'; cf. W. Clarysse, 'Some Greeks in Egypt', in Johnson, *Life in a Multi-Cultural Society*, 51–56.

26 Cf. *P.L.Bat.* 21, 337 s.v. Ἡρακλείδης 4.

unity, especially in vocabulary and syntax, sufficient to prove that Terentianus dictated them.[27] This is admittedly a remote example in some respects, but its applicability here ought nevertheless to be obvious.

The value of palaeographic evidence can be demonstrated from much closer to home, indeed from right at home. Zenon's files contain a number of his own notes and letter-drafts, along with some finished letters which were either written to the previous keeper of the Archive before it came into his hands or at a later period were either never sent or somehow found their way back into his custody. There are also his registration dockets added to missives from other persons. These documents are written in various hands, and the 'commonest and most characteristic' of them has been identified by Campbell Edgar as Zenon's autograph.[28] The identification has been generally accepted, and there is no good reason to doubt it. The hand in question is easily recognizable, of an informal type with a cursive tendency, not a formal scribal hand. It appears to have been a regular practice of Zenon to write drafts himself and to hand them over to scribes to produce fair versions.[29] A letter in the London collection (*P.Lond.* 7.2019) provides evidence which I interpret to this end within a single document. It was written by Zenon to the nomarch Achoapis on 24 September 234 BC, therefore from the last period of the Archive, when Zenon was a private businessman. Skeat remarks that the letter is written in 'a medium-sized uncial hand, clearly of later type than those elsewhere in the archive', but that the 'valediction and date are written in a much smaller and more cursive hand, presumably Zenon's autograph.'[30] We can recall here the case of Item 1 above and the habit of 'signing' documents in this way.

So here we have one case in which analysis of language and handwriting demonstrates copying by scribes from dictation and another in which a particular hand can be associated with a particular individual.[31] Further study of the Zenon Archive along these lines will do

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[27] J.N. Adams, *The Vulgar Latin of the Letters of Claudius Terentianus (P.Mich. VIII, 467–72)* (Manchester, 1977), 3, 84.

[28] *P.Cairo Zen.* 2.59287, introd.

[29] Willy Clarysse has pointed out to me that Zenon may not have been able to write a formal hand himself. This leads me to wonder to what extent aesthetic factors (distinct from issues like literacy) motivated the employment of scribes. The question cannot be pursued here and may be unpursuable.

[30] *P.Lond.* 7.2019, introd., and line 4 and n.

[31] Zenon is by no means the only named author who can be linked to a particular

much to clarify our understanding of the nature of written communication in the corpus, and indeed in non-literary papyri in general. Such work has its share of problems. The fact that the Archive is scattered in collections across the world has until recently meant that plates and images of specific papyri, let alone the originals, have often been difficult to access. As a result it should not surprise that no systematic palaeographic treatment exists. The situation regarding accessibility is gradually changing, especially through mounting of images on the Internet, and it will soon be possible to view perhaps 70 to 80 per cent of the Archive relatively easily. On the other hand, diplomatic editions of the vast majority of Zenon papyri have been published over the last 90 years.[32] Up to a point linguistic analysis, as opposed to palaeographic analysis, can be based on these, though here too there is often a need to check readings against the originals.

If we return for a moment to Herakleides, at time of writing I have been able to examine images of three of his documents (*PSI* 4.379, *P.Mich.Zen.* 84, and *P.Cairo Zen.* 3.59439).[33] Apart from observing that the hands of *PSI* 4.379 and *P.Mich.Zen.* 84 are in certain respects very similar, but not identical, while the hand of *P.Cairo Zen.* 3.59439 appears to be different (it has for instance a rather distinctive *nu*), I shall not venture a detailed assessment here in the absence of full data. Nevertheless, some provisional observations are already possible. In this case the evidence of palaeography is likely to prove more informative than that of language. Examination of the handwriting in each of the five documents will not necessarily allow precise identification—palaeography is not an exact science—but if most of the hands appear to be from the same author, then we will be able to say with more con-

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hand. See e.g. *P.Lond.* 7.1941, introd. (on the hand of Hierokles), *P.Lond.* 7.2056, introd. (on the hand of Philinos).

[32] At least 1,700 texts belonging to the Archive had been published by the late 1970s and are listed in *P.L.Bat.* 21, 3–71. The number continues to grow (Clarysse and Vandorpe, *Zenon*, 14), and in some cases to diminish through the identification of new joins. See e.g. W. Clarysse, 'Egyptian Scribes Writing Greek', *Chronique d'Égypte,* 68 (1993), 195–96 for the reconstruction of a single petition from four previously published fragments (a facsimile is included in Clarysse and Vandorpe, *Zenon*, 16–17).

[33] *PSI* 4.379 in M. Norsa, *Papiri greci delle collezioni italiane: Scritture documentarie*, Fasc. 3 (Rome, 1946), pl. V; *P.Mich.Zen.* 84 in *P.Mich.Zen.*, pl. VI (facing p. 162) and via Columbia University's electronic *Advanced Papyrological Information System*; *P.Cairo Zen.* 3.59439 via an image provided through the kindness of Willy Clarysse. I thank him for valuable comments on the relationship of the hands in *P.Mich.Zen.* 84 and *P.Cairo Zen.* 3.59439.

fidence that Herakleides was probably literate. The other possibility, which will always remain, will be that he was using a regular amanuensis. The three out of the five pieces which contain dates are certainly from much the same time, belonging to a period of about fourteen months.

By contrast, the language of these documents so far reveals little. This is due to quantity, content, and accidents of preservation. While the five letters of Terentianus which Adams studied (together with one from Terentianus' father Claudius Tiberianus) provide 212 lines of text, the five items from Herakleides give us only 99. And their linguistic contexts are not so informative. The duplicate receipts are strictly formulaic and obviously repetitive. The account is in large part a string of names and figures. One of the two memoranda is too incomplete to tell us much. All that can be offered at this point is that Herakleides' documents are all written in the clear Greek which we see in Items 2 and 4 (more may emerge in due course from my general analysis of the language of individuals and social groups in the Zenon Archive). The person or persons responsible for them would appear to have had a sound education.[34]

Now, Herakleides is far from the most promising prospect in the Archive for identifying distinctive features of personal style, or indeed for estimating degrees of literacy. He holds a central place in this discussion simply because he has been bequeathed to me as an example by Harris's treatment. Other individuals provide much more significant data samples. For instance, we have at least 29 documents written in the hand or name of Zenon (plus two more external to the Archive), 71 from Apollonios the finance minister, and approximately 26 from Amyntas, a senior member of Apollonios' Alexandrian household. Most of these are letters, memoranda, and petitions, the types of documents likely to prove most instructive (the documents of Apollonios and Amyntas, incidentally, like those of Zenon, are written in a variety of hands). What is more, authorities on the Archive generally recognize that certain authors' personalities do manifest themselves in their documents.[35] If that is not a mistaken notion, it ought to be possible to identify linguistic elements of such manifestations, to define them

[34] For the sort of education available see Thompson, 'Language and Literacy', 49; id., 'Literacy and Power', 75–77; cf. Harris, *Ancient Literacy*, 129–39.

[35] See e.g. *P.Cairo Zen.* 5.59823, introd. (on the banker Promethion, whose letters 'do in fact give one the impression of an amiable personality').

more scientifically. Herakleides' personality is not a case in point. It is arguably manifested more clearly in other people's documents than in his own.

To conclude, what becomes very clear in all this is that understanding the role of the scribe is crucial. Whether the named author is fully literate like Zenon or Epharmostos (whose literacy is confirmed by a fragmentary list of literary works for his use (*P.Col.Zen.* 2.60) as well as by circumstantial evidence),[36] probably literate like Herakleides, or just possibly literate like Pemnas, scribes are regularly employed. And where they are, we have to consider a variety of possible scenarios for transmitting the author's message to papyrus. Sometimes verbatim copying is involved, either from the oral context of dictation (as in the much later but surely apposite case of Terentianus) or from a written draft (as with some of Zenon's documents). Sometimes there may be more or less extensive development by the scribe from more or less detailed directions. Probably these directions were sometimes written, sometimes oral. And the message would sometimes have been delivered not in Greek, but in Egyptian. It would in my opinion be naive to assume that the process is of a similar nature in all cases, both from one named author to another and within the body of material attributed to a particular author. The range of possibilities always needs to be kept in mind. There is no way to recover all the details with precision. The detailed analysis of language and handwriting involved in my study of personal styles, however, provides a promising means to develop awareness of these varied processes.

Finally, a general comment. We are often warned that the Egyptian context is in certain respects unique and that its evidence on all sorts of matters must be used with caution in relation to the rest of the Graeco-Roman world. This is certainly true. In the present case we have to recognize that Egypt had an old indigenous tradition of literacy which impacted strongly on the new Greek regime.[37] But all ancient contexts are to some extent unique and we are always treading dangerous ground when we generalize. It would be a more dangerous mistake, I suggest, to neglect the Egyptian evidence. This paper ought to reinforce awareness of its rich potential for investigating questions of orality, literacy, and their close interaction in the ancient world.

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[36] Cf. Van Minnen, 'Boorish or Bookish?', 145.

[37] Cf. Harris, *Ancient Literacy*, 146.